Interview with William C. Harrop

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR WILLIAM C. HARROP

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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Q: Today is August 24, 1993. This is an interview with William C. Harrop on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies. I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. To begin with, could I get a little bit about when and where were you born and a bit about your family and your education?

HARROP: Surely. I was born in Baltimore [MD] on February 19, 1929. My father was a doctor, specializing mostly in research on the faculty of the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine. He moved to E. R. Squibb & Sons in New Brunswick, NJ, when I was 10 years old. I went to Harvard and received an A.B.

Q: What field was that in?

HARROP: In English literature. Subsequently, after a stint in the Marine Corps during the Korean War, I used the GI Bill to spend a year in graduate work in journalism at the University of Missouri in Columbia, MO. Just as I was completing that — in fact I was within a very short time of obtaining a master's degree in journalism — I was offered an appointment in the Foreign Service and accepted it. I was one of a considerable group of people who were delayed in entering the Foreign Service for a couple of years by Senator

Joseph McCarthy. This was the group who came in around 1954. We had been held up for two years when McCarthy cut off the funding to hire new Foreign Service Officers.

Q: What attracted you toward the Foreign Service?

HARROP: You know, that's an interesting question, because I wasn't sure of what I wanted to do. I think that there is a common tendency to have a mix of interest in journalism and diplomacy. This was true in my case. When I left college — I graduated from Harvard in 1950 — the father of a young woman whom I knew was the editor of the "Saturday Evening Post." He had worked on newspapers all over the country and gave me letters of introduction to about a dozen editors of newspapers in New England: the "Providence Journal," the "Boston Globe," the "Hartford Courant," the "Greenfield Times," Springfield newspapers, the "New York Times." I traveled around, interviewing these people, looking for a job on the editorial side, with no luck at all. It was a very bad time to be looking for work on a newspaper.

As I was making those visits, I stopped off at Deerfield Academy, in Deerfield, MA, where I had gone to school. Frank Boydon, the great old headmaster who was there at the time, persuaded me, since I was not doing well finding a job in journalism, to come there and teach for a time. So I spent about five months teaching there before going into the Marines.

When I left the Marines, the idea of journalism still attracted me, and I went to the School of Journalism at the University of Missouri. While there, I read a book or two about the Foreign Service. I was impressed by repeated stories about how difficult the Foreign Service exam was. I had a kind of, "Oh, yeah?" response to that. When I got out of the service in 1952, I took a "cram" course at George Washington University for 10 or 11 weeks during the summer and then took and passed the Foreign Service exam.

Q: This was the three and a half day exam?

HARROP: Yes, three and a half days. Then the die was cast, without any particular planning or any particular preparation. I had taken no economics courses in college, and economics is extremely important in the Foreign Service. In fact, I didn't take much political science — mostly English literature. In that sense I entered the Foreign Service almost by chance and had a fascinating, 39-year career.

Q: Well, you came into the Foreign Service in 1954, just when the McCarthy period was coming to an end. A new trickle of people came into the Foreign Service. Did you have regular classes or how did it work?

HARROP: It was interesting. The Department cleverly used a contrivance to bring in a new group of officers. A really fine group of officers came in with me. The Refugee Relief Act was passed in 1953, sponsored by Congressman Emmanuel Celler, then the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. The ostensible purpose of the legislation was to provide visas for people uprooted from their homes during World War II. The actual purpose was to provide a great many immigrant visa numbers for what was called Fourth Category or Fourth Priority applicants. This would mean, essentially, brothers, sisters, and parents of existing American citizens or permanent resident immigrants.

The Department used the money that was appropriated to implement this bill, which was of interest to a lot of congressmen, because of their own constituents' interests, to employ a group of perhaps 40 new FSO's [Foreign Service Officers] who had been waiting on the register since no money had been appropriated for their appointment. Some of these [newly-employed officers] went to Spain, some to Greece, and Eastern Europe, and the majority of them to Italy. The two posts [in Italy] receiving most of these officers were Naples and Palermo. For instance, in Palermo I was with Samuel Gammon, H. Freeman Matthews, and a number of other people who went on to have distinguished careers in the Foreign Service. Nicholas Veliotes and Samuel Lewis were assigned to Naples. We all knew one another at that time and have been good friends ever since.

Q: Then there was very little training?

HARROP: We did not attend the standard A-100 Course [at the Foreign Service Institute]. There was no orientation course for this whole group. Accepting the appointment was a difficult decision for me. I had heard nothing from the Department for months, and was suddenly told over the phone that if I would appear within nine days in Washington I would receive an appointment and would go to Palermo. I was within about two weeks of examinations in graduate school [at the University of Missouri]. I decided to do it. My wife and I were expecting a baby at the time. We packed up and flew back to the East Coast. I left my wife with her parents in the Finger Lakes area of New York and went down to Washington. The baby was born, by good luck, the day before I was to leave for Italy. I spent a matter of hours in Washington, checking in, and left for Palermo.

Q: Just as an historical note, the first, organized class [at the FSI] in the post-McCarthy period was in July, 1955, I think. That was class A-1, or whatever. I was in it, and that's why I know. Before that you were sent out as sort of infantry replacements.

HARROP: We really were sent out without any briefing or preparation at all and had to make our way overseas. And making our way wasn't easy because the Consulate General in Palermo in 1953 was a post which normally would have had about 12 people, which seems large. Then, with the Refugee Relief Act, it just exploded to almost 100. There were 75 or 80 people assigned, including about eight or nine vice consuls. I remember that Samuel Gammon's in-laws, whose [family] name was Renwick, and my in-laws, whose name was Delavan, happened to take the same boat to visit us in Palermo. One couple said to the other, “Where are you going?” The others said, “Well, we're going to visit our son-in-law who's the American Vice Consul in Palermo.” The first pair took great umbrage at that, replying, “No, our son-in-law is the American Vice-Consul in Palermo.” So there was a large group of us, issuing visas almost entirely to mothers, sisters, and parents of American citizens or holders of green cards [permanent residents of the U. S.].

Q: What was the situation in Palermo, as you observed the scene at that time?

HARROP: It was just after the era of Salvatore Giuliano. Giuliano was the great, supposedly “Robin Hood” outlaw who came from a nearby town named Partinico. He became a living legend after WWII, idolized and feared. Sicily was a very poor island, indeed, at that time — it still is relatively poor, although “relative” is an important word. One thing I recall is that on visiting the marketplace a few days after arriving we experienced “culture shock.” When we saw great chunks of meat hanging in the open air and covered by flies. Interestingly enough, in later years, when we went to truly under-developed areas of Africa, we never again experienced such a sense of culture shock. We'd been through that in Southern Italy in the 1950s. Sicily is a beautiful island. The wonderful Greek ruins are really some of the finest in the world. I think that it was a blessing to this very compatible group of young Foreign Service Officers, all coming in together, all with young children. Some of our best friends still are the people who were with us in Palermo.

The Mafia, at that time, was a very active organization. Its role in World War II in connection with the landings in Sicily has been well recorded, but the every day presence of the Mafia was something which we hadn't quite expected. I don't mean that in the sense that one felt a concern for physical security, as you would in Central Park in New York or in parts of Washington, D.C., today, but nonviolent crime was common. For instance, one officer's home was robbed. All the goods in it were stolen, including the furniture, while he and his family were away. The police and security forces, who were interested in having good relations with the United States, wanted to resolve the case quickly. So they arrested the local Mafia leader, whose identity was no secret. Within about 18 hours the real criminals came forward and all of the booty was recovered. I don't think that the Mafia had had anything to do with the theft at all, but the power of the organization was such that the police could use them to find the real thieves.

Q: The Refugee Relief Program, which I was involved in about a year later up in Frankfurt [Federal Republic of Germany], included a rather extensive, investigatory branch. We

had people going out and investigating backgrounds and all that. How did this work out in Palermo as far as our handling of the security aspect of things?

HARROP: That was a major part of the operation: the extreme sensitivity toward communism. A sizeable organization called the IRP, or Investigations, Refugee Program, was formed. In fact, that was the beginning of the role of Scott McLeod, who later became — I would have to use the word, “notorious,” as a security officer in the State Department. He ran that operation which included some 50 people in Palermo alone, performing investigations in some depth of every applicant for a visa, trying to find some linkage to the Communist Party, which was, of course, a major party in Italy at the time and had a strong following among the poor Sicilians.

Q: What about the Mafia? Did that play a role?

HARROP: Not really. I don't recall that the Mafia question was an important issue in regard to the visa applications, although a criminal record was disqualifying.

Q: Well, technically, the Refugee Relief Program was supposed to be for people who had been pushed out of their homes because of World War II and so forth. From my perspective we were dealing with people who basically fled from Eastern Europe. This was when I was in Frankfurt. They came from all over the place. But in Italy you were talking about people who had been displaced by the U.S. Army for a very short period. These weren't refugees.

HARROP: No, they weren't. When I mentioned that the largest part of the program was located in Southern Europe, I was thinking of the fact that most of the visas granted under it were issued in Italy, Greece, Spain, and Yugoslavia — the sources of American immigrants over the past couple of generations.

There were also offices under this program — and you were subsequently in one of them in Frankfurt — in Central and Eastern Europe. However, I would estimate that no more

than 10% of the visas issued under the program throughout Europe involved people who actually were refugees. The great bulk came from Italy, and were relatives of those already in America.

Q: I agree. We used to watch with wonder these decisions which would turn Italians, who were living in their own homes, into refugees, particularly when the applicants whom we were dealing with [in Germany] were truly refugees. Again, I'm drawing on my own experience. However, did this program, at an early stage, develop cynicism about political "bills" and all of that? Knowing what you were doing...

HARROP: Well, I don't know. To some extent that was the case. We had one interesting experience when Congressman Celler visited Palermo to review the program on the ground.

Q: He came, by the way, from a heavily Italian district in New York.

HARROP: A heavily Italian district in New York. I remember when he came through [Palermo]. I was a rather outspoken young man at the time, in fact a callous young man and I said, "You know, Mr. Celler, I'm concerned that very few of the people that we're granting visas under your Act are really refugees. I'm also concerned that we may not be attracting to America the highest quality of Italians that we could bring. Most of the applicants are not among the better educated or more ambitious or more promising." He was absolutely furious at that. He said, "You should know that Italian-Americans are among the finest people in our country, and I'm shocked to hear such prejudice and, I would say, even racism among young officers. It's just unacceptable." I was chastened. Then when Congressman Celler left, we were lined up at the airplane to see him off and he went along, shaking hands. To my delight, he came to me and said, "Well, all right. Goodbye to you, Mr. Matthews. I hope you can make a success of your career despite your obvious faults." My colleague Freeman Matthews, was considerably less amused by the mix up.

Q: I think that the Refugee Relief Program was very important as a sort of historical note because it was the incubator for a whole group of Foreign Service Officers.

HARROP: Indeed, it was, yes.

Q: Then you moved up to Rome after a relatively short time [in Palermo].

HARROP: Yes, we did. What happened was that Bill Boswell, who was later Director of Security for some time and Deputy Chief of Mission [DCM] in Cairo, was at that point the Administrative Counselor in [the Embassy in] Rome. Boswell got the idea — and part of it came from Bill Crockett, who was his deputy there — of giving these promising young officers, who had just come into the Service, and give them a chance to move up into other positions in Italy. He thought, “Why don't we use them in other work where we need staff and train them in the process?” So there was quite a migration of these new officers, after a year or a year and a half in Palermo and Naples, to other positions in Italy. I went to Rome to be Assistant Commercial Attach#. I was later replaced in that job by Nick Veliotes who had come to Naples some time after we arrived in Palermo. Sam Gammon went to the Consulate General in Milan. Sam Lewis went to [the Consulate in] Florence. I think that one or two others came up to [the Embassy in] Rome. Freeman Matthews went to [the Consulate in] Zurich.

Q: All of these officers, by the way, have been interviewed or are in the process of being interviewed.

HARROP: There was a USIS [United States Information Service] officer, a very excellent man, Paul Wheeler, who went to [the Consulate in] Trieste. Sam Wise, who was one of the young officers there [in Palermo], has since retired and become the director of the Congressional side of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] operation. He has been doing that for 10 years or so. He also went to Trieste from Palermo.

Q: Who was Ambassador when you were in Rome?

HARROP: At first it was Clare Boothe Luce and then, subsequently, David Zellerbach, of Crown-Zellerbach, the paper company. It was a fascinating time in Rome, too, because Mrs. Luce was so committed to a direct confrontation with and opposition to communism in Italy. She spent a lot of her time opposing the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor], the labor union controlled by the Left. She was a remarkable woman, really — a person of extraordinary presence, the very definition of the word “charisma.” She was exciting to work for, although I think, in retrospect, as we now look back more objectively at the Cold War, that she was almost a caricature of our pervasive American phobia over Communism.

Q: You were doing what, mainly economic and commercial work?

HARROP: I began doing straight commercial work and took American trade missions around the country. It was very interesting. We had a number of trade missions of experienced, American business people came to Italy. Our concern, which seems bizarre today in the 1990s, was to help them export to America. We would take buyers from [U.S.] department stores, Americans expert with various types of specialized equipment, managers from our steel industry. They would meet with [Italian] industrialists and manufacturers, farmers, and others, and advise them on how they could best gain access to the American market to earn dollars [for Italy]. Of course, in later years, all of the experience I have had with commercial matters was exactly in the opposite direction. I was in that work in Rome for, perhaps, 10 months. And then for the next two years I was an economic officer with main responsibility for a very interesting sector, energy, at a time when the first internationally financed nuclear reactor was being built. The World Bank invited bids on a nuclear reactor for Italy, and American, British and French firms competed, a most interesting thing for me to be engaged in. It was also the era when a man named Enrico Mattei was the very energetic, activist head of the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi. The Italian energy and petroleum industry was shattering the

historic “50-50” split in the Middle East by offering a much larger percentage of the proceeds and ownership of oil exploration to Arab governments.

Q: Were you at all involved with Mattei? By the way, there's a very interesting account of oil developments and Mattei in a book called, I think, “The Prize.” What was the Embassy's evaluation of Mattei at the time?

HARROP: Our perception was largely one of self interest, trying to protect the American oil industry against Mattei, feeling that he was opening a kind of “Pandora's Box” in these Gulf, Middle Eastern, and Maghreb countries. We thought that it was going to be very hard to close this box and that the future of Western energy economics was likely to suffer some mighty buffets from Mattei. So we regarded ourselves as opposed to him, and I spent much time endeavoring to frustrate his operations.

Q: Again, with reference to the energy field, was there any significant opposition to nuclear energy in Italy at the time?

HARROP: It was so new that I do not recall any major opposition. Certainly, there were no significant public environmental or radiation concerns. The focus was mostly on the cost of nuclear energy, which was considered very questionable. This was a time, of course, when atomic energy was regarded with great optimism. Later on, I was more involved with nuclear energy while working with EURATOM [European Atomic Energy Commission] as the European Community first began to pick up speed. There was even more this sense that the technology was going to leap forward and that we were at the threshold of a marvelous new era — an era which has not to this day, 35 years later, really unfolded. France is the only major country today which has a large proportion of its energy provided by nuclear power. But I do not recall that there were serious social or political objections to nuclear energy, as such.

Q: You were mentioning the CGIL, the communist labor confederation. Was the CGIL "big" in the electrical industry? Was this considered a problem, that communist hands might get close to nuclear reactors?

HARROP: It was not discussed in those terms, to my recollection. The Edison Company, a private firm, was very important in electric power [in Italy], and the chemicals giant Montecatini (which later merged with Edison) was also engaged in the nuclear industry. ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency] had not been involved in electricity, but moved energetically into nuclear energy. The CGIL was most active in the automotive, heavy equipment, and manufacturing sectors.

Q: Edison was an Italian firm?

HARROP: Yes. This World Bank nuclear reactor project came along very well. The major American bidders turned out to be General Electric and Westinghouse, the two companies that were most advanced at the time. A French parastatal consortium was trying hard to compete, as well as a British consortium. So there were four serious competitors for this first, major, world contract, which was thought of as being a milestone in the industry and a tremendous leg-up for whoever won it — and for the type of reactor. Each company had a different type of reactor: water and heavy water and gas cooled reactors of different types, requiring different degrees of uranium enrichment. The American companies finally won the bid, although, as I've mentioned, the French have since done more than anyone else to develop this energy source.

Q: As an economic officer, you served under Clare Boothe Luce and then Zellerbach. Could you talk to Communist officials or were they out of bounds?

HARROP: We really did not speak to Communists — hardly at all. I think that a few people in the Political Section were authorized to do that, but, by and large, we didn't do it. The Political Section was quite active. Our Political Counselor at the time was a man named

V. Lansing Collins. There was one officer who was responsible for dealings with the Socialists and with the Left. I think that he felt a little bit under constraint from Mrs. Luce more than from David Zellerbach. The Deputy Chief of the CIA Station in Rome at the time was Bill Colby, who later went on to be the Director of Central Intelligence.

Q: I grant that you were a junior officer in a large embassy, but did you have the feeling that we were "meddling" in the politics of Italy? Today Italy is somewhat in disarray and with the issue of corruption and United States support of the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] we had a hand in the development of this whole...

HARROP: I think that we were "meddling" very arrogantly in the politics of Italy — to an unusual degree. As you say, I was not involved in that. As a junior officer on the economic side I was more involved in working on economic and commercial relations. An interesting phenomenon was the tremendous importance of the United States. Any official American could have the ear of any Italian official. In economic matters there was a fascination with American management techniques, a scramble, a search for American investors and American markets. There was, I think, a very real gratitude for the concern which the United States showed in the redevelopment and rebuilding of Italy — the Marshall Plan and all the rest.

Q: How about Ambassador Zellerbach? Did you get any impression of his method of operation or his interests?

HARROP: He was not an activist ambassador. He personally played a modest role in the relations between the two countries. He was a very sharp contrast to the assertive, incisive, and energetic Mrs. Luce.

Q: Was Graham Martin there [at the Embassy in Rome] when you were there?

HARROP: Graham Martin was not there when I was there. He came later. The head of the Economic Section was a man named Henry Tasca, who later became Ambassador to Morocco and to Greece.

Q: He was my Ambassador in Greece.

HARROP: He was the Director of the very large USOM [United States Operations Mission], the foreign assistance mission, as well as of the very large Economic Section. He was later replaced by a man named Francis Deak, who was promoted from within. The Economic Section of the American Embassy was an extremely important and large operation at that time. It was not called AID [Agency for International Development] at the time, but ICA [International Cooperation Administration]. I've forgotten all the different names we've gone through to refer to foreign assistance, which has been frequently redesigned in response to its unpopularity with voters. In the 1950s we had productivity experts and all sorts of technical people doing much the same kind of work in Italy that AID has subsequently done in the developing world.

Q: What was your impression of Henry Tasca? He became a somewhat controversial figure later on, when he was in Greece.

HARROP: I thought he was a rather manipulative man, a very charming person. I felt the same about him subsequently in Morocco, where he seemed sometimes more engaged in representing King Hassan in Washington than vice versa. I was not involved in his work in Greece.

Q: You went to Palermo in 1954. You were there, what, until 1955?

HARROP: Till October, 1955. Then I went to Rome.

Q: When did you leave Rome?

HARROP: I left Rome in the late fall of 1958 to come back to Washington. I came back under protest because by that time I had become fascinated with energy questions and with the politics of energy — atomic energy particularly. I was asked to come back to be in the Office of Personnel in the State Department, handling personnel assignments. I sent back an imprudent cable to say that if I had wanted to be in personnel work I would have joined Westinghouse, not the State Department. I said that I wasn't interested in that. I was told in no uncertain terms that if I wanted to continue my career in the State Department, I should come back and work in Personnel. So I did.

Q: This is interesting because we certainly were lacking in FSO's who were interested in energy matters. Be that as it may, the system ground on. What aspect of personnel did you come into?

HARROP: I was initially a placement officer and later was Deputy Director of the Office of Washington Assignments. The personnel system was handled through the Personnel Operations Division, which was organized geographically. Different sections were in charge of assignments to different parts of the world. My section happened to be Washington. In fact, the Department brought back to Washington other officers with whom I had entered the service. Both Freeman Matthews and Sam Gammon came back to work in that area. Don Junior [Lewis D. Junior], who had also been with us in Palermo, came back to work in Personnel. One or two others from our group were also there.

Q: As an old Foreign Service hand, what was your impression of the Personnel apparatus of which you were part? This is back in the late 1950's.

HARROP: It was a system which functioned in a way which later so angered [Secretary of State] Henry Kissinger. There tended to be geographic hierarchies, so that the Arabists were a group and Latin America was thought of as being a particularly hermetic cylinder. Many people were trying to get into Western European operations. I myself became

fascinated by the “Atlantic” idea, particularly European integration. I moved into that area from Personnel, although I stayed for only a short period.

There was a system of listing all of the vacancies coming up in the near future and then comparing this list with the preference sheets, the famous “April Fool” sheets that people made up as to what they'd like to do. We tried to match these up. Once a week there was an all-morning conference or panel session, as it was called, at which representatives of each of these different areas would debate individual assignments. There would be heavy competition for the people with the best reputations. There would be a negative competition to avoid those who were thought of — for whatever reason — as being “weaker” performers. It was very much a “turf” debate and involved real competition for people. Gradually, they would all be assigned. The individual had relatively little to say as to where he was going. There was relatively little inclination to challenge assignments that were made.

I think that, in some respects, this system worked pretty well. In other respects it did not. While I was there, there was recognition that the career development of individuals was not sufficiently attended to. So another segment of positions was established — career development officers — who were to sit on the panels and look at the process more specifically from the individual officer's point of view, rather than in terms of the national interest or work requirements, in deciding where people should go.

This process could be accused, perhaps, of being a bit disorganized. On the other hand it did function.

Q: We're still talking about the late 1950's. Getting people to come to Washington — and you were a case in point — was a little hard, wasn't it? It was harder to get people to come to a Washington job...

HARROP: Yes, and this was also the time of — I've forgotten the exact dates of the Wriston Program.

Q: It started in about 1954.

HARROP: This was a time of a huge expansion of Washington positions, relative to those overseas. The Foreign Service moved from a proportion of probably four or five jobs overseas to one in the Department to a question of about 40 jobs in Washington to 60 jobs overseas. This would mean that you would spend about 40 percent of your time in Washington and 60 percent abroad. In recent years with some people it was more like 50-50. So that was quite a change. The “culture” of the Foreign Service had been that people who came into it expected they'd be mainly living overseas. There was some resistance, but gradually people began to understand that if you wanted to have an impact on policy, perhaps the best place to be was Washington. In my view the work was more difficult, more demanding, less well compensated financially, and certainly more fatiguing in Washington, with fewer diversions, less interest and variety than overseas. However, ambitious people began to see that Washington was probably a place they should focus on if they wanted to get ahead in their careers. That view was beginning to be appreciated by 1960.

Q: In my interviews some of the people who have done very well, in Foreign Service terms, seem to have served as staff assistants to some of the principal officers of the State Department. Did you get involved in arranging for people to go into these positions, working for the Deputy Under Secretary and so forth?

HARROP: Yes, that came up from time to time. I can't remember whether it was Mrs. Luce or Mr. Zellerbach who wanted me to be staff assistant to the Ambassador in Rome. I think it may have been just as Mrs. Luce was leaving, which would have meant working for Ambassador Zellerbach. I declined that because I was so interested in the energy sector I

was covering. There was no problem involved in turning the offer down. No one said, “For heaven's sake, you must do that if you're asked to.”

The area then regarded as more important in the Department than special assistant positions was the Executive Secretariat. The Executive Secretariat at that time enjoyed a “mystique” and a sense of importance which it has lost, to some extent, in subsequent years. But in the '50s and '60s to be selected for the Executive Secretariat was regarded as a tremendous honor. In fact, being selected for the Personnel Operations Division was also something of an honor, as we realized after we got there, because that office was in a position to choose whom it wanted to staff itself. They looked for people that they thought would do well. So when this group of young people whom I mentioned came back to find ourselves in Personnel, which had so dismayed us, we learned that, in fact, it was a flattering assignment, because the people looking at all of those available had felt that we were the ones that they wanted to have join them.

Q: I had a stint there some years later and I realized that you could dine on it for the rest of your career, knowing the intricacies of how assignments went, which was a very important...

HARROP: Yes, learning how the organization operated was something that you could do there as well as anywhere else.

Q: You were in Personnel until when?

HARROP: Until about 1961. I was there for about two and a half years and then moved to a position in the regional affairs office (RA) of the Bureau of European Affairs. While I was there, EUR was reorganized into two separate offices: Regional Politico-Military Affairs and Regional Economic Affairs. I replaced Arthur Hartman in that position. We had two desk officers for the European Community. One was Richard Vine, who focused upon the European Economic Community, and Hartman, later I, who focused on EURATOM. At that time the two organizations appeared to be of equal importance. EURATOM was thought of

by most people as the likely engine of unification in Europe because it had the advantage, unlike the Coal and Steel Community and unlike the Economic Community itself, of being a new field in which there were no existing structures and rigidities, no organizations established in a national format. There was great hope attached to it. Some of the most enterprising of the French, Italian, and German sponsors of [European] integration were focusing on the EURATOM side — people like Etienne Hirsch, Rene Foch, and many others.

While I was there, it began to become evident that nuclear energy was not, in fact, going to be as relatively important as had been hoped and predicted. EURATOM receded substantially in importance compared to the Economic Community.

Q: When you were there, was there concern about the Germans having anything to do with nuclear matters? This period was not all that long after World War II. Nuclear energy was still connected to...

HARROP: There was some anxiety about that. The concern for safeguards was beginning to develop then, although non-proliferation and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Administration] came many years later. At that time the focus was on nuclear research being done by multinational European regional organizations, trying to lock the Germans in as part of international institutions. This was the theme of European integration itself.

Beneath the strategic purpose, the real interest in EURATOM was on the effort to develop nuclear energy. People interested in the economics of it saw the atom as a cheaper, effective energy source to stimulate the recovery of Europe. Others saw it as the most likely vehicle for [European] integration.

Q: You said that while you were dealing with this you began to see that it was perceived as an important matter. What was the cause of this? Why wasn't nuclear energy growing as had been foreseen?

HARROP: I think that the economics [of nuclear energy] just did not begin to improve, as many people had hoped they would. There had been an expectation that technology would resolve more quickly the problems of [nuclear] enrichment, the handling of nuclear waste, and the overall economics of the containment of radiation. These things didn't happen. There was an expectation that we would have major breakthroughs in direct use of the hydrogen atom — thermonuclear energy — rather quickly. That hasn't happened to this day. This was a severe disappointment in a very complex area of technology. When you compare the rate of advance in nuclear energy and the rate of advance, say, in electronic technology, the difference is quite striking. Progress in nuclear energy has been very slow. As this became evident and as the economic questions of the Common Market assumed greater importance, in the sense of moving toward making the monetary systems, the tariff structure more compatible, and creating arrangements for freeing the movement of people across borders, the whole process of European integration began to gain real headway. It became evident that economic and trade issues in the European Community were where political progress was going to be made.

Q: You left there [the Bureau of European Affairs] in 1963. I have you going out to Brussels.

HARROP: Well, no, I actually left there early 1962 in what I would have to call a “forced assignment,” because, to my astonishment, I was telephoned one morning by the Director of Personnel, for whom I had been working before. He said, “Hello, I'm surprised to find you there.” I said, “What do you mean?” He said, “Well, you've been reassigned.” I said, “What are you talking about?” He said, “You're supposed to be down in the Bureau of African Affairs. You're responsible for economic matters having to do with the Congo and the Katanga secession. You'd better get down there very quickly.” I was angry.

Q: He was saying it in a half humorous and half serious way.

HARROP: I was quite angry. I talked to the people in the Bureau of European Affairs and said, “What in the world is going on? You can't do this.” But, no. A lot of importance was being attached to the Congo at that time, as the current focus of the Cold War. They'd given a kind of “hunting license” to the Bureau of African Affairs. Sheldon Vance was then the Director of the Office of Central African Affairs and had authority to get whomever he wanted. He knew me because he had been Director of Near East and African assignments in Personnel when I was working as Deputy Director of Washington assignments. He said that he wanted me, and the Personnel people said, “All right.”

So in a matter of hours I was switched over to a completely new field about which I knew nothing. I had no interest in Africa, but found myself working on issues which were entirely fresh to me with a very strong group of people. Sheldon Vance was a powerful personality. He was replaced subsequently by G. McMurtrie Godley. My other two colleagues on the desk were Frank Carlucci and Charles Whitehouse. The three of us were the Congo desk.

Q: And Frank Carlucci had just come...

HARROP: He had just come back from the Congo at that time.

Q: Could you give us a little sense of what you were dealing with?

HARROP: In the Bureau of African Affairs at that time?

Q: Yes.

HARROP: We were dealing with the Katanga secession and how that related to the central government of the Congo, how it related to the Soviet-American competition for influence in Central Africa, and to the role of the UN in peace keeping. There was active intelligence component. Economic questions were of major importance. We had tremendous difficulties with the Belgians, reflected interestingly in bureaucratic friction between the Bureau of African Affairs and the Bureau of European Affairs over policy

toward the Congo, toward the United Nations, and toward the Katanga secession (which certainly had major elements of a Belgian hand in it). So it was a fascinating period, and the year and a half I spent there was one of the most interesting periods I can recall.

I went from there to be the middle grade economic officer and deputy to the Economic Counselor in Brussels, and continued to be the person in Brussels following events in the Congo.

Q: Let's come back to the Washington side. This was a battle royal over Katanga, which was considered the "guts" of the Congo's wealth. It was very much [under the influence of] Union Miniere [Upper Katanga Mining Company]...

HARROP: Union Miniere, or UMHK.

Q: Which wanted very much to keep this area out of the hands of whatever passed for the central government of the Congo. You mentioned before that you learned how battles are fought. Obviously, our people in the Bureau of European Affairs wanted to keep Belgium happy because it is part of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and all that. From your vantage point, you were watching this battle going on. How did things work out?

HARROP: There were really three different bureaucratic power centers and three different interests. One was, as you described, the European side, the NATO side, the sense that Belgium was an ally of ours in Europe, that Belgium was a kind of proxy for the British and the French in African, or colonial, terms. We had broader and more important American national interests in our relations with Western Europe and our principal allies than we had to any degree in Central Africa.

Then we had the Bureau of African Affairs, which tended to be, I would say, more idealistic, particularly under G. Mennen Williams during the Kennedy Administration. There was a feeling of morality, the importance of democracy and self determination, American responsibility for helping to free subjugated peoples from colonialism, and so forth, as well

as deep resentment at what was perceived to be European self-interest manipulation of the tribal frictions that existed in Africa.

The third power center was the newly-created Bureau of International Organization Affairs...

Q: IO.

HARROP: The United Nations was playing a major role in the former Belgian Congo. This role led to the first deployment of blue-helmeted, United Nations forces to try to stop hostilities and actually, so people in IO thought, to end the Katanga secession.

There were these three major centers. The Bureau of International Organization Affairs was under Joe Sisco, who later became a major figure. “Woody” Wallner was his deputy. Then there was Governor [G. Mennen] Williams, who was not, himself, a powerful or effective bureaucratic infighter but who was a stubborn man well supported by some skillful diplomats. On the European side there was a group of experienced and tough Foreign Service Officers who saw policy through their own experience and wanted to defend their understanding of U.S. national interests. So there was much debate and much discussion. There were bitter fights over the wording of cables of instructions going out to the field and a repeated need for the Under Secretary or the Secretary to call the people involved together to try to reconcile differences and see if we couldn't develop a concerted American position on these matters. It was a fascinating time, my first of many experiences with efforts to resolve deep policy differences within the U.S. Government.

Q: Did you subscribe to the concept of a unified Congo at the time?

HARROP: Yes, I did. Whether this was a result of my coming under the influence of the culture that I was in, — “standing where you sit” — or whether it was by intellectual analysis, I don't know. I was impressed, even on that first exposure to Africa, by the interesting argument that the actual, ethnic makeup of that continent is so jumbled that,

unless you stay with the national boundaries established almost haphazardly for quite irrelevant reasons, you're going to be in for chaos. You have to defend those borders. I found that a rather persuasive argument. If the Katanga secession had succeeded, there would have been no end to secessions elsewhere.

Q: We went through somewhat the same thing with Biafra. You were talking about our basic policy of considering the chaos which would ensue if we let Africa break down. Was this view pretty well agreed to by those in the Bureau of African Affairs at that time?

HARROP: I think so. It became even more of a doctrine in subsequent years. You mentioned the Biafra case — and, of course, there have been others. I don't think that one should regard the Eritrea situation in quite the same terms, since that had been a separate, artificial combination [of territory] arranged by the Italians. However, the feeling right along, and I believe well founded, is that if you once let Africa begin to reorganize itself along ethnic lines — and there will always be a tendency to do that — it will be hard to retain any effective policy.

Q: Did you find yourself sort of "nose to nose" with people at your particular level in the Bureau of European Affairs?

HARROP: Yes, although I did not have enough seniority to be in the real struggles. The working level fellow in the Bureau of European Affairs who was the Director for the Benelux countries [Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg] was Bob Beaudry. He subsequently became a very good friend of mine — in fact, he became Political Counselor in [the Embassy in] Brussels a year or two later when I became deputy to the Economic Counselor there. He and his wife are good friends of ours to this day. But there was a heavy ill feeling at the time in the Department.

There was a sense that there was a lot at stake. The Congo was the focus of world attention at the time, the stage of the Cold War. The United Nations was absolutely devoted to this question. Dag Hammarskjold [late secretary general of the UN] met his

death, flying out there. We arranged American support for the transportation of United Nations troops. There was a big American investment in terms of political capital and funds. President Kennedy was personally interested in the whole subject.

Q: Looking at it from the economic side, how did you see the economics of Zaire?

HARROP: The focus at that time was so much upon the [Katanga] secession [issue] that my work was mainly to do with the economics of Katanga, how Katanga would survive, how the central government would be able to survive without the resources of Katanga, which was the great center of the copper industry. There was also the major issue of what was known as the "Congo portfolio." Under Belgian colonial rule there was a huge portfolio worth well over $1.0 billion of equity in many companies engaged in mining, agriculture, commerce. The most important investments included diamond, copper, cobalt, gold and tin mining companies operating in the Congo and marketing Congolese products outside. The question was under what terms would the new, central government of the Congo obtain the rights to this major portfolio of assets. It was a huge struggle and, of course, a lot of the assets were in Katanga under Katangan authority. There were several formulas put together for the strangulation of Katanga economically as well as politically and militarily, to force them back into the country. In the end, of course, those [strategies] succeeded.

It was a great political problem for the United States because the central government, at least under [Patrice] Lumumba, before I got there, was seen as being to the "Left," heavily supported by the Soviets (albeit elected). It became a kind of a political Left-Right struggle, among other things. We saw a challenge to try to encourage a government in Leopoldville which was compatible with our views and with which we could work in trying to put down the [Katanga] secession and reunify the country. This brought us into inescapable confrontation with the Belgians, supported generally by the Europeans, who were "winking" at the [Katanga] secession.

Q: Then you found yourself assigned to the camp of the "enemy" in a way.

HARROP: Well, I didn't see it in those terms. I was still following these issues. In fact, it was while I was in Brussels that we had a visit from Governor Harriman, who was then Under Secretary for Political Affairs, or Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs. That [visit] involved organizing the major exercise that was called “Dragon Rouge” [Red Dragon], using U.S. C-130 [aircraft] to send Belgian forces to Stanleyville to rescue more than 100 hostages there, including the American Consul. What was his name? Hoyt, Michael Hoyt.

Q: You went out to Brussels in 1963. You were basically the “African” man in the Economic Section [of the Embassy]?

HARROP: No, I did more than that. I dealt with Belgian national accounts and I did a good deal of commercial work and followed Belgian economic relations with the United States and the EC. I was the number two man in a three-man Economic Section.

Q: Who was the Economic Counselor?

HARROP: Chris Petrow, who later became Economic Minister in the Embassy in Paris and Director of Mexican Affairs in Washington.

Q: You mentioned that you had never taken any economics courses when you were in college. Did this come up to haunt you at all or did you find that economics reporting and the work we did really didn't require that type of background?

HARROP: I would have been better served if I had had some basic economics. I took one economics course when I was in graduate school, when I thought I might be going into the Foreign Service. However, I regarded economics then as a specious discipline — and still do, to some extent. I believe there is limited understanding of economic forces in the world. The American presidential election [of 1992] had so many, interesting economic elements, with economics, with President Bush almost stating that he had nothing to do with economics and with the business cycle in the country and that we should wait around

a bit and things would become better. Clinton based his campaign on economic conditions in the country. By the time Clinton entered office, even by the time of the election, the recession had already essentially turned around, without the government having much influence. So you wonder whether governments have as much of a role in the economic field as you might think. I was struck by the fact that, although I did not study economics to any extent when I was in college, I took an 11-week “cram course” [in preparation for the Foreign Service examination], in which economics played a very small part. That was before I took the one course in graduate school. I got a grade of 88, or something like that, in the economics part of the Foreign Service exam — higher than I received on subjects that I knew much more about. That persuaded me that economics was something of an artificial discipline, that by learning a little terminology one could pass as an “economist”.

Q: I agree with you. I consider economics a little bit like astrology. It is very good at explaining what happened but not very good at explaining what will happen.

HARROP: I think that it would have helped if I had known more about economic definitions. The language of economics would have helped me, particularly in doing the national accounts work in Belgium. That was fairly sophisticated work. I had some difficulty with it. However, on the whole, I think that the work on economics which you do in the Foreign Service up until recently — it's changing now — did not require an academic, economics background.

Q: Did you get a different perspective or did you find yourself the “African man” sitting in a sort of hostile field? Particularly coming from where you had been, in the Bureau of African Affairs.

HARROP: There was no sense of that, really. I may have overstated the degree of bureaucratic hostility. There had been tempers that flared. There had been some real feelings and fights. People were accused of disingenuous modification of language in

cables. It had been heated at times, but not to the extent that I might have had any feeling of being in the “enemy camp” when I went to Brussels.

Q: I understand, but, after all, this is how issues are thrashed out. The Foreign Service has a tendency of trying to “smooth them over.” Once in a while they don't get smoothed over. Did you see the Katanga issue from a different perspective when you were in the Embassy in Brussels?

HARROP: No I don't think so. Several things occurred when I got to Brussels which did not lead to a change in my viewpoint. One was a confirmation of the cynicism of the Belgian financial interests in their whole relationship to the politics of Africa. I had a sense almost of horror when I realized that. The Belgian colonial system was the most inhumane and selfish colonial regime of any in the world. It was an appalling situation, to which most Belgian participants were able to close their eyes.

Q: Like “The Heart of Darkness.”

HARROP: Yes, it was really appalling. So that feeling was underlined and confirmed in Belgium. Also, however, I developed a much better understanding of the way in which Belgians saw Africa and rather loved Africa. There was a real difference. The French, who had the most colonies and probably the largest presence in Africa, tended to go there for short periods of time. They still regarded themselves as citizens of Metropolitan France. They went to live there [in Africa] for a time and then returned [to France]. The Belgians also took a relatively short term view of Africa — even more than the French. Most of the Belgians did not stay in Africa for any length of time. There always was a certain number that set out roots, but, on the whole, they would go to Africa, establish plantations, work in the mines or something else, frequently remain for most of their lives, and then return home. The British were very different. The British really had become Kenyans and Rhodesians. Of course, those parts of Africa have climates which are most attractive to people from the temperate zones. But the British attitude was very different. I think that

the Belgian sense of impatience with the Africans was more marked. There was almost no effort in the Congo to bring the Africans into Belgian or European culture and society at all. Nor was there really an effort to develop the tools and machinery of government, as the British so emphatically did with their police forces, their judicial systems, and their administrative schools in all of their colonies.

The French really tried to make the Africans culturally French. They emphasized French culture, language and French law, “Epanouissement”. There was a lot of integration under the French, less so with the British, and almost none at all with the Belgians. The Belgians, in my view, were the most paternalistic and, therefore, the most patronizing.

Q: Did you get any feel as to why the Belgians were so different?

HARROP: Well, I think it's partly the fact that Belgium is such a small country. A lot is explained by that. They don't think of themselves as a distinct culture or civilization, as the French or British do. The French and the Flemish languages are not “their” languages. It's a quite different psychology under which they live. They don't think of themselves as large enough or important enough to have that sort of influence, although, in fact, in many ways, the [Belgian] Congo was the largest and richest of all the European colonies in Africa.

Q: Your Ambassador [in Belgium] for most of the time you were there was Douglas MacArthur II.

HARROP: In Brussels, yes. But Ridgway Knight was also Ambassador for part of the time. Ambassador MacArthur was there for about a year and a half, and Knight, about a year and a half. I guess it was about half and half.

Q: What was your impression of Ambassador MacArthur?

HARROP: He was a man of extraordinary personal energy, dynamism, drive, forcefulness, and ambition. I would say that he was a man without as good “ears” as he might have had.

He was not a sensitive person. That was a case in which a Diplomat's wife was really a liability to him because of her very erratic behavior.

Q: She was one of the well-known "dragons" of the Foreign Service.

HARROP: Well, I could tell you anecdotes about that, but there's no particular reason to repeat them. Some really extraordinary things happened to us there [in Brussels]. However, I did feel that Ambassador MacArthur was an accomplished professional diplomat. I remember, in particular, one incident in his office when we were trying to work out something which had to do with the Congo. We were at odds with the Belgians on an issue there, as we usually were, since, I would say, the world view of the Bureau of African Affairs was the one that prevailed generally in the end over the views of the Bureau of European Affairs. We found ourselves increasingly in confrontation with the former colonial powers.

We were working out a way to express to the Belgians that we simply did not agree at all with their point of view and wanted to insist on its being changed. I remember watching and listening in great admiration as Ambassador Douglas MacArthur dictated a memorandum to Foreign Minister Spaak. This was diplomacy in its purest form: language which simply and completely rejected what the Belgians were trying to achieve, but with such grace that you couldn't say that here he was contradicting them, or there, he's thrown it back in their face. Not at all. It was a masterful draft. I felt that I had learned a great deal that afternoon.

Q: This was part of your experience. Later on, you were an ambassador. Were you looking in particular at chiefs of mission but others as well, picking up little practices...

HARROP: Certainly. I was not consciously thinking of myself as an ambassador at that time, but I learned different things from many people. As you go along, you see

approaches that succeed and those that do not. I guess Ambassador Marshall Green was the most important to me subsequently in that regard.

Q: How about Ambassador Ridgway Knight? He was another professional diplomat, wasn't he?

HARROP: Ridgway Knight was a professional diplomat, although somehow he did not seem to be as much of a professional. Ridgway Knight had been raised in France and, throughout his life, spoke English with a French accent. He was quite an effective ambassador. He lacked the ostentatious self-confidence of Douglas MacArthur, but both of them had great grace in dealing with Belgians. I think that both were very effective. After MacArthur had an unsuccessful tour in Congressional Relations and went to Iran for a couple of years, he subsequently retired in Belgium. Their daughter had married a Belgian while they were there. The MacArthur's lived in retirement in Belgium for some years. Knight had a sense of cultural affinity with Europeans and with Belgians. Knight was not a “man of the people” and did not easily pick up popular currents. I remember that he was particularly grateful to me on one occasion. I was writing a speech for him. The two leading Belgian football [soccer] teams were and are “Anderlech” of Brussels and “Standard” of Liege. At some point in the speech [which I was writing for him] I used the metaphor of Anderlech and Standard. Ambassador Knight really didn't understand it, but the audience roared, applauded, and laughed. Afterwards he asked me to come up and see him. He thanked me for that brilliant remark. He said, “By the way, what was it all about?” He wasn't really aware of the nitty-gritty of Belgian life. I enjoyed working for him. He was an attractive and intelligent person.

Q: Then you finally got yourself off to Africa.

HARROP: Well, I visited there because I was following African affairs. At that time the Department of State had greater resources [for travel] than it has now. To make such a trip would be almost out of the question now. I was able to get official orders and spend about

15 days in the [ex-Belgian] Congo, where I had never been, to meet some of the people there and to see at first hand some of the economic and political questions I was following [at the Embassy] in Brussels. I stopped off and saw Ambassador Godley, who was then in Leopoldville. I had worked for him during my last months in Washington. I then went out to Lubumbashi and saw...

Q: Lubumbashi is the former...

HARROP: It was still Elisabethville at the time. I stayed with the Consul there, an old friend of mine, Arthur Tienken. Then I returned to Kinshasa to visit Ambassador Godley again. Godley invited General Mobutu to breakfast, and I first met him there. It was an interesting experience. I also met others. Moise Tshombe, former Prime Minister of separate Katanga, strangely enough, now Prime Minister of the Congo itself. He later, of course, was captured and exiled. Before I left, Ambassador Godley said, “Why don't you come down here follow to Tienken as Principal Officer in Elisabethville?” I must say, this possibility hadn't occurred to me, but it appealed right away. I said, “Sure, I'd like to.”

Q: You went to Elisabethville in...

HARROP: 1966. I spent three years in Brussels, 1963-66, and then two years in Elisabethville, whose name was changed to Lubumbashi just as I arrived. It was a tumultuous period. We had a Consulate of about 15 people altogether, including a small military advisory sub-mission under the military mission in Leopoldville. It was a very difficult time. There were a couple of “cooked-up” invasions of mercenaries from Angola. There was a mercenary “rebellion” against the central government of the Congo, and periods of violence and harsh repression in Lubumbashi.

Q: These all show the fine hand of Belgian...

HARROP: No, not really. It was not entirely clear. The mercenaries coming up from Angola must have had public or private Belgian or other European backing, but it was becoming a

very complex pattern by that time. Mobutu acceded to power while we were there and has been in office ever since. It was very dangerous for a time. The Second Paracommando Battalion from Leopoldville was sent down to discipline Katanga. The central government was always afraid of a renewed effort at secession by the regional ethnic groups, leaving aside anything that the Belgians might attempt. I don't want to leave the impression that the Katanga secession was a Belgian operation; the Belgians went along with, winked at, and somewhat supported an initiative that was going to happen anyway because of the tribal mix of the Congo. The Lunda tribe, of which Tshombe was the leader, was probably going to do that. And the central government were always afraid that it was going to happen again — they still are, to this day. So they [the central government] sent this very rough group down, armed with the most modern weapons from the Fabriqu# Nationale de Belgique [Belgian National Arms Factory] and just wrought havoc in Katanga, which became a perilous place to be. My family very narrowly escaped being shot in our own house.

Q: How did that happen?

HARROP: The Governor of Katanga at the time was a vicious villain named John Foster Manzikala, named after John Foster Dulles, amazingly. He came from a Presbyterian family. Wasn't the Dulles family — I'm pretty sure that they were Presbyterians. Anyhow, this Manzikala, who was really unbalanced — a bloodthirsty, cruel man — declared a curfew for whites (”Europeans”). Furthermore, they could not have any lights on in their houses. There were several thousand Europeans living in the area at the time. So with this wild, heavily armed, and primitive battalion of paracommandos there, all of the white residents of Katanga were cowering in their houses with their lights out at night, hearing gunfire all over town with undisciplined soldiers parading around. A group of them, drunken and menacing, came walking up our driveway toward our house. These fellows were displaying their guns. We were just sitting there in the dark, looking out the window at them. I had a pistol, though I don't know whether I wanted to use it or not. They came up, drunk as lords, rolling around, brandishing their weapons. Then they decided for the better

and walked away again. I think we certainly would have been dead if they had entered the house.

On another occasion, a night or two before that, one of our younger sons and I were out in the backyard. We heard the thud of a shell which landed a few feet away in our garden, a dud miraculously. It was an absolutely frightening experience.

This was a very, very awkward period. At one time a curfew was set from Leopoldville for a certain hour. The country is so large that there is a time difference between the East, where Lubumbashi is, and Leopoldville. So there was a knot of Belgians, Italians, and Greeks in a cafe about half an hour before the curfew was to begin. The security forces, the Army, thought that the curfew should begin according to local time, not Kinshasa time. So they picked these Europeans up, put them in a truck, and took them out into the country and shot them. About eight people were just killed, which created a near panic. We evacuated our wives and children and most of the staff for a time and sent them down to Zambia. My wife and children stayed with the Edmondsons — Bill Edmondson, who was then Deputy Chief of Mission in Zambia, and later Ambassador to South Africa and my Deputy when I was Inspector General.

Q: Here you were, chief of mission in a place where you've got...

HARROP: Principal Officer.

Q: Principal Officer. In this chaotic situation, what did you do? How did you operate?

HARROP: The United States is always a very important country, and particularly so in Zaire because of the role it played there. I was able to stand up to Governor Manzikala and got him to cancel the curfew for Europeans. I became kind of a folk hero to the Belgians and [other] Europeans there because they viewed me as the man who had been able to relieve them of some of their greatest concerns. We could do things like that because we were important to the Zairians. Mobutu has always behaved as if the

support of the United States was crucial. In recent years I've come to the conclusion that the United States was never as important to the politics of Zaire as he [Mobutu] said we were, whether he believed it or not, or as we thought we were. But that is a separate issue.

We also had C-130's, large transport aircraft, in Leopoldville. I'd arranged to have them come down to Katanga for a show of force during the period of greatest tension. They flew in. I remember driving out to the airport with Governor Manzikala and the chief of security for Katanga province, Major Mika. There was a dramatic incident on the way. It was night, and our car was stopped at a roadblock. The Governor decided a soldier was not sufficiently respectful to him. We were in his blue Mercedes-Benz. He stopped when challenged but would not continue until the soldier was taken out and beaten virtually to a pulp before him. Then we were able to proceed to the airport. The man at the roadblock had been instructed to stop all vehicles. Manzikala had driven up, and all the soldier could see were headlights coming toward him. He'd stepped out with his gun and said, “Stop!” Manzikala barked, “You're talking to the Governor of your province and you're going to regret that.” Anyway, it was a great pleasure for me to hear those American planes overhead and see our soldiers jump out and take positions around their aircraft. It was a little show of force which served our purposes tremendously at that dangerous moment.

Q: Were there any United Nations troops down there [in Elisabethville] at that time?

HARROP: No. That period was all over. The United Nations presence had ended in 1962.

Q: I've conducted a fairly long interview which actually hasn't been completed yet with Terry McNamara — about his time in the Congo. How about your relations with the Embassy? Were they supportive? Here you were in a very difficult situation.

HARROP: The Embassy provided full support. Ambassador Mac Godley's relationship with Mobutu was complex and difficult, as all ambassadors' [relationships with Mobutu] have been, including my own twenty years later. In late 1966 we had a particularly bad day

and night in Katanga. It looked as though the central government's control might finally be dissolving, and the people might be rising up against the central government forces there.

I received an IMMEDIATE, NIACT [Night Action] cable from Ambassador Godley asking me please to go out and take a look around town. Mobutu was begging Ambassador Godley to let him know what was happening in Katanga. So I did. I was rather nervous, but drove around town to assess the security situation. In fact, it was rather quiet. I went back [to the Consulate] and prepared a report for Ambassador Godley to share with Mobutu. This was sent under difficult circumstances. My only communications person was a superb worker — in fact, I was able subsequently to get him a double promotion. He had been out that night at a big beer party and was drunk. So I had to call him back in — it was a Sunday night, I think — to prepare the message. He had the most terrible time with the old-fashioned, encryption system, punching out the messages. He was just drinking coffee, perspiring, and in agony over it. He had had no reason to expect that he would be coming in, but he shouldn't have taken on as much alcohol as he did.

Anyway, we finally got this message out. Godley went to reassure Mobutu that the situation was resolved. But then, within a few weeks of that time, Godley, under instructions, went in to put some new pressure on Mobutu. The lot of the American Ambassador is to put pressure on Mobutu in Zaire on human rights and corruption issues, economic policy, UN votes and any of hundreds of other matters. Although it was never so announced publicly, Godley was expelled by Mobutu. Godley radioed me to say, “I'm leaving. I wanted to let you know that. Carry on.” Then the Charg# d'Affaires for a long time after that was Robert O. Blake. Godley was finally replaced — we allowed Mobutu to stew a bit, as we did later when he expelled Dean Hinton — by Bob McBride, who proved a very uncomfortable — I would say very unhappy — Ambassador to Zaire. He'd always worked in Europe. His last three jobs had been as Director of Western European Affairs, Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission in Madrid, and Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission in Paris. The Zaire job was a grueling shock for him.

Q: There is a continuing theme that goes around about people who hit Africa at least during the period from 1960 through 1980, at the pinnacle of their careers, and particularly at difficult posts. It didn't work out very well.

HARROP: No. Bob McBride had a difficult time. He was dealing with Mobutu, who had named himself President by then, and with Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko, who was a most difficult fellow in a very different way. Ambassador McBride told me one day, “I am awakened at all hours of the night, either by the megalomaniac or by the schizophrenic. I never know which one will be on the other end of the line with some crazy ultimatum.”

Q: You left there in 1968.

HARROP: I left there in 1968 — again, not terribly pleased to be leaving because I came back to be assigned to Princeton University for a year of training. Princeton was my home. It was a puzzling assignment. There were other things I would rather have done, but I adjusted to it, and it became a most interesting and, especially from a family point of view, very fulfilling year.

Q: When you left Lubumbashi, what did you feel about the direction of Zaire and all of that? This was your first real exposure to it on the ground. Certainly, it was a very difficult time.

HARROP: I felt that Zaire was in for extended crises. By that time Katanga had been renamed Shaba by Mobutu. Whether Shaba was going to remain within Zaire was unclear. While I was there [in Lubumbashi], the Union Miniere was nationalized and renamed “Gecamines” although the Belgian engineers and administrators continued to manage the company, many now under contract to the central government. Their numbers were dwindling and their authority was circumscribed. Whether they were going to be able to continue [to work there] was unclear. In fact, no one really thought the mines could function for long. That picture has become more difficult over the years, with corruption

becoming absolutely monumental, although for 25 years the mines kept operating and exports continued. Mobutu has been simply stealing money from Gecamines all the time, tens of millions of dollars a year. The situation has gotten worse, year by year. As of 1993 the company is hardly operating at all.

Q: How did you feel about Mobutu, as you saw it at that time? Was he considered to be the “hope” of...

HARROP: Well, he was the “hope,” in the sense that he was the only person strong enough to unify the country, after a fashion, and keep the Army behind him. He appeared to be the most skillful and the most forceful politician, but it would never have occurred to me that he would last for 25 years more — almost 30 years now. I never would have thought that. It seemed most unlikely, the history of political turmoil in that country in the eight years since its independence, the continual shuffling leaders, the insurgencies, assassinations and bloodshed had to have its impact. Mobutu's mastery of the political system of his country has been a phenomenon I would not have been able to predict.

Q: Well, why don't we stop here and then touch on your time in Princeton and then go on?

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Q: Today is September 7, 1993, and we continue. When we left off this interview, you were on your way to Princeton University, to the Woodrow Wilson School. What were you doing there? I have you going there from 1968 to 1969.

HARROP: Well, a few years before that the State Department had started to send officers to participate in what was called the “Mid Career Program” at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton. Although it's called a “Mid Career Program,” by Princeton — and they take about 15 people from government annually for a sabbatical year, often including one or two Foreign Service officers — from the State Department's point of view it's what we call

“senior training.” That is, it parallels — or in my case replans — an assignment to one of the war colleges or to the Foreign Service Institute Senior Seminar Program.

So I spent an interesting and stimulating year at Princeton. This was an unusual situation, because the town was my boyhood home. I'd grown up in Princeton. At that time my mother had a large house there, with no one in it but herself, so our whole family moved in with her. We had our four sons with us and had a very pleasant and interesting time, a year of re-Americanization for the boys after five years of education in French.

I think this sort of program is a very good idea. When you've been living under tension overseas, as we had, or are fatigued from the strains of responsibility and career, getting away to refresh yourself is a very sensible and worthwhile measure.

Q: Well, this was 1968-69. The Vietnam War was going strong. The protest against the war was still going on. Did this impact on you at all?

HARROP: There were very gifted, young graduate students at the [Woodrow Wilson] School. They were very highly motivated people who were going more probably, at that time, into domestic affairs than into international affairs. In fact, it was an embarrassment to Princeton whose Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs was based upon a large and anonymous donation, which had stipulated equal attention to international and domestic matters. Princeton was having difficulty in attracting people who were interested in international affairs at that time. Our country was turning inward, to a certain extent. There was some sense of pressure on Vietnam questions — with a rather liberal group of young people at the university. On the other hand they were also mature, motivated, and ambitious. They wanted to get out and into government. It was not a matter of burning symbols and marches at all. It was a restrained atmosphere, I would say, an atmosphere of intellectual concentration and hard work with strong focus upon public policy issues.

Q: Speaking of government and its problems, how did you find coming up against the academic world? Here you'd been in [the Foreign Service] for some time. Did you find yourself somewhat removed from the situation?

HARROP: Yes, I think that is not a bad way of putting it. I became impatient with the tendency to look on foreign policy issues in academic, intellectual terms, as opposed to immediate, operational, and pragmatic terms. This came up over and over again. I took several different courses, including one with Dick Ullman, a professor of political science who later spent a year writing editorials for the “New York Times” and a year in the Pentagon in Washington. He was an interesting and capable man. I became impatient with the tendency to look at foreign policy issues as if you were in a laboratory, examining specimens. I felt that the people in the academic world were removed from the real pressures and the real world of diplomacy, the decisions that had to be made. At the same time, I felt a sense of inadequacy in that I had been, perhaps, too inclined to work in a “seat of the pants,” operational way and had not been looking long enough ahead from a strategic or political perspective. So the experience was certainly good for me.

Q: Did you find that there was a carry-over later on, so that you could hark back and say, “Ah, ha.”

HARROP: I learned a good deal from the experience, and have since Princeton tried to step back a bit from reacting too rapidly to events, to look at issues in a longer perspective.

Q: Then you came back to INR [Bureau of Intelligence Research in Washington, D. C.] from 1969 to 1971. You were the Director of Regional African Affairs?

HARROP: INR at that time, and I guess still is, was divided like most of the State Department into regional and functional offices. One office dealt with African research and analysis. That was the office which I headed. It had perhaps 15 people in it, though I think that it is smaller now. It was a time of considerable interest. There was the overthrow of

the monarchy in Libya. There were rising tensions in Ethiopia — as the end of the regime approached there. It was a time of the usual difficulties in Central Africa and also of the Biafra secession in Nigeria. There were a lot of things going on.

Q: Let's take a couple of these at a time. What about Biafra? This seemed to pit the State Department and its policy of opposing splitting Africa up into clans or tribes against the Jewish community, most of the Christian community, and other groups. All of the rock stars seemed to be on the side of Biafra. It was a difficult policy...

HARROP: It was a very difficult policy and a very interesting problem. Careers were made and broken in the U.S. Government over that issue. There was a sense that, politically or in the national interest, we had to work with the central government [of Nigeria] in its efforts to contain an insurgency, or else all of Africa might fragment. The Biafrans were extremely competent in public relations. They were very skillful at portraying themselves as being ill-treated, as, in many respects, they were. One of the central government's tactical approaches was to choke off food and fuel supplies. There was starvation in Biafra. It was a tough, tough time. There was a lot of feeling and sentiment in Washington over it, with the academic community largely favoring the secession. We had great difficulties with the French, who kept slipping arms to Colonel Ojukwu...

Q: What was in it for the French? How did they look at it?

HARROP: The French, I think, have always tended to be contrary in Africa. They have tended to take a position counter to the United Kingdom and, later, the United States. Nigeria was the major, former British colony in Africa where the British still had tremendous influence. I think it was a rather cynical opportunity for the French to increase their stature in Nigeria, and to put down the British.

Q: Were there problems within INR and with the geographic desk on our Biafra policy? I'm thinking of today, where we're having so much trouble about [policy toward] the former

Yugoslavia. We're having resignations and so forth. It seems to me that this would be somewhat the same situation.

HARROP: There were a number of people who were concerned on humanitarian grounds. The pro-Biafra element in the United States was essentially a humanitarian element. One of the leading figures was the Dean, at the time, of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Jean Mayer. He happened to be a physician and nutritionist. That brought him strongly into the subject. He wrote a number of articles on the suffering of the people in Biafra.

In the State Department itself there was some division, but I would say there were no major differences. There was a division between the Department and the National Security Council, where there was a young Foreign Service Officer named Roger Morris who left the Foreign Service over this question. He was a junior officer on the National Security Council staff. He wrote a stream of strongly critical pieces in an endeavor to turn policy around, going over the issues repeatedly, dramatizing the suffering in Biafra, even though the administration really had limited sympathy with his view point.

Q: How did you find Congress on this?

HARROP: Very divided and very susceptible to influence from Colonel Ojukwu and the Eastern Nigerians. A number of members of Congress can always be approached successfully on human rights questions, and this happened on this occasion. Members often seem open to allegations of heartlessness on the part of the U.S. Government.

Q: How did you find the reporting from Nigeria and the neighboring posts on this issue?

HARROP: Well, it was quite mixed, as a matter of fact, because we had an ambassador there for a time, Bill Trueheart, who tended to have difficulty with our policy. It was a difficult problem for Assistant Secretary David Newsom, then in charge of the Bureau of African Affairs. There were more political, analytical, and emotional divisions among the

staff in the Embassy in Lagos than in the State Department itself, it seemed to me. So we had of problems.

Q: Were you getting reports in from the CIA? How well did you feel that they were dealing with the situation?

HARROP: I think they were doing pretty well. The CIA traditionally has prided itself on not being distracted by matters of humanitarian concern when security and national interest are believed at stake. I don't believe there was a serious, internal problem within the Agency. They played a responsible role. The main data was purely political reporting, and some economic reporting, in the sense of military economics. It was not, I think, the kind of situation in which the CIA could be expected to play a major role.

Q: Could you sketch a picture of INR at that time? This was early in the Nixon administration. William Rogers was Secretary of State. Henry Kissinger was beginning to develop his power. INR is somewhat removed from the policy side, but did you feel the hand of Henry Kissinger at that time?

HARROP: Yes, certainly. Ray Cline was the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research when I first arrived in INR. He was a former Deputy Director for Intelligence at CIA and very familiar with the intelligence community. Kissinger played a major role. I remember Cline complaining bitterly about his experience with the morning briefings of the Secretary of State. William Rogers, who was then Secretary had, in Cline's view, a distorted view of intelligence. I asked, “What do you mean by that?” He said, “Well, he doesn't seem to think that information is “intelligence” or is of value unless it has been obtained covertly. When I go to brief him every morning, I try to give him a picture of our best analysis of what's going on in the world of concern to the United States. As always, four-fifths of that information is obtained by Embassy reporting or from news services or overt reports from other governments. At the very most one-fifth, and probably only one-tenth is obtained through covert, intelligence channels. He [Rogers] seems uninterested

in anything that wasn't 'purchased' from an agent or something of that kind." It was very frustrating for Cline, he said.

Q: As an aside, in the course of these interviews, I've been struck by the pernicious development of our "buying" information. This kind of information tends to be given greater weight, although, in many cases, it should be given less weight. When you buy something, the old saying, "let the buyer beware," should apply. Within the foreign affairs community there is a certain cachet or something like that...

HARROP: Historically it developed in that way, although I believe that there is a more balanced view now. The fact is that you make foreign policy on the basis of all available data and knowledge. Clearly, only a very minute portion of that is going to be covert, secret intelligence. I agree with you that one should start with "caveat emptor".

Q: How did we view Ethiopia and the decline of [Emperor] Haile Selassie there? I don't know how important Kagnew Station was at the time.

HARROP: Kagnew Station was still fairly important in the late 60's. I went out there for a visit in 1970. The Eritrean insurgency was already active, and Asmara was rather isolated from time to time. Kagnew was declining in resources and in the value of its output. Kagnew and the intelligence station that we had in Morocco, which I also visited at about the same time, were losing their position on the scale of values back in Washington. Both were closed shortly after on budget grounds.

Q: Because of changes in communications...

HARROP: Changes in communications in the world. But Kagnew was an immense operation, I must say. It was a huge base.

Q: I had the "Horn of Africa" area in INR in 1960-61, and everything there in the Horn of Africa was related somehow to Kagnew Station. Everything else was of lesser importance.

HARROP: It should have been clear at that time that Ethiopia was headed for change and that the regime [of Haile Selassie] was on wobbly footing.

Q: Looking at the picture of Africa at the time, from your perspective, what was the importance of Africa, particularly in terms of the Cold War? Was it still a "zero sum" game — either the Soviets get their people in or we get our people in? How did we look at Africa then?

HARROP: It was still seen very much in Cold War terms. The "loss" of Libya, and Wheelus Field there, were seen as a problem for the United States. There was concern about the Leftist nature or avowed Marxist nature of some of the independence groups in Eritrea — the ELF [Eritrean Liberation Front] and the EPLF [Eritrean People's Liberation Front]. There was concern about the Soviet role in Zaire, the Congo. There was always a worry because the Soviets had been around in that part of the world for a long time. Africa was still seen in Cold War terms, and the former colonial powers were relatively far more influential, at the time, than they are now. They were much more active. The French and the British, the Belgians — even the Italians — were still very active in that part of the Horn of Africa.

Q: Did you get any impression about Secretary of State Rogers' concern about Africa?

HARROP: I don't think that he was much involved in Africa or worried about it very much. He didn't tend to play a strong role. He was a passive Secretary of State. I often felt that there was a kind of psychological weight upon him, since the whole world felt he was dominated by the National Security Adviser [Henry Kissinger]. He behaved as if that were the case.

Q: As of that time — the 1969-1971 period — did you hear much about Henry Kissinger?

HARROP: He began very early to be quite dominant, and there was a sense that the State Department, even in the early days of the Nixon administration, was not privy to much that was going on.

Q: This is a little before you got into AFSA [American Foreign Service Association]. We had the Cambodian invasion from Vietnam in the spring of 1970. There was a sort of revolt of some junior officers on this matter. Did you get involved in any of this Vietnam-type thing?

HARROP: I did not personally become involved in it, but many of my associates did. For instance, a young man who was staff assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, John Marks, resigned over the issue. This was the time, I think, when Tony Lake, Dick Moose, Bill Watts and others left the National Security Council staff. I recall very distinctly a letter signed by 35 or 40 younger officers that was sent to the Secretary of State over — was it the bombing of Haiphong or the invasion of Cambodia?

Q: I think that it was Cambodia.

HARROP: This was a very critical letter. It was sent supposedly discreetly, but it became public knowledge in time. I recall that Alexis Johnson, who was then Under Secretary, and the senior FSO in government, had an interview with these people and was very upset. He was convinced that the Department and the Foreign Service would be seen in the White House as disloyal.

Q: That was the time when President Nixon said, "Fire them." I think that it was Alexis Johnson, with the cooperation of Secretary of State Rogers who sort of "buried" the whole thing.

HARROP: Yes, he tried literally to “bury” Nixon's orders in his safe. It was a time of great difficulty in the Department because there was very limited sympathy among the younger generation for our Vietnam policy.

Q: Then you became very much involved in personnel matters.

HARROP: Well, I'd been interested in them since the time when I'd worked in Personnel in 1958-61. I'd been interested in the Foreign Service as an institution and I became more interested when I was at Princeton, for some reason. When you are in a different community, in a different institution, you tend to think more about your own institution. I spent a long time reflecting on the Foreign Service and what it meant, discussing it with people on the Faculty and among the students at Princeton. I guess I must have written one or two things about it at the time.

I'd been back in Washington less than six months when I was called upon by Lannon Walker, the outgoing Chairman of AFSA who had been a leader of the “Young Turk” movement which had taken over AFSA in 1967. He was casting about desperately for a successor. It's always the case with an organization such as the Foreign Service Association. It has to be a self-perpetuating institution. The great body of the Foreign Service is working as much as 15 hours a day on policy matters and simply doesn't become “engaged” in AFSA as an institution. So people who become involved are always looking for others to follow them.

Lannon came to see me and said, “Why don't you become Chairman of AFSA?” This possibility had never occurred to me. I thought it over for a bit and talked to some other people. A friend of mine from boyhood days, Charles Bray, was also involved with Lannon. So they persuaded me to join a slate to run for the board of AFSA. I didn't run for chairman. Charlie Bray ran for chairman and I ran for a position on the Board. It was not at all a secret maneuver on Charlie's part to withdraw from the position of chairman. He had

been working for AFSA as long as Lannon Walker had, and was tired. That would leave me as Chairman, and that's what happened.

Q: Was this full time as Chairman of AFSA?

HARROP: I began on a less than full time basis. Then, when I was elected Chairman subsequently, I took “leave without pay” (LWOP) for a year, which was a bold thing to do in some regards, since it reduced my annuity. The U.S. Government would pay its contribution to an individual's annuity if that individual was on leave without pay for six months. But after six months there was no way to continue contributing to the annuity. Subsequent legislation changed that. So I spent that year as Chairman of AFSA on LWOP.

Q: When was that?

HARROP: The year 1971 approximately, the calendar year of 1971. We had to find a way to finance my salary. I made a trip to New York with Charlie Bray — a couple of trips, in fact. We called on Douglas Dillon, who had a strong feeling for the Foreign Service. He'd been Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. I remember calling on him in that beautiful suite that he had at the top of the General Motors Building on Fifth Avenue and 58th St., South of Central Park. We went in and discussed the matter. What we needed to have was — I've forgotten the amount. I guess my salary was probably around $35,000-40,000 a year. We needed to have half of it in a taxable donation and half in a charitable contribution, since we estimated that about half of the time would be spent on matters which would be seen as charitable, under the tax laws, and half would not be. He said, “Well, I'll give you all of the tax-free part and I'll give you half of the other, but you've got to get the rest of it matched.”

So we went around looking for other people and found them. It was useful to work with a group called “The Public Members' Association.” I don't think that it exists any more. Certainly, it was a great support to the Foreign Service. This was a group of people who

had served, as public members, on performance and selection boards and on inspection teams. For a while we had a public member on inspection teams. These people had a strong sense of affiliation to the Department of State and the Foreign Service. We talked to them, and several of them helped us financially, quite substantially. They subsequently helped with other things that we were doing in AFSA. In that way I was able to collect the money to pay my salary and was able to take a year of leave without pay.

Q: In 1971 what were the issues that you saw [in AFSA]?

HARROP: There were several issues that I became involved in — not so much professional questions, which interested me more at the outset, but in the question of exclusive representation, labor-management relations, and, subsequently, the grievance system of the Foreign Service. In a sense the whole federal government was changing to a more classical labor-management relationship with an elected, exclusive representative from among the employees, agency by agency. The branch of the AFL/CIO for government affairs, the American Federation of Government Employees, AFGE, was extremely active in organizing.

So the first challenge that we [in AFSA] had was to try to see that an executive order was promulgated to cover the Foreign Service separate from the one that would cover the entire government. We felt that the Foreign Service was a very different institution from the Civil Service in such basic matters as the concept of “rank in man,” rather than the “rank in position” concept, and in overseas living. That was a hard, long, difficult struggle. I spent hours on Capitol Hill, talking with Congressmen, and was invited to the White House and elsewhere. We were finally successful. Then we participated in the drafting of the executive order which would apply to the Foreign Service.

Q: What was the thinking? Why was AFSA going after this, as opposed to becoming a branch of AFGE, which would cover the Civil Service?

HARROP: Well, the feeling was that the diplomatic service was, in fact, a separate service, that the Rogers Act of 1924 and, later, the Foreign Service Act of 1946 had been landmark pieces of legislation which created a personnel system which was effective and useful and quite essential to the proper conduct of diplomacy. The Foreign Service was composed of people who were world-wide available, who carried their rank in themselves from place to place, who were evaluated by other Foreign Service Officers, and which had the “up or out” promotion concept. We felt that all of these things were essential to maintaining a high quality system of international representation. We were persuaded that we would lose those qualities if we came under the regular executive order. Most particularly, if we were represented by the American Federation of Government Employees, we would have been represented by an organization of which, perhaps, 99.5% of the membership was from the Civil Service and .05% from the Foreign Service. Since many of the issues, as we saw them, were issues which separated the Foreign Service from the Civil Service, we wanted to represent ourselves.

Q: There was nothing tougher and more professional than some of the labor unions, particularly at that period. Here you were, a bunch of neophytes to this business. How did you deal with AFGE on this?

HARROP: Well, we were able to succeed because we knew our own institution better than they did — much better than they did. We were more determined. The representation of this tiny little number of Foreign Service personnel was more important to us than it was to them. They had much larger fish to fry. We became rather proficient at labor-management relations, to tell the truth. We worked very hard at it and we became fairly skillful at managing these issues. I had suits brought against me by individuals. I had to appear before the Labor Relations Boards and in court. It was a very difficult business.

Maybe I should tell this story, a rather strange one. A woman officer whom I'd been associated with earlier on had been working in Vietnam. She was assigned to a job in Washington which she didn't want. At the time I was then both Chairman of AFSA and still

Director of RAF [Office of Research for Regional African Affairs] in INR. She wrote me and said, “I want to stay in political work. The Department wants to put me in this management and personnel stuff. I don't want to do that. Couldn't you find a position for me in INR?” I called up the Personnel people and said that this officer wanted to work in INR and not where you have her assigned which, I think, was to the Board of Examiners [of the Foreign Service]. I asked, “What is the situation?” They said, “Well, if you would like to have her there, it's not important that she go to the Board of Examiners.” So she came to work with me in INR.

Then, eight or 10 months later, when we got into the thick of the troubles over representation, she embraced AFGE — became an activist for AFGE, of which there were several in the Department at the time. Then she filed a formal complaint with the National Labor Relations Board against me. She claimed that I was not qualified to head the American Foreign Service Association since I was, myself, a management official and, therefore, was part of management and not part of the body of employees. The evidence was that I had had the influence to change her assignment. So I was brought before a board in the Department of Labor and had to defend myself, successfully in the end with the pro bono help of an expert Washington attorney.

Q: I recall the period. There was an awful lot of heat within the Foreign Service — correct me if I'm wrong — particularly among people who felt that the Foreign Service “had done them wrong.” Didn't promote them or something. You know, hell hath no fury than someone who hasn't been promoted. Did you find that this group, which was really just mad at the Foreign Service, was leading the AFGE stuff?

HARROP: It was a very difficult time. An officer named John Hemenway had been selected out of the Foreign Service. He brought a private lawsuit against me as Chairman of AFSA, which I had to defend in court. He claimed that I had made it more difficult for him to run for office in AFSA. There was a lot of ill feeling and a lot of passion. Another officer who had been dropped from the Foreign Service — I don't know whether he had

been “selected out” or just failed to be promoted — named John Harter also was very bitterly opposed to me, although neither I nor AFSA had had anything to do with his career. These people felt that the leadership of AFSA was itself a kind of establishment. In order to get at the Foreign Service, they wanted to go with AFGE and really shake up or break down the whole Foreign Service system.

Q: At this time I was a voting member but not involved in this, looking at this whole question from the outside in — although I was a Foreign Service Officer. Revenge seemed to be their prime motive — Luddites, or whatever you want to call it. They were trying to destroy the machinery.

HARROP: Yes. We finally won the representation election, when it was held in the Department of State, in USIA [United States Information Agency], and in AID [Agency for International Development]. We lost two small units which went with AFGE. One was a group in USIA who were only nominally in the Foreign Service, and another group was the faculty at the Foreign Service Institute. But we won that election [as a whole] and then endeavored to defend the interests of the Foreign Service, vis-a-vis management, under the new rules. I had a long and, I think, both honorable and confrontational relationship with Bill Macomber, who at the time was Under Secretary for Management. We had considerable, mutual respect, but we had some very hard words also.

Q: Macomber had the reputation of having a very explosive temper.

HARROP: Yes, he did.

Q: Could you tell me a little bit about dealing with him?

HARROP: He is a very human man but also, as you say, has an explosive temper. He knows that. He worries about his own temper. I found that we could work together. He had great respect for the Foreign Service, although not himself a Foreign Service Officer. When I was able to demonstrate to him that the body of the Foreign Service was behind

our position, he would normally try to accommodate himself to that. I remember F. Allen “Tex” Harris, a man who worked with me for a time as Deputy Chairman [of AFSA]. He is himself now Chairman of AFSA and has in turn gone on leave without pay. Tex Harris is a man about 6'4” in height and must weigh about 260 pounds. He is a big, friendly, bluff Texan and also a lawyer. He is persuasive, forceful, gregarious, and effective. I remember that I once telephoned Bill Macomber concerning some issue that meant a lot to us. I said, “Look, we really care about this, and I hope you can find a way to go along with our point of view.” Macomber said, “Damn it, if you'll promise not to send Harris over here again, I'll do it.”

A second phase of all these problems came with the grievance situation, since the Department of State and the Foreign Service had never had an objective grievance/appeal system. There was great concern and anxiety over it. Alexis Johnson, for instance, felt very strongly that “Papa knew best,” that the senior people had to decide these things, and that those affected shouldn't be able to appeal to objective, third parties. He felt that such matters should be taken care of inside the Foreign Service. We had a very difficult time with this matter. About that time an officer that had been “selected out” committed suicide, a man named Thomas.

Q: Yes, Charles Thomas. There were two Charles Thomas's.

HARROP: Thomas' wife was embittered. She became very active politically, drumming up Congressional support.

Q: Her name was Cynthia Thomas.

HARROP: Cynthia Thomas. She is quite a capable woman, actually. It was clear that we had to have some kind of objective grievance system in the Foreign Service. Yet we wanted to have it in such a way that it would not destroy the fabric of the Foreign Service. We were able to get a program through, and subsequently into legislation, which, I think, did that. But it was a difficult and divisive issue. On one occasion I sent a circular cable out

to ambassadors throughout the world which asked, “Will you support us on this?” We had an overwhelming flow of support from the ambassadors. It was heartwarming, really. That, I think, broke the Department's opposition.

Q: I had the feeling that, starting with Lannon Walker and then continuing with you and Tom Boyatt, this process involved a generational change. The older generation, represented by U. Alexis Johnson and others, although they themselves might not have come from money, thought that [when you encountered problems], you gritted your teeth and hoped that your family would support you. This was more than a job. It was a calling. For those of us who came in after World War II [service in the Department of State] was a profession, but we had wives and children whom we had to worry about.

HARROP: I think that the Foreign Service, the traditional Foreign Service, had become somewhat out of phase with social evolution in America. There is more of a problem now than there was then. We are in difficulty in the Foreign Service, because of Americans' insistence today upon individual rights — the individual against the institution — and the reluctance to commit oneself to a life-long calling, as most of us did 30-50 years ago. That commitment no longer is the case. My own son is a very capable young officer who is now on his third tour, currently in Washington. I don't know whether he's going to go abroad again or not. His wife and he are both lawyers. They don't feel that sense of commitment. It never occurred to me that I wouldn't go abroad again or wouldn't stay in the Foreign Service. They're looking [at this situation] every day, asking themselves, “What's our best bet? Should we stay here or should we go?” I think this is true of virtually all of the younger people now. I believe that the Service loses a great deal when its members no longer have that sense of long-term commitment to an institution despite the fact that it's been even more buffeted than the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency seems to have been more successful than the Foreign Service in retaining that sense of cohesion and coherence.

The other day I went to the funeral of a fellow who'd been my Chief of Station at one post and saw many CIA people who had been his friend — people who included senior officers and those at all levels. That reconfirmed in my mind the feeling sense that they still retained more of that sense of being part of an institution, working together in a single direction, than the Foreign Service does. I guess it's not surprising, since they work under certain pressures which round them together against the rest of the world. They have to have secrecy, and their lives must be conducted in a very unusual and special way which they share among themselves. This would tend to prolong the sense of institution.

Q: A minor digression. In a way what we're doing here right now is part of a very modest effort in one direction of trying to pass on to the next generation what people do. I think that the Foreign Service and the Department of State have been terribly remiss. They have done virtually nothing to draw attention to the fact that they recruit an elite. However, they don't do much about telling this elite why they're special and what they've accomplished.

HARROP: I think that's true. But it's been possible to maintain this quality, and I think it's been fascinating that, despite all of the problems, social introspection, and difficulties over the past 20 to 30 years, the quality of the recruits that we are bringing in remains very, very high. I've served with young officers at every post and I'm struck by the fact that this quality stays up.

Q: Were there any other, major things that you were dealing with in AFSA?

HARROP: Sure. On the professional side we were working hard to bring the Foreign Service more into American public life and to establish a constituency interested in foreign affairs and in the welfare of the Foreign Service. AFSA's worked on this for a long time. I guess it began, really, with the “Young Turk” group in the late 1960's. [We have tried] to get more Foreign Service Officers out, speaking to public groups, attending meetings with members of Congress, business people, and academic people — trying to get the rest of the country to understand the role of the Foreign Service better and trying to make

the Foreign Service more open to influences from the rest of the country, trying to fend off the risk of insularity. This is always a risk when you have an institution with its own strong culture, with a sense of elite-ness.

Q: I've often heard complaints that the Foreign Service really didn't understand the importance of working with Congress to develop a constituency...

HARROP: Yes, it's a common criticism, and essentially probably true. The role of Congress was nowhere near the same, 30 years ago. There's been a secular increase in the day to day involvement of Congress as a whole — Congressional committees and individual Congressmen — in foreign policy issues. This really was not the case when I entered the Foreign Service. I remember very well — and this is a sharp contrast — that in the 1950's and 1960's it was regarded as not only improper but possibly illegal for foreign diplomats assigned to Washington — ambassadors and others — to deal directly with Congress. One even heard talk about taking action against them, if they dealt with the Congress. They should work with the executive branch. The Constitution made that clear. Now it is a very common phenomenon for foreign diplomats to work with Senators and Representatives. I've heard Secretaries of State say to ambassadors, “Well, you really should talk to Senator So-and-So about that because he doesn't understand your point of view. Go and have a talk with this or that committee.” So we've come full circle on that subject. The Congress has become much more intimately involved in foreign policy — I think with both good and ill effect. There are some very real problems in the efforts of Congress to make individual, “fine tuning” decisions, to allocate funds, or to earmark AID money, which is the most evident aspect. But it's not just that. It involves a hundred, different directions.

Q: Then you came back [to the Department of State] in 1972-1973 in the policy planning area.

HARROP: That's right.

Q: How did you leave AFSA? How were you replaced?

HARROP: Well, one of the issues which we had at that time was the role of women. We were energetic, working with NOW [National Organization of Women]. We had some active women on our board [of directors]. I tried to promote the role of women in the Foreign Service and to achieve greater equality — I think, with some success.

Q: Was Alison Palmer active at that time?

HARROP: Alison Palmer was very active at that time.

Q: Could you talk a little about how she worked or did not work with AFSA, because she was a very controversial figure?

HARROP: She was a difficult person for me to communicate with. Alison Palmer is the woman I was referring to who brought suit against me for helping her to change her assignment in Washington. I didn't mention her name before. She could be difficult — I would say even vicious. She had become completely embittered about the role of women in American society, and particularly in the Foreign Service. She seemed cynical, almost iconoclastic, and carried through that way. She was an intelligent and capable officer but was just totally soured.

Q: This is one of the things I know of, particularly in personnel matters. One can't help thinking of three names: Alison Palmer, John Hemenway, and John Harter. Iconoclastic is probably the best term to use for their attitude. They weren't really looking for a solution [to problems] but were almost [trying] to destroy, out of a feeling almost of vengeance. I get this feeling...

HARROP: They were very, very bitter. In fact, some five years later, when I was first nominated to be an ambassador, they came to testify against me before the [Senate] Foreign Relations Committee, and then pursued me in subsequent nominations in a

hostile and provocative way. It's very sad, but I suppose it could be said, that there are people such as these who were destroyed by their experience in the Foreign Service. You would have to go carefully into the whole history [of this matter] to understand it.

Q: How did you feel about AFSA when you left it in 1971? Where was it going?

HARROP: I was concerned that it would be difficult, as it had been for the NEA (National Education Association), which had tried the same thing that we had: to be both a professional association and a union. In the case of the NEA, they appeared to drop the aspect of a professional association and became an outright union. There's kind of a Gresham's Law, if that's the right term, that applies here. The union issues tend to push out the professional issues. But that, in fact, has not entirely occurred with AFSA, which is still much involved in professional matters and is still doing many things of a responsible, professional nature. So I'm pleased that up to now AFSA has been able to combine the two. I left AFSA with a strong, positive feeling for the Foreign Service and a positive feeling for AFSA itself, as well as with deep concern that only about 10% of the Foreign Service really cared about the institution enough to find time to do something about it.

I don't know how many times I've talked to colleagues, some of them the best-known “names” in the contemporary Foreign Service, including chiefs of mission and assistant secretaries about the Foreign Service. To my astonishment I have often found that they don't know even the basic elements of their own personnel system — even things that affect them personally such as their own annuity situation, their allowances, what will happen to their spouse and children after they die. They simply aren't concerned. They are focused exclusively on national interest, policy questions, foreign policy. So there is a very small group that tries to defend AFSA and the Foreign Service as an institution. But you can get those other people, the very silent majority, to rally around, as I learned from experience, when you have some major issue. You can appeal to them in terms of the Foreign Service, and they will usually come through. They just don't spend time on it and they're not involved on a day to day basis.

Q: Then how did your job in policy planning come about and what were you doing?

HARROP: I guess it came about in part because I had become fairly prominent as the Chairman of AFSA during this turbulent period. I'd just been promoted to FSO-2, which was fairly senior in the Foreign Service, now the rank of counselor.

Q: This is the equivalent of a brigadier or major general.

HARROP: Brigadier general, I guess. Our military friends hate to admit that analogy. I was still Chairman of the American Foreign Service Association, but I was going to return to my career from leave without pay. I was concerned about where I would go that would not be a clearly managerial position, so that I could still represent the Association. Assignment to the Policy Planning staff seemed to be a good compromise. This was suggested, and that was what I did. Arthur Hartman was then the head of the Policy Planning Council. I'd known him — I'd replaced him once before in the European Bureau. We were friends, and so I joined that organization and worked, as a matter of fact, more on management issues than on policy issues; the Policy Planning Council at that time was going through a period of experimentation. It was called the Planning and Coordination Staff. I was working on the coordination side, which was the managerial side.

I found it very interesting and became involved right away in a major issue which I followed both as Chairman of AFSA and as an officer on the Policy Planning Council. We'd gone through several repeat performances of the Department of Commerce's seeking alliances in the American business community to strip away the economic and commercial aspects of overseas representation from the Foreign Service and the Department of State. Another one of these efforts came up at that time in the form of a bill introduced by Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington, who was then Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee. The Magnuson bill would have simply stripped most economic responsibilities out of the Department of State and put them in the Department of Commerce. I regarded that as a tremendously undesirable development for the country as well as the Foreign Service. I

worked hard to defeat this bill, both on Capitol Hill and inside the executive branch. John Irwin was then Deputy Secretary of State. I worked very closely with him on the subject. And we succeeded. We defeated the proposal.

However, it came back again. The Foreign Service always has a short memory for bureaucratic issues. Without very many people willing to spend the time which I had spent on this subject, it came up again six or seven years later — and, 10 years later, passed into law.

Q: At least the commercial side.

HARROP: Yes, only the commercial side, although the office of the Special Trade Representative was soon to be established with responsibility over trade negotiations.

Q: Apart from a feeling of just plain "turf," why would it have been a good thing to have both the commercial and economic aspect in the Department of State, as opposed to Commerce?

HARROP: Because, on the one hand, those areas are so intimately part of foreign policy. You would further divide the management of foreign policy if you had other cabinet secretaries or ministers of government formally running parts of foreign policy. Secondly, in fact, ambassadors and Foreign Service Officers are really more effective than people from the Department of Commerce in defending the interests of American business and American exports. This has been demonstrated frequently. I worried very much that one of the reasons that the whole issue came up and nearly succeeded at that time — and did succeed later — was that Foreign Service officers were often "blind" to the importance of these matters. Foreign Service Officers tended to focus on political and otherwise defined economic issues and not to put their backs into export promotion and the support of American business interests. This was costly for the entire country, as well as for the Foreign Service itself. I felt we might correct this psychology in the course of opposing Magnuson"s proposal. In the process, we changed the name of the Bureau of Economic

Affairs to the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, and did a number of things to raise the importance of business support. We were trying to bring about a cultural change and, in that sense, ultimately failed. The Foreign Service did not then really grasp the fact that export promotion was a major part of its responsibilities, did not put itself into it, and lost this function. The failure of the Department of Commerce to handle this function effectively since then is clear enough. I don't know whether [this function] will ever come back [to the Department of State], but in any case the interest of American exporters and investors are still not effectively defended by Ambassadors and FSOs, and U.S. companies look to the Ambassador for support.

One of the themes of the whole AFSA “movement” is that there should be unity in foreign policy efforts, that there should be central direction, and a central personnel system with, perhaps, branches in agriculture, commerce, and elsewhere, a single “Foreign Service of the United States.” There should be a coherence to foreign policy management in a world which is more and more fractioned and split up vertically.

Q: I've always had the impression, never having worked with it particularly, that the Department of Commerce has traditionally been a very “weak” Department and poorly managed. This would obviously reflect on its “clout” and its ability to deliver.

HARROP: I think Mr. [Ron] Brown, our new Secretary [of Commerce], is having a disillusioning experience. He is a man of tremendous energy and ambition. I suspect that he's found that he doesn't have an effective instrument to deploy.

Another cause that we worked on at that time in the Policy Planning Council, and which I've expended much energy over the years, particularly as Inspector General, was “management by objectives.” This is the effort to do institutionalize planning and programing into the management of foreign affairs.

Q: Could you explain what “planning by objectives” is?

HARROP: The notion of designing your purposes ahead, over a period of time — whatever the schedule is you wish to use, normally a year, with longer periods beyond that. Then, on a “rolling” basis, review how you are going to attain your objective, setting out, as concretely as possible, the steps that will be necessary to realize the purposes that you want to achieve. This tool is used in virtually all successful enterprises outside of foreign policy. There has always been monumental resistance to it in the Foreign Service. There is a preference for doing things “by the seat of the pants”. Officers will say, “Well, how can I tell whether they're going to devalue the currency?”, or “How can I tell if they're going to invade their neighbor?” If you aren't careful, you find that your foreign policy is a policy of reaction to others' actions, instead of thinking through where you want to go and where you are going to allocate your resources in order to influence people and events.

It's a continuing struggle. We've made a good deal of progress on it. Foreign policy is not a perfect world. [Your objectives] cannot be fully realized, and, in fact, you can't predict when one country is going to invade its neighbor or devalue its currency. But if you know where you're going and you've set yourself up to pursue defined objectives, you can do much better. We're doing better.

Q: Policy planning and, again, your part of the management side, would seem to be running counter to what was the great engine of the Nixon administration, the National Security Council. Did you feel that you were being undercut or shoved aside...

HARROP: You mean, to the extent that the National Security Council itself was trying to play the role of the Department of State? Sure. That was a big problem. Actually, Arthur Hartman had already become a favorite of Henry Kissinger at that time, and that was a help, from the Policy Planning Council's point of view. But it was a real problem. That sense of working in an institution, which was challenged, and challenged successfully on a daily basis, by a small team in the White House, was a disillusioning matter in the Department of State. People say from year to year, “Morale has never been lower in the

Department of State.” Such comments seem always in fashion. However, that particular era — of Kissinger and Rogers — really was especially difficult.

Q: Moving away from the management side, because you were on the Policy Planning Council staff, what were some of the prime issues that we were concerned about which the policy planners were looking at? This was the 1972-73 period.

HARROP: The Middle East was always [a matter for concern]. The Rogers' Plan was the current program for attacking Arab-Israeli issues. There was great concern about the future of the developing world and the American relationship to it. The evolution of Europe was a heavy topic, and we were kind of “regrouping,” because in the early 1960's there had been a sense of exhilaration over the integration of Europe and [the prospect of] a really valid partner abroad. We could set the risk of war aside in Europe by helping [the European countries] to bind themselves together and develop a more effective political and economic structure. There was a certain disillusionment in that connection as the problems came up, as De Gaulle and the British, in an odd alliance, set that whole movement back. That was a matter of focus to policy planners. We were still involved in the Vietnam War, another matter of daily concern. And always the Soviets and the strategic competition.

Q: Was the opening to China taken out of your hands?

HARROP: No, that was an issue on which a lot of time was spent in the Department — and to some good effect. There was concern and interest. There was a naive feeling of exhilaration in the country that China had more or less replaced Europe as the center of America's future. Ten years later, taking part in an inspection of Foreign Service posts in China, I saw the way in which American companies had “jumped” at the chance to go into China and then had proved unable to master the bureaucratic and culture impediments to doing business there. This phenomenon has been repeated, I hope with more care, in Eastern Europe since the downfall [of communism] there.

Q: How did we view the Soviet Union at this particular time?

HARROP: The Soviet Union was viewed, and very strongly, as a contestant and opponent. We were in a bipolar world and we could not let down our guard. Maintaining our defenses and defense appropriations and looking at foreign policy issues in terms of the Soviets were very much in vogue.

Q: Did the policy planning element in the Department of State get at all involved in the covert activities of the CIA? I'm not talking about "spying" but trying to overthrow regimes, to exert influence or something like that, to help set [national] goals?

HARROP: I was not involved in intelligence or covert issues at that time. To what extent a more narrow circle [in the Policy Planning Council] was involved, I don't know.

Q: Then you left Policy Planning in 1973 and went off to Australia? What were you doing and how did that come about?

HARROP: Marshall Green was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and a most distinguished Foreign Service Officer. He had been Ambassador to Indonesia and Charg# d'Affaires in South Korea and had held various other positions in Asia. He simply did not "get on" with President Nixon. He didn't really approve of the policy in Vietnam, although he loyally carried it out. From a personality point of view they didn't mesh. Nixon is a very serious man, I would say, without much sense of humor. Marshall Green tends to be — not flippant, but witty, a clever, a quipster, a punster. He is able to look at things in a light way, and makes jokes about issues when tension rises. I understand that Nixon just hated Marshall Green's puns — couldn't stand them. So whether for policy or personal incompatibility Marshall was going to have to move. He was named Ambassador to Australia.

He had to choose a DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission]. Although I was only an acquaintance he chose me to be his DCM. He called me down to talk to him, and off we went. Well,

I'd been replaced as Chairman of AFSA and I was at the end of a normal tour in the Department of State. I was flattered that Marshall Green would ask for me. So I accepted the proposal and had a perfectly fascinating two years in Australia.

Q: You were there from 1973 to 1975?

HARROP: Yes.

Q: How did Marshall Green use you as DCM?

HARROP: Marshall Green taught me how to use a DCM. By happenstance, we arrived the same month in Canberra. The previous Ambassador, [who was] a former chairman of Reynolds Aluminum [a businessman], left just after I arrived, and Marshall came in three or four days later. We were both new to Australia, although he had a long, long contact and experience with Asia, where I had never worked.

We had a Country Team meeting the day Marshall Green arrived. He and I were there at the head of the table of 15 people — it was a large mission. He went around the table, saying, “I'd appreciate it if each of you would introduce yourself and outline some of the main issues that are facing us in your area of concern.” After he did that, the Defense Attach# spoke about our defense facilities in Australia, and the fact that under the new Labor Government they were under public scrutiny and pressure. Ambassador Green turned to me and said, “What do you think, Bill?” I said, “Well, I don't know. Let's look at that further.” I knew nothing about the subject at all. Somebody else described another sector, and the Ambassador said, “What do you think, Bill?” I finally figured out that he was systematically trying to build me up to the group there, showing them that my views were important to him and that they'd better listen to me as well as to him. It worked and I was off to a strong start. I've since done the same thing myself as Ambassador five times. It is an effective technique and builds a strong leadership team.

Q: What were the main issues that you were involved in in Australia?

HARROP: I arrived in Australia shortly after the new, Labor Government came into office. There'd been a conservative government — Liberal, as it's called there — in office for 21 years, under Prime Ministers Menzies, Holt, and others. So for the first time the Left came into power. They were just itching to get at it and to reverse all of the “criminal, reactionary policies” that had been followed the previous 21 years. They pulled their forces out of Vietnam in a matter of days. They brought to the top of their agenda the three major American defense facilities in Australia, which were highly classified but which people knew vaguely to have some relationship to space or to atomic energy or communications. They whipped up public opposition to these facilities. There were marches on two of them. One was near Alice Springs or Pine Gap, as it was called. Another was at Woomera, in South Australia, and the third was at Northwest Cape in western Australia, a naval communications facility north of Perth.

The atmosphere was actually quite tense. The government was very critical of the United States. It seemed determined to demonstrate, on a daily basis, that Australia was no longer a “satrap” of America. It established relations with China right away, sent an ambassador there; other such steps were taken very, very quickly. So we Americans felt a certain amount of pressure. It was an interesting and exciting time to be in Australia. We had about $5.0 billion in American investment there, but the country was in economic difficulty, partly through mismanagement. It was a time of particular political excitement and confrontation because of the policies of the new Australian government. Gough Whitlam was the new, activist Prime Minister.

Q: Did you find, when you were dealing with the Australians — was this sort of a reflection of the British labor movement?

HARROP: Well, some of the extremes in Australia were a reflection of the British labor movement, because Australian labor had been very much “tutored” by their British counter parts. I'd never been in a society so persecuted by strikes, by industrial action, as Australia. I don't think that there was ever a day in which some group was not on strike

— if not the airline pilots, it would be the mailmen or the bakers or the autoworkers or the engineers, the health workers or the teachers. The society was crippling itself. A pervasive self-conscious radicalism which had been kept under wraps for a long, long time had burst free. Even stronger than the opposition to American leadership, was the outright hostility to the [British] Crown and to London and toward even being a member of the [British] Commonwealth. We had to be careful not to appear to be in alliance with the conservative elements in Australian society. People from the older generation would come to us and say, “You understand that we don't agree with any of this radical nonsense. You Americans are our friends. We remember how you saved us during World War II. We remember the Battle of the Coral Sea. We are your allies, and don't you worry.” And the [Australian] Ministry of Defense and the armed forces and the intelligence community maintained the firmest possible links with their American counterparts, as a kind of bastion against their own government. The period 1973 to 1975 in Australia was quite something.

Q: How did you deal with the Labor government people?

HARROP: [Prime Minister] Gough Whitlam was a man of parts. I found him fascinating, a joy to work with. Intellectually, he was quick and sharp personally, charming and decisive. A little volatile at times, but a man of great energy. Ambassador Green was very skillful in getting to know the Prime Minister, learning how best to work with him, to earn his trust.

Some of Whitlam's cabinet ministers were incorrigibly hostile to America, men like Jim Cairns. They were real Labor radicals. They disliked the United States and made that fact very clear. I recall that I had difficulty being received by one of these ministers, a man named Cameron, at one time when the Ambassador was away and I was Charg# d'Affaires. He didn't want even to see the American charg#. However, by working through the Prime Minister we could find more balance. We sought to operate as much as possible through the Ministry of Defense and the foreign affairs and intelligence establishment (without undermining their position). These groups retained an intuitive pro-Western stance and were embarrassed by the excesses of their own government. And the public

at large retained a spirit of English-speaking unity. We had not yet reached the point when the dominant generation had no experience of World War II. So it was possible to manage a difficult relationship.

Q: Were there any Presidential visits while you were there?

HARROP: No. It was a critical time at home as well. I was charg# at the moment of Nixon's resignation, and the United States was descending into the Watergate affair while we were there. That was a really tough problem to manage anywhere overseas.

Q: I was in Greece at that time. The Greeks just couldn't understand what it was all about. I think that most Europeans had a very hard time because Nixon hadn't done anything that any self-respecting European political leader hadn't done, and in spades, a number of times. How did the Australians react to Watergate?

HARROP: It was mixed. Some Australians felt that all is fair in love and politics. They just found the way the American nation turned against its President on moral and ethical grounds incomprehensible. But there's a tradition of honor in British politics, which Australians very much reflect, a sense of lines one must not cross. So there was some understanding. I think that there was a very real worry about the implications for Australia, the sort of worry found around the world. The United States was the greatest power on earth, and we were still in the middle of a tremendous bipolar confrontation with communism. People were looking at America's troubles in introspective terms. They were very worried. Was the United States going to falter now as the leader, and what was going to happen? There were many discussions of that sort.

The Australian press is a brawling, robust institution. Rupert Murdoch is from Australia. There were speculative reports coming out all the time about the Watergate affair. It was just a very emotional time there, as it was everywhere else.

Q: How about our withdrawal — in disarray is probably a mild term — from Vietnam? That happened during the time you were there. How did that play?

HARROP: There you also have the different political segments of the country. It was a matter of great worry and anxiety to the conservative elements, to the defense and intelligence community, and to the pro-British, pro-Commonwealth, Western conservative and traditionalist groups. It was really welcomed by the Left and by the Australian government itself. I don't think that they were cynical or bitter, in the sense that they wanted to see the United States humbled in that way, but they did welcome our departure from Vietnam. They felt our policy had been badly mistaken, and it was best that we get out. I must say that the Australian government was dallying a bit with North Vietnam during part of that period.

Q: Although you say that the [Australian] intelligence and defense communities were strongly with us, did you get the feeling that elements within the government wanted to get out of the alliance with the United States and to play it alone...?

HARROP: Yes, but views were mixed. There was a sense of the need to address the social ills of Australia. Labor was in power with a feeling that they had much more important issues in health, education, and employment than they did in Vietnam or anywhere else overseas. They tended to shrink their defense budget below what we thought prudent. They were faced with a political quandary. How could they insult the United States and shrink their defense budget and yet still continue to depend upon the United States for their global defense? That was a theme that you heard often. The defense and intelligence community were very concerned about Australia's security under the new Labor Government. They leaned over backward to cooperate with and fully support their counterparts in Washington — and in the Embassy, too.

There was an interesting dichotomy. In fact, there was some question for a time, I felt, about the loyalty of the defense and intelligence community — the establishment in

Australia, which has always been a strong body — to its own government. They had a profound disagreement with what they felt were the dangerously lax and radical policies of their government, and its failure to appreciate the continuing threat of communism.

Always another issue there was immigration from Asia. Australians were chronically concerned about immigration. In addition to the perceived “yellow peril” they were having difficulties with Yugoslav and Croatian immigrants. There was considerable terrorism, strangely enough, in Australia, caused by and among Yugoslav newcomers, who were a fairly substantial community.

Q: What about Indonesia? What were Australian views concerning that country?

HARROP: It was and probably always will be a preoccupation for Australia, which is more sensitive to Indonesia, in some ways, than to China. Papua New Guinea was not yet independent. It was still an Australian trusteeship under the United Nations. That was a great concern. The Left in Australian politics was very exercised about East Timor and about Indonesian repression of the population there.

Australia is a very interesting country — quite unique, very different, I think, from other political systems. There is something unformed about Australia. It's a country without a long history, without a past. An industrialized, developed country without a history. There actually is, to a surprising extent, a conscious, individual awareness of the convict background. People blush at the notion that their ancestors might have been convicts. It's a peculiar society, but highly attractive.

Q: Were there any reflections of New Zealand? I'm not sure where New Zealand was at that point.

HARROP: New Zealand was part of the ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, and the United States] Alliance. I did not, myself, sense foreshadowing of their later turn on the nuclear issue. There were always elements in both Australia and New Zealand which were

concerned about ship visits and about nuclear questions. That was always a question, always an issue. Nuclear ship visits and nuclear weapons. You see the great concern was that the secret American defense bases would, in some fashion, attract nuclear retaliation upon Australia. That was the political framework in which hostility to the American presence was expressed.

Q: Then you moved from this world of Australia back to your "roots," didn't you?

HARROP: Yes. I was on home leave after less than two years in Australia and was telephoned by the then Director General [of the Foreign Service], Nathaniel Davis. Actually, we were out skiing. We'd had a visit to Australia from former Deputy Secretary John Irwin. While he was there, he had dinner at our house. When I mentioned that on our home leave we were thinking about skiing. he said, "Well, why don't you use our place?" It turned out that he had a lovely, big apartment in a new ski area called Snow Bird outside of Salt Lake City. So we did. While we were in John Irwin's apartment, I received the telephone call from Nat Davis, asking if I'd like to be Ambassador to Guinea. Our sons have joked about it ever since. They heard me say, on the phone, "I'd be honored." They said, "What was that, Pop?" I said, "He's asked me to be Ambassador to Guinea." And everybody laughed and said, "He'd be honored to be Ambassador to Guinea." So that's what we did.

Q: When you went back to Washington, what was the situation in Guinea and what were our concerns there?

HARROP: It was a tense time. Sekou Toure had been in office, I guess, for about 12-14 years. He was the leader of the radical, Pan-Africanist movement of hostility toward the Western world, particularly France. He was defiantly and determinedly trying to implement socialism in Guinea, now a poverty-stricken country which had been relatively prosperous. Guinea possesses about one-third of the world's supply of bauxite, as well as marvelous iron ore resources, water power, good soil, waterfalls useful for generating hydroelectric

power, diamonds. But the economy had been virtually destroyed by this socialist regime. The Soviets had a strong position in Guinea. I remember that they had a mission of 1200 people in that small African nation. The Chinese had about 700 people.

Q: How many did we have?

HARROP: We had 16 people.

Q: It seems as though the socialist idea — I'm trying to use the term in the normal definition of government as meaning control over most matters — has really had a pernicious effect in much of the world. We're recovering from it now. Why did it take root in Africa so much and why was it so destructive at that time? Do you have any thoughts on that?

HARROP: I think that it took root in Africa because communism or “African socialism,” in fact, is the most effective tool for a determined leader to use to take charge of a society. I think that that's the real purpose of it. There was also a revolt against the capitalism of the former colonial powers — a desire to get away from that and change things altogether, as well as an honest idealism based on concern for the “common man.” But actually I believe such idealism was manipulated as a weapon in the hands of a determined, forceful leader.

Sekou Toure was a very ruthless authoritarian, but a man who had a certain amount of personal charm — as is so often the case. He was one of these people who would work all through the night. I encountered another in Siad Barre in Somalia some years later. Sekou Toure would offer me a meeting very late at night. Or I'd go to see him at his request at 6:00 AM and find that he hadn't been to bed yet. He was just a dominant figure, trying to regiment the society. [Guinea] was called “the party state.” It was organized in party terms. The governmental institutions were really manifestations of the party, so that a person's role in the party was that person's prominent, primary credential. After that the individual was given certain jobs as a mayor, governor, or something else. Every citizen was perforce a member of the party. Sekou Toure insisted on certain dress codes.

He enforced a regimentation of society beyond anything that you could imagine. He banned any private, commercial activity. Most people who have seen Africa think of it as shopkeepers, markets, women with piles of grains and nuts in front of them. That wasn't permitted in Guinea. There were no shops — there just was no commercial activity in Conakry or in Guinea generally. It was an unspeakably sad country.

The tremendous presence of the Soviets was an interesting challenge, as far as I was concerned. In fact one of the things that we encountered right away was the use of the Guinean airport, which had been built for them by the Soviets, for surveillance flights over the [U.S.] Atlantic Fleet. Large Soviet “Bear” aircraft, the Tupolev transport, would operate from three airports. One was Conakry, another was Havana, and the third was Angola, out of Luanda. They would patrol the Atlantic Ocean and overfly NATO shipping. I set out to try to reverse this disagreeable and potentially dangerous situation, and finally succeeded in doing so by exerting continuing pressure on Sekou Toure, appealing to any sense of fair play that he might have. He always had great respect for [President] Kennedy and a high regard for the United States, as a matter of fact, despite his determination to establish a socialist system. He was totally dependent on us for PL [Public Law] 480 food supplies, because the productive capacity of his rich, agricultural country had been totally undermined. Since there was no profit involved in producing food, people just didn't do it.

In the end, and with some objections to it back in Washington, I rather equally ruthlessly used our PL 480, Title I relationship with Guinea to force him to close the airport to the Soviets — and succeeded.

Q: Let's talk about this policy a bit. Here we were selling food [to Guinea] for local currency, which was...

HARROP: Guinea was what was called an “excess currency country,” along with India and its rupees. The [Guinean] currency was called the “Syli”. We had billions of Sylis.

Q: Where was the opposition to "putting the screws on" [Guinea]? You know, there should be a "quo" for a "quid."

HARROP: Well, that element in the United States which felt strongly about starvation in Biafra felt the same way about starvation in Guinea. There is that strong feeling that humanitarian assistance should not be affected by political considerations. I was exposed to a recent manifestation of this in Israel, when our support of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union was [regarded] as a humanitarian "duty" of the United States and should not be mixed with the construction of settlements [in the Occupied Territories] or with other political issues. It's the same kind of argument. It was seen as cynical or cold-blooded to use food as a weapon for political purposes.

Q: Were the Soviets in any position to provide food supplies as we stopped providing them?

HARROP: They tried to do this for a short time but were not really [able to do so]. They were over-extended in Africa.

Q: Outside of these overflights, what were the Soviets and the Chinese hoping to get out of this?

HARROP: I guess it was a foothold, a reflection of their rivalry with the United States, maybe a dream that they could turn Africa "red." I don't know. Certainly, there was a rational case to be made for our efforts, looking at [the situation] retrospectively [from the point of view] of both sides. They [the Soviets] wanted to give us a black eye and to establish a Soviet presence. They wanted to replace the former colonial powers and the West by the East and socialism. They were also in keen rivalry with the Chinese. I would even suggest that maybe they were internally rationalizing some of this to themselves by their use of Guinea and Angola for the overflight purposes. This was one way in which they could, in their own councils, explain why they were spending ridiculous amounts of

money in these parts of the world, and that there was a direct, strategic payoff. Imagine, maintaining a 1200-man mission [in Guinea], building factories, railroads, highways, ports, a university, hospitals. It was just incredible.

Q: I assume that they brought all of their supplies in.

HARROP: Yes, everything. There was one area in which there was an economic quid pro quo for the Soviets from all of this investment in West Africa. This was fishing. They heavily exploited the fishing resources of that area of the [South] Atlantic. In fact, they have rather drained it of fish.

Q: Outside of trying to stop these [Soviet] overflights, or using [Guinea] as a base for these flights, what was American policy toward Guinea?

HARROP: There was a humanitarian element to American policy toward Guinea. We had a sense of responsibility for human beings in Africa. This had begun with the Kennedy administration. The Peace Corps had been in and out of Guinea twice. Finally, we gave up trying to keep the Peace Corps there given Toure's suspicions and outbursts. We had no AID operation, except for PL 480 [activity]. We tried to get one little AID project going. I worked on it during the whole time that I was there. It was very, very difficult to do. Obstacles were put up both bureaucratically and politically at every step. It was frustrating, but we felt a sense of not wanting to “abandon” the people of Guinea, who themselves suffered miserably from their misguided leadership. I think that there was some of this sentiment throughout Africa, combined with our reaction to the Soviet presence. I don't know whether either the Soviets or we behaved in a rational way in acting as if Africa was a valid field [for competition] between ideologies and great powers. But the United States felt that we had to play that game.

Q: Did France play any role at this point, or had they been pretty well excluded?

HARROP: The French were totally excluded. While I was there, a very skillful, young French diplomat named Andre Levin, who had been press spokesman [for] Kurt Waldheim when he was Secretary General of the United Nations, was assigned to Guinea as French ambassador. Waldheim had been active in trying to mend fences as a mediator between Guinea, on the one hand, and France and the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other, since there had been accusations of interference and conspiracies. Sekou Toure went through phases of accusing the Western powers of trying to overthrow him. Levin had been very skillful in supporting Waldheim's mediation and had managed to ingratiate himself with Sekou Toure. He was appointed to reestablish a French Embassy in Guinea. He did very well. The [West] Germans also came back with a Charg# d'Affaires, about that time. They were trying to keep their hand in. During all of this period, dating from the early 70's, a major bauxite operation was going on — a consortium of firms led by Americans, but including Canadian and some small French and [West] German interests, also. That is still going on, to this day. Guinea is still the world's major source of bauxite, I believe.

Q: How did you find Guinean officialdom?

HARROP: Only a very few close associates of Sekou Toure had any real authority. They were all “scared to death” of Sekou Toure. You had to deal with the president to get much done. Bureaucratic obstacles and a kind of intellectual lethargy were highly frustrating. Sekou Toure was brutal to his own ministers. I remember, before going to Conakry, I called on President Kennedy's Ambassador to Guinea, who had been there in the early 60s — his name escapes my mind.

Q: McIlhenny?

HARROP: No, before McIlhenny. This man had been an editor of “Look” magazine and later wrote a book called, “The Reds and the Blacks.” He was later editor and publisher of “Newsday” — his name was Bill Attwood. I went to call on him in Long Island, where he was running this “Newsday”, one of the largest newspapers in America. He had had

a strong attachment to Guinea and had played a strong, “Kennedy” role there. He had arrived in Guinea shortly after the ascent to power of Sekou Toure. In his office in Long Island, I recall, he had a picture on the wall of the government of Guinea at the time that he was Ambassador. He said, “Well, this man was assassinated. This man died in prison. This man was tortured to death. This man is now in exile.” Tears came to his eyes as he went over this government of men that he thought of as his friends, all of whom had been destroyed by the dictator. For me, it was a moving experience, I must say, to see Attwood's very graphic recollection.

Q: How about your staff? How did you find that they dealt with what must have been a very difficult post?

HARROP: We were not permitted to leave Conakry. There were some lovely mountain areas — it had been a resort for most of French Africa for years during the colonial period, because of the lovely climate. When you get up high, it's like Baguio in the Philippines. We couldn't go to that resort area. I wanted to visit a friend of mine who was Ambassador to Sierra Leone, one of the neighboring countries. I couldn't even drive down there — it would have been a four-hour trip — because we weren't allowed to leave the capital. Diplomats were kept in town. So it was hard for the staff. It was one of those places in which you depend on your internal resources. That whole small American community was involved in everything that we did — everyone worked together, entertained together, and had parties together. It worked out well. We had volleyball teams. We built a tennis court. I think that morale normally stays higher in a post like that than it does in a post like London or Rome. There is often not much sense of cohesion in a large mission.

Q: What about UN voting? Was this sort of a futile exercise? Every year an Embassy receives a list of UN issues and reviews them with the local government to try to get support. Did that bother you? I assume that Guinea was always on the opposite side...

HARROP: Usually. However, on some issues Sekou Toure was helpful. For instance, he was sympathetic to us on the Cuban Missile Crisis. That occurred before I got there, of course, but he had seen the American point of view on that issue and admired John Kennedy. On certain other issues raised in the UN which I can't recall now — possibly one of the resolutions calling for the independence of Puerto Rico — he had some sympathy with the United States. He was not necessarily a lost cause on such issues. The man was politically rational. He was fiercely independent and did not want to be a Soviet stooge. You could deal with him. Strangely enough, I rather enjoyed working with him. He was the prototype of post independence African socialist leaders.I remember two different conversations I had with him. On one occasion I was trying to persuade him to allow the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to bring a team of experts to give him some advice on how to manage his economy. He said, “Look, that's fine for a country like Switzerland or Belgium, but in this country the IMF and IBRD are irrelevant. They understand nothing about Africa. We couldn't possibly implement the policies they recommend, these free market things. It would not work. It's out of the question for me to accept their advice.”

On another occasion he called me over for one of those very early morning meetings. It was interesting. There are two parts to the story. He summoned me at 6:00 or 7:00 AM. I had the feeling that he hadn't slept all night. He looked just exhausted. If a black man can look pale, he did. He looked wan and just sad. He said, “You know, Ambassador, I'm so fed up with these Guinean people of mine.” I said, “What do you mean, Mr. President?” He said, “Well, over and over again I've explained to them and demonstrated and told them that they must work for the good of everyone. They must work, not for themselves but for all of society and for all of the people. But they won't work — they won't do it. I'm just sick of them. They won't do the job that they've got to do to make this country great.” He did not seem aware that this was a vivid admission of the failure of his Socialist philosophical approach. Later that morning, I recall, there was a big political rally in the football stadium, where he would assembly 10,000 people to hear him speak. The diplomats sat on one

side — we were very regimented. He was in his classic white outfit — everyone had to wear pure white robes — waving the white handkerchief he always carried. He looked the same to me as he had looked two hours earlier — absolutely exhausted, tired out. He began speaking, and I marveled to watch a politician taking sustenance from the crowd. You could almost see the blood flowing into his veins, you could sense the oxygen, you could see him begin to absorb energy from the crowd he was addressing. Then, by the end, he was his charismatic self — a fascinating thing to watch. I knew that he was drained and discouraged, and yet that political life came back into him as he spoke to his people. It was an interesting experience. Toure was a remarkable orator. He could speak for hours and would often publish the verbatim text — I have a dozen of these books he gave me. His extemporaneous rhetoric would emerge — in fact, was — orderly sentences, paragraphs and chapters, although in the substantive content was balderdash.

Several years after that Sekou Toure died. It must have been six or eight years later [about 1980]. He died in a hospital in the United States. He was brought back to Pittsburgh — ALCOA's headquarters — by the bauxite company in Guinea. He died there, leaving behind complete chaos. No succession had been organized at all. Finally, a succession emerged which strongly backed free enterprise, capitalism, human rights. One of the tragedies of Africa is that the Western world was unable to respond to their call for investment after they had adopted the market economic policies we had been pressing upon them for years.

Q: You left there in 1977...

HARROP: Yes.

Q: And came back to the Bureau of African Affairs, is that it?

HARROP: Dick Moose, who had become Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs...

Q: During the Carter administration?

HARROP: During the Carter administration. He asked me to come back to be his principal deputy in AF [Bureau of African Affairs], where I served for three years.

Q: Could you talk a little about Dick Moose because he's back in the Department now in management. He started in management during the Carter administration, didn't he?

HARROP: Yes.

Q: Then he moved over to AF. How did he operate at that time and what was your impression of him?

HARROP: Dick Moose is a man of tremendous energy, personal charm, and, I believe, of decency. He's a straightforward, open person who has a strong view of how he thinks the world should be. It's essentially a liberal view — at least at that time it was a very liberal view. He was open to Africans, very concerned about racism in South Africa and in Rhodesia and about getting rid of the vestiges of colonialism. He worked very hard on that subject, particularly on Rhodesia and the independence of Zimbabwe. He was effective in this effort, I must say. I think that he played a major role in that whole affair. He had begun these efforts, as you suggest, at the beginning of the Carter administration. He was appointed Under Secretary for Management and held that job for only a few months. I recall that I met him in Abidjan [Ivory Coast], where there was an Africa Chiefs of Mission conference — it must have been in April or May of 1977, and I was in Guinea. He was still Under Secretary for Management at that time. Bill Schaufele was Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, nearing the end of his time in that position. Dick Moose is very concerned about people. He asked everybody's advice about the really good people in the Foreign Service for appointments of various kinds. He felt that the job of Under Secretary for Management was mainly a “people” job — keeping lists and so on.

Shortly after that it came to light that he, in fact, was going to take the position of Assistant Secretary for Africa and leave management. The feeling at the time was that he had not

worked out well in the position of Under Secretary for Management, had not been cut out for it, had not seemed suited for administrative work, and was much more suited to run a geographic bureau. That's why he changed. It was a sensitive topic to discuss, particularly with someone who was your senior. I never went over that subject with him, although we became good friends. I don't really know how he saw that matter himself, but my guess would be that now — 15 years later — he sees himself as accepting a challenge. Maybe he always wanted to be Under Secretary for Management. He may feel that he has a bit of history to set right and needs to go back and do the job.

Q: At the present time he is Under Secretary for Management.

HARROP: Yes, he is. He didn't begin in the [Clinton] administration — Brian Atwood had the job to start with. Then Atwood was shifted to be Administrator of AID, and, all of a sudden, to my astonishment, Dick reappeared.

Q: What was your role in AF?

HARROP: My role really was doing most things that were not directly related to South Africa or Southern Africa — Rhodesia, Namibia, Angola. Those areas Dick handled himself, with tremendous concern and close attention. He traveled a great deal. He became a close associate, really, of British Foreign Secretary David Owen, now Lord Owen who is presently involved in the affairs of the former Yugoslavia, [on behalf of the European Union]. In 1978/79 Owen was working very hard to resolve the Rhodesia situation. I handled most of the management of the Bureau of African Affairs, in effect running the Bureau. The other, major political problem area that we had at the time was the “Horn of Africa,” with which I was concerned. Those were the two big issues we had. Well, there was also Zaire. Zaire is always an issue in Africa. There were two “invasions” of Zaire [by mercenaries] in 1977 and 1978. The United States was concerned about both of these matters. Moose and I both worked on that, but by this time Lannon Walker had

come back on the scene. He had been DCM in Zaire and was now the Office Director for Central Africa. He didn't need all of that much support. He knew Zaire very well.

I spent a lot of time on matters concerned with the Horn of Africa.

Q: We're talking about the 1977-1980 period. What was the situation in the Horn of Africa, and what were our concerns?

HARROP: The revolution in Ethiopia had occurred in 1974. [Colonel] Mengistu came to power — a very bloodthirsty ruler and a very harsh man, in some respects not unlike Sekou Toure, who tried to impose communism or his own brand of socialism on a society which didn't really understand it. The Soviets had been gaining major influence in Somalia for several years. Some time in late 1975 or early 1976 the Somalis invaded the Ogaden area [of Ethiopia] and tried to take back what they regarded as part of their historical territory. A bitter war ensued between Ethiopia and Somalia, with the Soviets switching sides to support Somalia, militarily. The Ethiopians were operating, to a large extent, with American arms which we had provided to Emperor Haile Selassie. It was a major war and quite costly in terms of casualties. It was a very delicate and difficult challenge for the Carter administration, because in this case there was a juxtaposition of the usual, Cold War considerations. The situation did not easily fit our Cold War attitudes. It was a fascinating period.

Q: What were we after? What were we doing there, outside of watching these two adversaries fight over a...

HARROP: We had several different purposes. One was to reduce or oppose Soviet influence, in both countries. The Soviets were caught in a very bad position. Actually, at the outset they were supporting both sides. They had been behind Siad Barre's regime in Somalia, but after the revolution in Ethiopia they were very close to Mengistu, an avowed Marxist. This war began, as I say, with American weapons in Ethiopian hands. Soon after, the Soviets were providing the arms to both sides. In the end they chose

to support Ethiopia over Somalia. They drew back from Siad Barre. We were then in the quandary of trying to decide if we were going to support this opportunistic fellow [Siad Barre] who was certainly the aggressor, against the Ethiopians. We resisted the impulse to provide large scale military help to Somalia but we tried very hard to negotiate a settlement. We wanted to see Soviet influence diminished, we wanted to see the influence of communism diminished in both countries, and we wanted to see stability in the area. It was undesirable to have another conflagration going on in Africa. We wanted to see longer term economic development of the two countries, which we saw as being in our interest, both economically and politically.

In February, 1978, I took part in a rather remarkable trip. By that time the Somalis were being pushed back out of the Ogaden and we were close to a negotiated cease-fire between Somalia and Ethiopia. [Zbigniew] Brzezinski's deputy as National Security Adviser in the Carter administration was David Aaron, who is now, under the Clinton administration, Ambassador to the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] in Paris. Aaron led a mission to see Mengistu. It was the first contact between the American government and the new Ethiopian government. This was four years after it [the new Ethiopian government] came into power. I went on that trip, along with the National Security Council expert on the Horn of Africa, Paul Henze:, who previously had been assigned there. In fact, he wrote a book about Ethiopia, called “Travels in Ethiopia.” Henze, Aaron, and I went out on this trip. I was to represent the Department of State.

The three of us went to England, where we picked up a large aircraft, with only the three of us aboard. This U.S. Air Force plane flew us down from Heathrow Airport [London] to Ethiopia. We had a remarkable, four-hour meeting with Mengistu, trying to talk through a settlement. It was not entirely successful.

Q: What was your impression of Mengistu?

HARROP: I think that Mengistu presented more of a surface confidence than he actually felt. He was in a very correct and well-pressed, military uniform with polished boots. He was sitting in what had been the office of [Emperor] Haile Selassie, in Haile Selassie's palace. I was told that the office was unchanged, except for a prominent bust of Lenin which had been added in the corner. I had the same experience as a couple of members of Congress, whom I had spoken to a few weeks before — Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts and Don Bonker of Washington. Tsongas was then a member of the House of Representatives. They had just returned from a visit to Ethiopia when I talked to them. They had been the first Americans of any official standing to call on Mengistu. Tsongas and Bonker told me that they had sat in that same room which I subsequently sat in, talking with Mengistu. They heard the late Emperor's lions roaring underneath. The late Emperor's office was cantilevered out over the grounds of the Palace zoo. The lions were growling beneath. Paul Tsongas said he couldn't help but wonder if Mengistu had a button that he could push there which would open the floor, and the visitors would fall down among the lions. I had the same feeling as I talked to Mengistu. We all heard the growling of those lions below us.

It was a long meeting. Mengistu was very difficult to reach. He really understood English pretty well but used the old trick of waiting for the interpreter every time. So the meeting dragged on. We didn't see much “yield” or much “give” from him. Subsequently, not too long afterwards, he did agree to stop the war which he had effectively won.

Q: What were you trying to do at that point?

HARROP: We were trying to get a cease-fire, trying to stop the war over the Ogaden. More specifically, we were actually trying to head off an Ethiopian occupation of Somalia. The Ethiopians had really broken through the Somali lines by that time and were in a position, I think, to sweep through to the sea. We were trying to talk them out of that. In the end they did not do it, to their great credit; they had said from the outset that they did not

have territorial ambitions beyond the Ogaden. So it turned out that they did not advance beyond the Ogaden and into Somalia.

Well, I don't have much else to say about Mengistu. I would say that he was an introverted, a closed man. You couldn't easily tell what he was thinking. He seemed to me to be less confident than he wanted to appear to be. This personal insecurity is a danger in a person like that, because he can lash out, as he repeatedly demonstrated that he could. I think that Mengistu is very fortunate to be alive today. He is living on a farm in Zimbabwe — a very fortunate man to survive in view of all the people that he personally killed.

At any rate, I attended a number of quadripartite meetings in London, which seemed to be the headquarters for them, with the French, British, Italians, and Americans talking over our policies toward the [Ogaden] war. I followed that area closely for several years. It was a most interesting time to be doing that.

They were interesting meetings because the four powers had somewhat different purposes, I think. The British and Italians had some residual concern for Eritrea and Somalia, because of their former, colonial position there. In Italy the whole history of Ethiopia has been a kind of strange cultural and political phenomenon. There's a museum on Ethiopia and Eritrea in Rome. There's a little bit of German national guilt toward the holocaust in Italian thinking toward their historical role — Mussolini's role, in fact — in the Horn of Africa. The French participated in the talks because they're an important power, with a military presence in Djibouti, and because they want to be “in” on things. They saw a possibility for developing their influence. These were very interesting meetings, I must say. In the end there was pretty good cooperation among the four western powers because the overall purpose of all four was to reestablish stability and not have their other interests in Africa and their Cold War interests upended by this war.

Q: At that time were we looking for an opportunity to pick up some [military] bases? Did we think that, if the Ethiopians go this way, we'll pick up the Somalis, or...

HARROP: We were accused of that, and our policy was rather controversial in the Administration and in the country generally. There were some particularly Cold War conscious people who thought that we should develop a position in Somalia to oppose the Soviet position in Ethiopia. In fact, this came out a number of times in the form of Zbigniew Brzezinski's strategic analyses about the great importance of the Horn, and of course we did negotiate base rights in Somalia. In the end, we never really developed a lasting military presence.

Q: Did you sense, at least until the winter of 1979, when the Soviets took over Afghanistan — that the Carter administration was trying a little harder to downplay the Soviet threat and trying to look at things on a country to country basis, rather than looking at everything in terms of the East-West confrontation?

HARROP: Oh, very much so. I think that it was a kind of an educational experience for the Carter administration — as events around the world unfolded — to find itself, almost in spite of itself, looking at the bipolar nature of the situation and reacting to the Soviets.

Actually, Secretary Cyrus Vance and the State Department basically wanted to avoid a Russia-centric, cold war based policy, and suspected the NSC of being far more hard line. The Carter administration placed a tremendous emphasis on human rights. I might mention, as a brief digression, the striking elements of that April, 1977, African Chiefs of Mission conference in Abidjan where, as I mentioned, I met Dick Moose. The lady who later or perhaps already had become the flamboyant representative for human rights in the Department of State was at that meeting, her first exposure to senior career diplomats.

Q: Pat Derian.

HARROP: Pat Derian. Her point of view and her perspective was astonishing to the traditional ambassadors who were there at that meeting. Gradually, her point of view began to prevail in the Department of State. President Carter really felt strongly about

human rights. I would say that regarding human rights concerns as a real component of American foreign policy was a lasting legacy of the Carter administration. It goes on to this day in a very strong sense, and has essentially been internalized in the Foreign Service.

Q: Well, sort of reluctantly I have come to the conclusion that that was one of the keys to the collapse of the Soviet Union, when we started playing to our strength instead of to the Soviet strength, which was covert activity, messing around, and that type of thing.

HARROP: It's a fascinating thing. That's just a small example of how human rights came to play a major role in practical terms and why it was so difficult for the Carter administration to come to grips with the realities of the Cold War. I would say that one regime for which the Carter administration had the least affection for or interest or sympathy of any kind was Mobutu's Zaire. The Carter administration just hated Mobutu. He represented everything that they were hostile to, in the field of human rights and everything else. And yet, when the “rump” invasions of Katanga — now Shaba Province — took place, by mercenaries and other elements, he [President Carter] found himself providing air support for Mobutu and reinvolving the United States in Zaire on the side of the central, Mobutu government against Soviet-supported efforts to frighten it out of the country. I think that it was a very hard thing for the Carter administration to do — I know it was, because I was working in the Bureau of African Affairs at the time. It was a difficult set of issues, and we probably did the right thing. However, Mobutu has lasted a lot longer than anyone thought that he would and has been the source of dreadful human suffering.

Q: Let's talk a bit about this. Did the Carter administration subscribe to our general policy of not supporting local, provincial, tribal, or whatever you want to call them, revolts? Was this the overriding consideration?

HARROP: The Carter Administration wanted to view local conflicts as such, not as part of a general confrontation with Moscow. But as the months went by it became impossible not to evaluate these clashes somewhat in Cold War terms. Mobutu, for all of his blemishes,

was always four-square on the side of the United States. He expelled Soviet ambassadors and supported American views in the United Nations. It seems to me that he's been very astute and for a very long time. His was, for instance, the first African government to restore relations with Israel after the six-day war, and the first to answer Carter's call for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics in '78. Many “good friends” of America, otherwise unsavory, were very skillful at taking advantage of the Cold War. Mobutu was one of them. So a [mercenary] intervention [in Zaire] was seen somewhat in that light. However, the realities of American national interest and realpolitik considerations led the Carter administration to oppose the fragmentation of Africa. The Carter administration learned that there were American national and strategic interests which had to balanced against universal values of human rights.

Q: What was your impression of the African corps — the African specialists in the Foreign Service and the Department of State at that time?

HARROP: I think that, historically, these have been good quality people who have learned a great deal about that part of the world and have performed there, by and large, very well. They include leaders such as Hank Cohen, Ed Perkins, Princeton Lyman, Bill Edmondson, Bob Keeley, Bob Oakley, and many others whom I could name — really excellent people.

Q: Did you see the problem, at least in terms of the “corridor reputation” of ARA, the Bureau of American Republic Affairs? The problem is that people tend to serve in ARA so long that they really don't see any other part of the world. Did you find that African specialists should take a little broader view [of events] or not?

HARROP: I think that there is a danger of becoming too specialized. What we saw very often, interestingly enough, was a migration to Africa at the ambassadorial level of people from Asia, but more often from Europe. This was because there would be a large corps of officers of very high quality in Europe and no access to embassies in “their” part of the world since these were taken up by political appointees. So we had a

stream of ambassadors appointed to African posts, coming from Europe, who had not previously served in Africa. That has had very mixed results, actually. I tend to believe that diplomacy is a profession of skills which are geographically transferable. If you can handle government issues and American interests and problems in Helsinki, why you can probably do it also in Kuala Lumpur. I happen to believe that. But we did have some experiences in Africa with ambassadors from other areas which did not work out awfully well. But some Foreign Service African experts have performed very well in other areas — for example, Ray Seitz, now Ambassador to the UK, and Frank Wisner, now Under Secretary of Defense, not to mention Frank Carlucci.

Q: As we were talking about this, I thought of another factor, too, with the Latin American types. There is so much diversity in that area, and many of the posts aren't that bad [to serve in]. They tend to go to Washington and back to Latin American posts, whereas many of the African posts are difficult. So somebody serves for a while in Paris, or in Asia. Eventually, as a relief, they are given a post some place else.

HARROP: I think to a greater extent than in Latin America, but not as much as you might think. I think we have had too many officers whose lives revolve around Africa.

You know, we went through that period with Henry Kissinger when he was just determined to...

Q: "GLOP" [Global Perspective].

HARROP: "GLOP."

Q: Anyway, the [initial] idea was to break up the group of Latin American specialists.

HARROP: It was about Latin America, at least partly so. But the more important thing, from Kissinger's point of view, was that he wanted "his" diplomats to think of American

strategic interests in global terms. He felt that we were a global power and not a regional power. He felt that you had to serve in various parts of the world to understand that.

There was a lot to be said for what he meant. You always have a tension in a diplomatic service between “generalists” and “specialists.” You have a similar tension between area expertise and broader functional expertise. Maybe that's another form of the difference between generalists and specialists. The tension is always there — there's no answer to it. It's important, but not necessarily a bad thing.

Q: I thought we might talk about Kenya and then stop for the time being. You left the Bureau of African Affairs in 1980 and served from then until 1983 as Ambassador to Kenya. How did that assignment come about? For one thing, one looks at this and says, “Kenya is the sort of place which a lot of political appointees thirst to have.” How did you happen to get that post?

HARROP: I was probably fortunate. I replaced a political appointee, Wilbert LeMelle and was replaced by another political appointee, Admiral Gerald Thomas. I don't know — it just happened that way. The position was coming open — I think that there was a little dissatisfaction, perhaps, [in the Department] with Ambassador LeMelle and a feeling that it might be time to send a professional diplomat to Kenya.

It was a fine tour from my point of view. Kenya is a country of great fascination. The British heritage there, I think, was as strong as in any of the former British colonies. There was a sense, when I arrived in 1980, that Kenya had greater prospects of success than almost any other place in Africa, because it appeared to have a better balance [than most other African countries had]. It appeared to have a better appreciation of the “rule of law.” It appeared to have something closer to a true democracy, a parliament that had some effectiveness, a respect for property rights, and a certain degree of free enterprise. It had substantial natural endowments and many capable people. It also had a lot of former

British colonials who had stayed on and had become, in fact, Kenyan citizens. This was seen as providing balance and a rudder for the country.

However, even while I was there, worry grew over the level of corruption, a concern that has become endemic to Africa, often in connection with all ethnicity. We saw tribal issues in Kenya that refused to go away and became very, very destructive. Then there was the ambition of individual leaders who would not bow to democracy, quite evident at that time. So the handwriting was pretty much on the wall. We also had had some rather difficult relations with Kenya over economic questions. We were trying to support the Bretton Woods institutions [the IMF and the World Bank], which advocated imposing more classical budget stringency and discipline on the Kenyan economy, trying to shrink the parastatal sector and to reduce a really exorbitant level of price controls. On the other hand Kenya became important to our problems in the Gulf.

Q: You're talking about the Persian Gulf.

HARROP: The Persian Gulf, yes. Kenya was really the only location on the Western rim of the Indian Ocean where we could provide shore leave for our sailors. At that time we always had a Carrier Task Force near the mouth of the Persian Gulf. So we negotiated agreements providing military access to Kenya. It was very difficult for President Moi to agree to this, because of Kenya's tradition independence. He didn't want to be subservient to the United States and didn't want any military alliances. So the [port access] agreements were public and publicly ratified by the Senate of the United States but were secret in Kenya, a most unusual and really unworkable situation. We had as many as 40 ship visits a year for a time — to Mombasa. We got into some difficult, bilateral problems. Two different prostitutes were murdered or were killed by American sailors in two consecutive years while I was in Kenya, under circumstances which obviously were complicated and difficult to unravel, extremely political. We had trials, bilateral frictions, and great emotion over those issues, which, in fact, absorbed a disproportionate amount of my time.

Q: What was the political situation — who was running the country and how did you deal with the government?

HARROP: [Jomo] Kenyatta had died in 1978 and had been replaced by his vice president, Daniel arap Moi. Kenyatta was a member of the Kikuyu tribe, the largest group, which had been the heart of the rebellion against the British in the 1950's. His vice president, Moi, was from a small, minority tribe, called the Kalenjin. Somehow, the formal succession system held together. Moi acceded to power as Vice President and then was reelected. He is not an educated man — he did not complete secondary school — and appears to be somewhat slow-witted. Actually, he is cunning in understanding power and the tribal politics of Africa, which is what the politics on that continent come down to. The common denominator is ethnic rivalries. While I was there, Moi was consolidating his position as president and doing so quite successfully. He had a group of cronies from his own tribe around him who were extremely corrupt — not just in political but in money terms. He was himself involved in a lot of business ventures. There was a revolt by the Air Force while I was there — in August, 1981. That was put down, but you could see on the horizon that the clouds were there and that there was going to be more trouble. There has been more trouble, and the Moi regime has become more and more authoritarian.

We had considerable American investments in Kenya and some bilateral trade. Kenya is a tremendous tourist destination for Westerners and for Americans. There are many Americans in Kenya at any given time. Kenya is also the headquarters of the United Nations Environmental Program, a specialized UN agency with its central office in Nairobi. Nairobi was a very busy place.

Q: Here you are, the American Ambassador, in an area with a lot of business activity and Americans coming there and working there. Corruption is endemic and massive. How do you function in this type of situation? We have this attitude that, “We don't mess around

with corruption and all of that." Yet this is how things are done. How did you keep the Embassy going and give advice to [American business firms]?

HARROP: It's a very difficult proposition, and I saw more of it in Zaire. I can't recall the year when the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed [by Congress]. It must have been some time in the 1980's. I was more directly involved in [these matters] in Zaire than I was in Kenya, although I think [that this law] may already have been in force [when I was in Kenya]. American companies overseas just can't engage in bribery or "sweetening" of officers because they'll get in trouble with their own Department of Justice. Also, the majority of American companies feel that, over the long pull, they're better off not doing that anyway. That's not always the case, but the big companies feel that way. We had a few big companies that were very successful in Kenya. Delmonte was very successful in growing pineapple on a large scale and exporting it to Europe. Some of the American pharmaceutical companies were there, General Motors assembled motor vehicles in Kenya, the Corn Products Company was involved in food production and packaging, Union Carbide manufacturing batteries, and there were quite a few others. It was an active place. It's a difficult thing to be in competition when you have the government openly corrupt, openly trying to get payoffs and bribes from companies.

Q: Let's say that an American businessman comes to you or your commercial officers. He says that somebody's asked for this or that [kind of bribe], and he's a cabinet minister. He asks, "What do I do?"

HARROP: I think that the only thing that an ambassador can do is to tell him that he can't pay bribes. That became literally the case when the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed. You try to support him as best you can. I had many meetings with cabinet ministers and with President Moi himself in support of individual American companies and interests. Often, I supported them institutionally. I had meetings every month with American business representatives at my residence in Nairobi and talked over issues that

were coming up. When there were customs or tax issues or regulatory problems, I would go to bat for them — often successfully.

Q: Did you find that, in a way, if you carry on a policy such as this and really stick to it, the government and the people involved conclude that there is no point messing around with Americans and that it's more trouble than it's worth. Did you find that this worked?

HARROP: Well, unfortunately, all too often the Americans decide that it's not worth it. My concern is that Americans kind of cop out, on the grounds that it's too much trouble, it is too costly, too much red tape, it is personally too difficult for them, from the ethical point of view, and also, it's risky for them legally. So you have American companies that opt out of a developing country, often after years of presence. A major American tire company backed out of Kenya while I was there. [It decided that it] didn't want to produce tires any more, because it was too costly, too much hassle. It's too bad to see that, although you cannot argue about a decision based on the balance sheet. American firms retain a certain prestige in Africa. Local people want to work with them and for them. For both political and economic reasons it was useful for Kenya to have them there, among other reasons as a foil to British firms. Some contracts were lost to Europeans because, when you have two, comparable firms — and one will make payoffs and one won't — the first tends to get the nod in Africa.

Q: Did you find that other countries, say the British, the French, and the Dutch...

HARROP: Oh, they're much less sensitive or much less “correct” than Americans are in this regard, if you can generalize in that sense.

Q: Did you have much to do with President Moi?

HARROP: Yes, I saw the president every few weeks. I felt that I developed a degree of personal relationship with him, although he's not a warm man, a bit withdrawn. There was always that sense of tension over economic issues and, more importantly, over military

issues and human rights questions. He was always reserved on human rights issues. I was repeatedly instructed to go in and “bang the table” on human rights. Then we had some very difficult Congressional visits when some of our more liberal Congressmen would criticize President Moi and his human rights practices in an outspoken and public way.

Q: What were the human rights problems?

HARROP: There were people in jail for political dissent. There was a refusal to allow opposition parties to organize, the authority of Parliament was circumscribed. Newspaper editors were arrested — the usual things.

Q: As you [arrived in Kenya], the Reagan administration was coming into power in the U. S. Did you find any diminution of interest in human rights?

HARROP: Probably somewhat so in the case of the executive branch [of our government], but Congress was still controlled by the Democratic Party. Some of the people in positions of authority in the committees interested in Africa were very keenly concerned about human rights and were very outspoken about it. They kept pressing us and pressing the Moi Government [on such matters]. So you had the case of the executive and legislative branches taking a somewhat different attitude.

Q: How did the government of Kenya respond to these [expressions of concern about human rights]?

HARROP: There is a tradition of free speech in Kenya, so the [local] media continued to try to keep after these issues, and would be put down, over and over again — and more and more harshly. It was a confrontation which just did not end. President Moi was consolidating his personal power all the while, and successfully. He was getting rid of possible opponents within the system. There was a resentment in the government, on the part of President Moi and his immediate supporters, of this persistent American concern

over human rights. However, you felt that they recognized this was something that they were going to have to live with and that it wasn't going to go away.

Q: How about the borders? You had Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania. Were we getting involved in...

HARROP: There were continuing problems. With Tanzania there was no love lost between [Julius] Nyerere and [President] Moi, as you can imagine. The Tanzanians were trying to establish a socialist society, depicting Kenya as heartlessly corrupt and capitalist. Uganda was in turmoil with insurrection and continual warfare. The same thing could be said of the Sudan. There was a sense of complete hostility between Kenya and Siad Barre's Somalia, and then there was persistent marauding over the border by ethnic Somalis. There is some Kenyan admixture in the population of Somalia. There were tensions all the way around. The area in which we played the greatest role was in supporting a United Nations effort to mediate the historical problems among Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania — the old East African Federation under the United Kingdom. There was a quite brilliant, former central banker from Switzerland, named Ulrich, a man for whom I have great admiration. Just as I was leaving he finally succeeded in negotiating out the interests of the three parties in the complicated common possessions of East African Community under the British regime. This led to a lessening of tension, with Tanzania opening the border with Kenya. The border was closed almost the whole time that I was there. You couldn't easily travel across the border to Tanzania.

Q: Is there anything else you want to cover on Kenya?

HARROP: I think that I might mention the unusual circumstances of population questions. Kenya, at that time — and perhaps still — has the highest population growth rate in the world: about 4.0 percent annually. This meant that Kenya would double in population — I think the arithmetic states that this would happen every 17 years. There also was a persistent migration toward the cities. About half of the population of Nairobi was

unemployed. Crime was beginning to grow. We spent a lot of time — most of our very large AID program was devoted to family planning programs, in which the Kenyans were interested.

Q: What about family planning under the Reagan administration?

HARROP: We kept it up. We were able to keep it up.

Q: The Reagan administration was taking a rather strong stand...

HARROP: They did, and even though a new Assistant Administrator for Africa in AID was appointed, a Catholic who was ideologically and religiously opposed to family planning, we still kept the program going.

Q: Did you do it by not asking?

HARROP: No, they weren't able to stop the program. The momentum was there, and they weren't able to stop it. There was no issue of abortion, which was the most sensitive issue during the Reagan administration. We worked very hard, and the Kenyans worked hard. I think that we actually made some progress. I understand that [population growth in Kenya] is now down to something slightly over 3.0 percent, which is phenomenal progress. But [population growth] was a major problem and will continue to be. Kenya was self-sufficient in food but, I believe no longer is.

Q: We'll pick this interview up next time, when you serve as Inspector General.

HARROP: OK. Very good. — Q: Today is November 4, 1993. This is a continuation of a conversation with Ambassador Harrop. Bill, we stopped when you had just left Kenya and were going to be the Inspector General. You were in that position from 1983 to 1986. Could you give me an idea of how the job was presented to you when you took it over, because the role of the Inspector General waxes, wanes, and changes all the time?

HARROP: Secretary of State George Shultz wanted to make the point that he was concerned about management and that he was establishing a new “management team,” as he put it, in the Department of State. He was going to pay more attention to managing the institution than other Secretaries had done. So he appointed three new people at one time: Ron Spiers as Under Secretary for Management, Roy Atherton as Director General [of the Foreign Service], and me as Inspector General. He made some public statements about that, and we had kind of semi-public swearing in of the three of us, at which the Secretary spoke about what he hoped to achieve.

Not a great deal of thought had been given to what the role of the Inspector General would be. It was more the framework of a new management approach to the Department of State. In fact, Ron Spiers who, as Under Secretary for Management, was the senior of the three [of us], established a system of weekly Management Council meetings at which the Inspector General, the Director General, the Director of the Foreign Service Institute, the Assistant Secretary for Administration, and the Chief Budget Officer [of the Department of State] would talk about the issues of the day and try to apply our collective wisdom to the problems of budget, personnel, and administration.

As I say, I don't think that a great deal of thought had been given to the role of the Inspector General. This has historically been a somewhat different function in other parts of the government than in the Department of State. In other departments — it is much more the investigation of malfeasance or actual crime in other departments — combined with auditing in a rather technical sense. In the Department of State, historically, the emphasis has been put upon the improvement of operations through inspections. I think that both sides — both the Department of State and the other agencies — benefited during the time that I was there by a set of circumstances which brought those two approaches into closer [contact]. Well, at first, there was conflict, and then, I think, each benefited in the end.

The Department of State began to acknowledge that Foreign Service Officers were not above petty crime and chiseling like everyone else in the world. We paid a little more attention to the investigative side and also began to apply more technically correct auditing systems — really auditing our finances, administrative operations, and procedures to try to be more technically proficient and correct on the money side than the Department of State had been previously. I think that the other agencies began to understand that the notion of a “non confrontational inspection,” designed to improve the way in which business was done, of having an inspector work together with a chief of mission, a bureau head, or the head of any kind of a segment of operations to make that segment or that embassy work better, were pretty good ideas. That is now being done [more frequently] in other parts of our government than before.

This cross fertilization took place because there had been for several years a Presidential Council on Integrity and Efficiency, which is chaired by the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget. This brings together all Inspectors General. A meeting was held once a month or sometimes every two weeks to discuss general management issues and general operational matters in the federal government. It was at those meetings that this difference [of approach] really began to come out. There was more of a “rubbing of shoulders” between the Department of State/Foreign Service approach and that of other departments at that time, for a variety of reasons.

I felt that we had developed a tool which could benefit the entire federal system. My approach was strongly one of trying to work in a non-provocative fashion and to improve operations, although it became evident that we did have enough crime and enough problems of malfeasance that we had to focus more heavily on that. One of the great difficulties of the work of an Inspector General, particularly in organizations like the Department of State and the Foreign Service, which are rather small, elite groups, is that the Department of Justice is very reluctant to prosecute cases of malfeasance. I can remember a number of occasions when we found that Foreign Service or Department of

State people had “chiseled” on travel vouchers or had somehow pocketed, say, $5,000 in one way or another. When I went to the Attorney General and urged him to prosecute, because an exemplary finding would be so useful to us in improving our performance in the Department of State, I found great resistance. From his point of view, it's extremely costly to prosecute, it means bringing witnesses — particularly in the Foreign Service — from all over the world, at great cost, and it means taking the time of prosecutors and lawyers to do the job. In fact, there is very little in it for the Treasury out of the “small potatoes” that we represented. They just had to save their resources, they said, for the major prosecutorial jobs that they had — there were much larger amounts of money or much more important systemic issues involved. So it was very difficult for us to get the exemplary findings that I'd like to have gotten to stop people short and make Foreign Service people understand that there was wrongdoing in their own organization as well as others, that they were not “pristine,” that there were people watching them, and that they had to shape up and act properly.

Q: Were you able to do anything administratively if you caught someone...

HARROP: Well, encouraged very much by Secretary Shultz, we put a great focus on “management by objectives.” We tried very hard to instill an instinctive “management by objectives” approach in the Foreign Service, whether that was called “goals and objectives” or a “program plan” or a “working blueprint” or whatever we wanted to call it. We went through several different iterations to try to get chiefs of mission and bureau heads really to think in terms of setting out in detail what they hoped to achieve in a given period of time and how they were going to deploy their resources to do that. To set up measurable “mile markers” and “achievement points” which could be reflected in budget terms and in performance evaluations.

I think that as an institution we have actually made some progress. Secretary Shultz was very keen on the subject, and so was I. The heart of that effort really was in the Inspector General's office. The Foreign Service instinctively resists “management by objectives.”

The Foreign Service is a highly pragmatic institution, as we know, and as Senator Helms [Republican, North Carolina] so resents. A Foreign Service Officer will normally say that it's not possible for him to predict when an insurgency is going to begin, when elections are going to be won or lost, when a currency is going to be devalued, when an earthquake may take place, when an American will be taken hostage. These are the things which he or she has to deal with every day. You can't just set out a simple array of things you're going to achieve, the argument runs. You're working in the real world, and so forth.

Of course, the answer to that is that if you operate in a purely “responsive” mode, without planning, you're not going to achieve anything. All you're going to do is react to events. You have to have your own program, your own purposes, and your own detailed objective to be effective. We talked through this subject over and over again, and I think that people in the Foreign Service have gradually come to realize that you do have to think ahead, more than was their practice in the past. So I'm pleased to have had some part in that.

We also made some progress on matters of ethics. I was able to introduce a couple of ideas. We circulated a “pre-inspection” program for posts to run through in building up to an inspection, a more detailed exercise than had been the case in the past. People commonly conclude that the major achievement of an inspection will turn out to have been the work done to prepare for it. We tried to make that more tangible. We also tried, in terms of ethics, to make clearer to everyone, from chiefs of mission down, just what the ground rules were. Foreign Service Officers, diplomats, tend to be overworked and terribly busy and don't really spend a lot of time reading regulations and laws about their own conduct and their own behavior. The Foreign Service had to become more sensitized to the notion that you can't take a “free” airplane trip from someone and you can't take different types of benefits from people without breaking American law and without putting yourself in a very dubious position. We worked hard to make that clearer, with some rather pointed disciplinary examples, in the cases of a couple of ambassadors. Ethical lapses

were more likely to involve non-career ambassadors, I must say, but there were also some career ambassadors...

Q: Wasn't there something that happened in Switzerland, Austria, or some place like that?

HARROP: There was a very difficult business involving Ron Lauder in Austria and Faith Whittlesey in Switzerland. Both of them political appointees, wanted to have much more in the way of representational funds available to them.

Faith Whittlesey had been working on the personnel side in the White House before going to Switzerland. She left Switzerland, returned to her job in the White House and then was reappointed back to Switzerland. She went to Switzerland twice. Their idea was to seek contributions from members of their party or their friends, thereby constituting a fund that they could use in various ways for representational activities, in return for which they would invite the donors [to the fund] to dinner parties and other special events in their embassies. It was, in fact, a rather sick idea. They were using the money in the fund in ways which the regulations prohibited an ambassador from spending representational funds. It took quite a while to get at this problem, working with the Legal Adviser [of the Department of State] and also with the Deputy Secretary of State, who was very interested in the subject, too — John Whitehead, an investment banker from New York. He was a good friend for whom I had great respect.

Q: How about the White House? Did you find that you were butting heads with the White House, because these were their "boys" or their "girls?"

HARROP: Not to a great extent. I found that the Reagan White House was fairly correct in these matters and quite useful.

Another function that the Inspector General undertook at that time — and, I imagine, still is — was the investigation of special issues or special problems that came up. For instance, when chiefs of mission were accused of poor performance or misconduct of one type

or another, I had several distinguished, retired ambassadors who would come onto the payroll for a short time to go out to do a job of that type. The two [retired ambassadors] who come to mind as being most helpful and most effective were Tony Ross and Bob Sayre, who would take on one of these tasks and do it with great distinction. It was a very delicate matter.

Q: What would they do?

HARROP: Let me give you a couple of examples. We had the case of a career ambassador in South America who was accused by Senator Helms' staff and by certain members of the military government in his country of having an “affair” with a lady who was organizing a liberal, anti-regime party, and also of interfering in the political life of the country. One of these two former ambassadors went down there and did really quite an excellent job of reviewing the whole thing, talking to people, investigating the matter, and coming up, I thought, with a very useful report which enabled us to clarify the situation. Senator Helms and his very energetic, although, at times, quite vicious, staff did not want to accept our findings and kept the matter alive.

We had another case of an ambassador — also an FSO — in an African country who was regarded simply as not performing effectively and of becoming a liability for the administration, because he was not leading his mission and not doing his job. One of my deputies — himself a former ambassador — went out to review that situation, interview members of the staff and individuals who were there, and come up with an analysis which would resolve that situation. These tasks were often done following an approach to me by a regional assistant secretary, who would say, “I've got a real problem which I can't handle in such and such a country. Is there some way that you could send someone out to look into that?” We would do so.

There was the case of a non-career, politically appointed ambassador in a Scandinavian country who was actually going out and picking up prostitutes in a park of the capital city.

There was just a terrible, public scandal, involving drunken behavior as well. The White House was reluctant to make an issue of that matter but did finally agree to get rid of the man when they could base their action on a documented inspection report.

Q: Just to get a feel for this Scandinavian problem. You would hear about this issue from where? How would something like this come to your attention?

HARROP: There would be two usual ways for it [to come to my attention]. One way would be that the [regional] assistant secretary would come by to see me or call me up — or ask me to come by and see him. He would describe what was, to him, a very difficult issue. When you have a case of gross misbehavior by an ambassador, it's very difficult without documentation, particularly if it involves a non-career person. Without real documentation it's very difficult to take action in a case like that. You would be pitting the political party system of the U.S. Government against the professionals. So what would be required would be documentation. The Inspector General would be in a position to document the situation.

The other way in which it would typically come to light would be through one of our regular inspections. In a different country the inspectors found dreadful malfeasance by a career Foreign Service ambassador, who was using public property for his own ends. He had wasted endless funds on his residence in a perverse fashion. His wife was writing a book, using a Foreign Service secretary and the word processor and copying equipment of the mission which belonged to the government. This ambassador was locked in confrontation with his DCM, who was trying to stand up to him. The inspectors found out about this. We were able to have this man removed, using the evidence accumulated during the inspection and during a subsequent, special visit by a senior Inspector sent there to resolve it.

I don't think that we should look upon the U.S. Foreign Service or diplomatic system as being a particularly soft or corrupt. It's not that at all. But any large organization of people

in government is going to have problems, and the Inspector General is in a good position to resolve some of these problems.

Q: Go back to where you were going after gross corruption and all of this — and all of us who have been in the "trade" know that this does happen. Power goes to people's heads. Let's go back to the Scandinavian type situation, which has happened other times, too. All of us have our stories. I would think that the Assistant Secretary could call up the Ambassador or get somebody in the White House to call him up and say, "Look, this problem is really causing trouble." They might tell the offender to lay off the hookers and lay off the booze or he's out.

HARROP: You might think so, but it just doesn't prove to be that simple a problem, because the behavior comes to people's attention in third person stories, accounts, and rumors. You aren't sure whether the individual has some enemies who are trying to put him down. You don't really know what the facts are. Human beings are very reluctant to call up and dress down other human beings without having a really strong basis for it. The Department of State, including the Secretary of State, is very, very reluctant to go to the President and say, "This, this, and this, and the man you appointed must be fired." In the case of a political appointee, he's likely to be a personal friend of the President. After all, the ambassador is the President's personal representative. It's very difficult to do in human terms. So the approach which is usually taken is to develop "hard" evidence of the problem, and then to approach the President and the White House.

Q: Now if you have a case of this nature, do you, more or less, warn the person that you're coming out to look at the situation, that you've heard various reports, etc? How is it handled?

HARROP: You inform the ambassador that there's a special inspection coming up, that there's a team of inspectors coming out to meet with him. That is an awkward situation when an individual on the staff is accused of peculation — that is, a Budget and Fiscal

Officer is alleged to have been pocketing funds, or something of that kind. Then it really amounts to a criminal investigation, which is done by special investigators from the Office of the Inspector General. That's a difficult situation, too, which must be handled with great delicacy. Usually, only the chief of mission is informed of what the purpose of the special investigation is.

Q: What was your impression regarding teams which you sent out on allegations of criminal offenses? Did you find that, usually, before you sent out a team, there really was something there, or were you getting involved in "backbiting" within the Embassy?

HARROP: My experience was that, "where there was smoke, there was, in fact, at least some fire." You know, we have a "hot line." People would call up or volunteer an account to an inspector of gross misbehavior on the part of some colleague. You would begin with a considerable skepticism, but I would say that, in four times out of five, there was something to it — not always as marked a version as had been reported, because often the reports were vindictive. Usually, there was some basis. It was an unusual case — certainly, as I say, not more than one out of five, when there was simply no truth in the allegations. People do not lightly accuse others to the Inspector General.

Q: On the more mundane side, I can recall going through various phases in the Foreign Service. I came into the Service in 1955. The inspectors would come around. They'd only see you for a short time, but you had the feeling that their report carried great weight. Then, toward the end of my career, I had the feeling that the inspectors' report did not carry as much weight. I'm talking about the personnel field.

HARROP: For a long time we stopped doing inspectors' performance evaluations of individuals in the Foreign Service on the ground, quite specifically, that it was really not appropriate for an inspector, on the basis of two or three weeks at post and one or two interviews with an individual, to do a performance evaluation. The reason that they had had such weight in the past was that performance review boards had become fatigued

with reading overly praising and overly homogeneous reports. The inspectors' reports tended to be more incisive and more curt and blunt than the normal, supervisors' reports. They were treasured — this I know from much experience — by the review boards. We stopped doing that because it just didn't seem quite appropriate.

Then, while I was Inspector General, we went back to something that had been done in the past, which was a special review of the performance of the ambassador and the deputy chief of mission, on the ground that the inspector could get a sense of the overall leadership — policy and substantive leadership and management ability — of the top people in a mission, even during a relatively short time there. After all, the work done by these people was not being observed by supervisors on the spot. It was a way, we felt, in which we could have a major input. In fact, I think that has worked pretty well, particularly since the inspectors, to a greater extent than the assistant secretary, are looking at executive and management performance — and not only the policy performance. In the Foreign Service generally we've tended to focus on policy. It still is the case that people are recognized, appointed, and promoted basically for foreign policy performance, despite a lot of lip service paid to the management side.

Q: You could make a judgment on a regular Foreign Service Officer who was looking for another assignment as ambassador, so this would have some weight. But what about a political appointee?

HARROP: We did these appraisals, and I think that, to the extent that there is rationality in the political appointment of ambassadors, I would hope it would have some effect. I don't know. Certainly, the Secretary of State would take a look at [the appraisal of the performance of a political ambassador], if there were a question of reappointing him or her to a another, similar position. This would be one part of the file, but I would not have any illusions that this would be the major consideration.

Probably, the main thing that I began to focus my attention on as Inspector General was a complete reorganization of the Inspector General's job. I was helped tremendously by two very capable deputies who were old friends of mine: one was Bill Edmondson, the former Ambassador to South Africa, a man of sober, responsible judgment and unshakable integrity and dedication — just an excellent person; and by Lannon Walker, whom I had succeeded as Chairman of AFSA a few years before, a man of great dynamism, personal force and creativity. I think that, together, we were able to form an unusually effective team. We reorganized the entire manner in which the Inspector General's office worked and inspections were done. We tried to build up the investigative and auditing sides, which had been criticized, and with reason. I was really quite pleased with our efforts. We drew up a new manual for the Inspector General's office and for inspectors.

I think it went pretty well. However, I was increasingly forced to spend my time in what you would have to describe as a “defensive operation” against Senator Helms, who became determined to destroy the institution of the Inspector General of the Foreign Service. As part of his relentless campaign against career Foreign Service professionals, he tried to prevent, as he put it, the Foreign Service from inspecting itself. One technique was an amendment to legislation, usually to the Department of State authorization act, in the typical way in which Senator Helms and his very effective and competent staff operated. The amendment would be introduced on the floor of the Senate, without any hearings or discussion of the issues in the committee. With a handful of Senators present for a routine bill, a Helms amendment would go through with just a voice vote. Ultimately, he was able to eliminate the language in the Foreign Service Act which was the legislative basis for the Inspector General function in the Department of State and to bring the Department's Inspector General system under the legislation for inspectors general in other parts of government. His amendment included a clause that the Inspector General could not be a Foreign Service Officer — he had to be someone from outside the service. The Civil Service can inspect the Civil Service, but the Foreign Service can not inspect the Foreign Service. So I was the last Foreign Service Officer to serve as Inspector General.

Q: This is a very important thing to understand — the political process of the Foreign Service. You had to deal with this intimately. What was your evaluation of the motivation of Senator Helms and also of his staff in this almost "go for the jugular" campaign against the Foreign Service? What caused it?

HARROP: I think that there's a deep resentment of self-contained aspect of the Foreign Service — its pragmatism, really. The Senator has a very strong, ideological underpinning for his approach to the world. He resents the way in which the Foreign Service thinks of the national interest in a highly pragmatic way, without the beacon of ideology that he has. He seems to loathe the Foreign Service professional's view of American interests overseas as a continuing reality not affected by the alteration of political parties at home. Somehow, he has built that up into a crusade. He has a hatred for the Foreign Service which is very hard to understand in rational terms. I think that part of his staff [feels] a plain, personal hatred. The Senator tends to employ disaffected Foreign Service Officers or people that have been selected out of the Foreign Service, who failed to reach career status, but still are quite brilliant people. There's a sense of crusade, it seemed to me an ill or abnormal crusade.

Senator Helms has taken his feelings to the point of working to deny to the Foreign Service by law benefits which officers of the Civil Service or the armed forces receive. Military officers who are rotated in and out of Washington are exempted from paying District of Columbia income taxes if they have residence in a state. Senator Helms managed to have legislation passed which provides that Foreign Service Officers in the same circumstances, as presidential appointees, are subject to District of Columbia income tax. Meanwhile, by law, members of Congress and their staffs are thought of as being residents of their states, as are personnel of the Armed Forces, and are not subject to District income tax. The Foreign Service has been singled out by name to receive discriminatory treatment.

Senator Helms is a very effective parliamentarian, an experienced and astute member of the Senate. He knows his work and how to get things done in the Senate. With the peculiar hostile agenda he has had, this has caused great difficulties for the American Foreign Service. For instance, if he has the impression that a particular career officer does not approve of a policy line he supports, the Senator will really go after him personally. This came up most often in connection with Central and South America, a focus of the Senator's interest because he was chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee for that area at the time of which we are speaking. He would insist that there be a special investigation or inspection done of an Embassy he believed varied from his policy position. He would not accept the result of special investigations, which I handled, of certain career officers in Central and South America. I think that one of the reasons why he was going after me and the notion of a Foreign Service Officer as Inspector General was that he wanted to find someone a little more malleable to work with. I don't know.

Q: Did you feel, within the Department of State, that you were being told, "Watch out for this guy"? After all, you were looking forward to a future career, and this man was going to be sitting on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Were you getting the advice from people, "Play it carefully" with this guy?

HARROP: No. I was never cautioned by the Secretary of State or anyone else in the Department of State in that way. On one or two occasions, I felt the Department had trimmed its sails a little because of the power of the man. People were afraid for the sake of our budget, or something of that kind. In my opinion on several occasions, people might have stood up to him with greater determination than they did. But I did not feel a lack of support in that regard. The Senator operates in a very unusual fashion. For instance, I've had six presidential appointments and six Senate confirmations. On two occasions he went all out against me, and I had a struggle. I was delayed for many months before going to Zaire and had a really horrendous time being confirmed by the Senate. On another

occasion, to Guinea, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, Mike Mansfield and Hugh Scott, who did not know me personally, stood up for me on the Senate floor against Senator Helms as a matter of Senate procedural principle, before I could be confirmed. On the other four occasions he simply was not heard from — as if he was not interested. On some of these four occasions my appointment was to a position which, you would have supposed, would be of greater concern to him. His erratic performance and the mean behavior of his staff were among the more difficult aspects of dealing with him.

Q: You're talking about a Senator who has a powerful position. At the same time did you find that there were others [in the Senate] whom you could seek out — "allies" is the wrong term, but rather "supporters" — who understood what you were after?

HARROP: Sure. There are people in Congress who have an understanding of the Foreign Service — or, in this case, my point of view on things. They would lend a sympathetic ear. However, I guess that what happens is that Senator Helms is prepared to press his case to the hilt, to make a major issue of matters affecting a single Foreign Service Officer's career or over some clause in the Foreign Service Act which simply isn't that important to any other member of the Senate. Because he makes the issue so important to himself personally, the others are not interested in using up too much of their political capital to counter his idiosyncratic behavior. That's one reason that he's so remarkably successful. He's been able to destroy a number of Foreign Service careers. Other Senators just don't want to go to bat over such ancillary issues, and they also seem to fear his volatility, viciousness, and competence.

[Senator Helms'] position, articulated quite frankly, was that the other inspectors general could be Civil Service officers — civil service people can inspect and audit other civil service people, but Foreign Service people cannot inspect or audit other Foreign Service people, because they're likely to be "tainted" and likely to be more "reachable" by their own colleagues.

Q: Before we leave the Inspector General experience, you were getting reports in from all over. Did you get any feeling about the relative efficiency and strengths of the various bureaus [in the Department] at that time? This was a chance to review the whole system.

HARROP: Yes, there was a great variation in the quality of leadership in different bureaus. There has always been, in the Foreign Service and in the Department of State, an odd dichotomy between administration, management, budget, and personnel questions on the one hand, and policy questions on the other. The institution has been far more successful in policy matters than it has been on the management side. The Inspector General is concerned with the management. He doesn't intervene in policy matters, although his inspectors do try to take a look to see that the policy being pursued is appropriate and coherent and makes sense. If they feel that there is a problem there, they will invite attention to it by the leadership of the Department. But that's a more unusual matter than problems on the administrative side.

There are great variations among assistant secretaries of state and their staffs in how they deploy their resources, how well they manage their operations, how well they use their money effectively, or how much time they're willing to devote to trying to obtain more resources, if that's required, from the Administration and from Congress. At present, in my judgment, the ability of the Foreign Service to protect and advance American national interests overseas is in doubt because appropriations have declined over the past 15 years below the “red line”. No more easy cuts are possible, and operations — policy operations — are suffering.

Unfortunately, in our system — historically and still at present — the policy side is the only one that catches the attention of the President and the Secretary of State. Performance on the policy side is more likely to be rewarded or punished than is performance on the managerial side — which, I think, should have more weight. As I mentioned, Secretary of State George Shultz made a tremendous effort to focus attention on management. Often,

in recent years, there has been rhetoric about the need to have greater attention paid to that aspect, but the rhetoric has seemed to be just that.

Something else that the Inspector General does which, I think, is useful, is to seek innovative, systemic improvement. The notion of the “small post” came out of the Inspector General's office. We are into an excruciatingly difficult budget situation. It gets worse every year and is now reaching the stage of a real, national crisis in terms of budget allocations for the management of foreign policy. It has been building over the last generation. With this crisis in resources to manage and implement foreign policy, inspectors have been trying to identify savings that could be made in specific areas, positions that could be deleted, and functions and posts that could be abolished altogether. Out of all of this work we developed the notion of the “small Embassy” which would have a much narrower set of responsibilities and would be exempted from a number of things which other embassies are required to do. It would have a staff of three or four people, instead of 30 or 40, and would, we would hope, keep the American flag flying without having to spend as much money as would otherwise be necessary. This concept was developed in the Inspector General's office.

We would also recommend consolidations of bureaus or other reorganization of the Department of State. In a bureaucratic system such change is so difficult that people hesitate to take it on. The power of an entrenched bureaucracy is so great. We've just seen an example in the last few months of 1993 when Vice President Gore's committee recommended that the different segments of the law enforcement, drug enforcement, and firearms operations be consolidated into the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and that different branches of the Department of Justice should be merged to achieve major budgetary savings and to improve efficiency. It was literally not possible for the Attorney General to do this because of the defensive breastworks set up by the bureaucracies and the Congressional committees from which they depended.

This was a very hard problem to take on, but we tried it a number of times. The Department of State could benefit from real reorganization, and some of it is now going on, to the credit of the present leadership.

One thing that particularly galled me, I must say — and still does — was the cost of the “imperial travel” of the Secretary of State. It had become a scandal 15 years ago and is more of a scandal now — because of declining budgets — than it was then. We did a special inspection of the travel of the Secretary. I reported on conclusions to Secretary Shultz. The expenditure of tens or scores of thousands of dollars for the advance teams was not justified, nor were the scale of special security provisions and the autonomous communications arrangements made for the Secretary's visit even if he was living in a hotel next door to the Embassy and could easily use Embassy facilities. I said that it was ridiculous to have a whole jet aircraft full of people, including hangers on and what not. I was unable to get him to agree, although he certainly understood. In fact, when the administration changed recently, I called up the new Executive Secretary of the Department. The Secretary happened to be coming out on his first trip overseas to Tel Aviv, where I was Ambassador at the time. I said, “Look, you and I know this situation. Here's your chance to strike a blow for the United States and for the taxpayer. Why don't you try to organize this first visit in a new fashion? You could probably save $100,000 on this three-day trip.” He wasn't able to do it. I wasn't surprised, because these procedures have an inertia which only determined energy can overcome. It takes a brutal approach to stop it.

Secretary Shultz was very interested in the inspection business. He's an inner-directed and, I would say, a “reserved” man. I would go to him, after doing an inspection of a bureau or a mission or a series of missions overseas. This would have been one example — his own travel budget. I would make a report to him about the findings of the inspectors and how matters could be improved. He would ask a number of intelligent questions. His attention would clearly be focused on the issues involved, and his interest would be

there. At the end of the presentation I would say, “So, to recapitulate, Mr. Secretary, the problems are such and such, the actions which we must take to resolve or improve this situation are A, B, C, D, and E, and I urge that you do that. Here it all is in writing.” He would say, “Bill, thank you very much, indeed.” I would go back to my office and I would never know if I had moved him or if he was going to do it at all. Sometimes the actions would be taken and sometimes they would not be taken. But he was hardly a person who carried his ideas or his heart on his sleeve. So it was a bit frustrating not to have more responsiveness from a man for whom I had tremendous respect.

Q: You were the last Foreign Service Officer to serve as Inspector General. Was it sort of cut out from under you or how did this happen?

HARROP: Senator Helms succeeded in changing the legislative basis of the Inspector General and his office. He was brought under the Inspector General Act and out of the Foreign Service Act: the Inspector General function in the Foreign Service Act was simply replaced by a classic civil service operation. Now, in fact, there is still an Office of the Inspector General, but the individual, who happens to be a college classmate of mine...

Q: Sherman Funk.

HARROP: Sherman Funk. He was Inspector General of the Department of Commerce and now he has come to the Department of State. I think that he is doing a good job there, although the philosophy is somewhat different. I guess my greatest grievance with Sherman is over the budget and resources that he's allocating. He has multiplied by at least three times the budget and the staff that I had. He has vastly expanded the operation in a way which I personally do not believe was necessary. I think that there's too much money being spent on it now. However, I would also say that he has shown a great deal of courage and integrity in the tasks and the jobs that he has taken on. He's done a good job.

Q: Yes, he has come “head to head” with the White House on a number of occasions.

HARROP: Yes, he's shown courage, and I have great respect for him.

Q: We might as well continue this look at the inspection function, because you did serve there for some years and for a considerable time thereafter. I've had the impression that, partly because you had such a big staff, you had to justify it by finding cases of "malfeasance," and so forth, to show that you were doing something. Did you find that the new inspection corps, with much more emphasis on what is termed "We gotcha" type of things...

HARROP: I don't think so. It was always a preoccupation of ours that we not do "We gotcha" types of things, although an individual inspector — even some of our Foreign Service Officers, career people who were assigned to be inspectors — would develop that mentality to some extent. I mean, you're out inspecting and you're looking for problems and trying to correct them. That is a human tendency, I think. But I don't believe that that ever was a big problem, despite the fact that people being inspected thought it was. I don't think it is a problem now. I don't think that the new operation is going in that direction in particular. I think that they're behaving responsibly and don't feel the need to justify their operations by finding problems.

Q: How about the other side? I speak from an historian's point of view. One of the greatest things that happened when we turned to a professional inspection corps in 1906 was the creation of an Inspectorate for consular operations, as it was called. [People assigned to it] were called "Consuls General at Large." There were five of them, and they performed inspections. It drew the service together, and it was designed mainly to unify and to make sure that people were doing things correctly and also understood what other people were doing. What about that function now? Do you feel that the inspection is looking at ways of improving performance and helping the post?

HARROP: Absolutely. I think that's still being done. Mr. Funk came in with the feeling that he had a particular mission from the Congress to reorganize and, I think, to make the

Inspector General's function less of a specifically Foreign Service operation and more of a typical, federal government OIG function. However, I believe that he appreciated very quickly that the inspection and improvement of operations — the non-confrontational inspection — were, in themselves, very worthwhile. He's retained this concept and he's retained Foreign Service Officers to do Foreign Service inspections, I think to the dismay of Senator Helms, who tried very hard to get that abolished.

Q: What happened then? You left [the position of Inspector General] in, what, 1986?

HARROP: Well, it went through a stage. During my last year as Inspector General I was called the “Program Inspector General,” as they were beginning to organize the office under Sherman Funk. We had two inspection systems for a short time, which was obviously not going to work. Deputy Secretary John Whitehead was involved and helpful in these matters.

I can recall a meeting in Mr. Whitehead's office with Ron Spiers, Under Secretary for Management; George Vest, the Director General [of the Foreign Service]; and Nick Platt, who was then the Executive Secretary of the Department of State. We were faced with this incomplete legislation which created the position of “Program Inspector General” and the new office of a non-Foreign Service Inspector General, who was clearly to have the stronger, legislative basis for operations.

At this meeting Mr. Whitehead did not take a strong position. He acted more as a referee, letting the others discuss the matter. My Foreign Service colleagues said that we had to hang on, we had to retain the Foreign Service inspections, because our system really needed that function. They argued that we really had to insist upon maintaining this function despite Senator Helms. I said, “No, we shouldn't. We've lost the battle, and we're better off trying to work with the new Inspector General, to see that the things we believe important for policy making and for keeping our system effective are incorporated into his operations — than for me to compete with him.” My position proved more realistic,

because the handwriting was on the wall. Things were going in that direction. We had a real donnybrook over how we should respond. Ultimately, I did phase out my operation, as Sherman Funk built his operation up. He did, in fact, incorporate the best features of the Foreign Service inspection system. So I think, by and large, the Department of State, despite Senator Helms' personal agenda and efforts, has probably been helped by the whole exercise.

Q: I have to add at this point that we've talked twice — the name has mercifully left me, but the former head of AFSA who was basically out to destroy the Foreign Service...

HARROP: John Hemenway.

Q: Hemenway and Senator Helms. You butted heads with these two "H's." It is sort of unusual, in a relatively small organization, to have people both inside and outside of it — we're talking about both Helms and Hemenway — almost trying to destroy the Foreign Service.

HARROP: But, you see, John Hemenway had been inside, but he had been selected out of the Foreign Service, for whatever reasons. I take no position on the merits of his selection out. It's not easy to get selected out of the Foreign Service, virtually impossible to arrange for the selection out of a Foreign Service Officer through manipulation. I would start from the premise that if someone who has been selected out of the Foreign Service there was probably good reason for the service to have dropped him. Hemenway understandably became very hostile after having been selected out, as were some of these people who, as I say, worked on Helms' staff. They were also disaffected Foreign Service Officers. He was in the same category. He was not an "inside" man. He came back, through a remarkable fluke, and a divided election, as Chairman of the American Foreign Service Association, and was both controversial and destructive. Finally, he had to be formally recalled in a special election of AFSA members. It was a very sad occurrence.

Q: But it is interesting that the Foreign Service...

HARROP: Although the term “elitist” is a bad term and “politically incorrect” at the present time, the Foreign Service is, in fact, and has been for generations, an “elitist” or “elite” organization of very carefully selected people. People who are well educated, ambitious, and have a certain image of their country and their nation do aspire to get into the Foreign Service. They work hard to pass this difficult examination and to get into this career, as in any other prestigious organization, whether it's the U.S. Marine Corps, an “Inspecteur de Finances” in France, or the Coldstream Guards. That's the way it works. By the same token, there's almost bound to be a certain resentment of this, and there will be people trying to tear down any group which has an elitist reputation and the kind of arrogance which, I'm sorry to say, comes with it. So I don't think that it would be surprising that the Foreign Service would be subjected to these things.

Q: One other question occurs to me on this. What about during your time [as Inspector General], did you get involved in matters of women and minorities, meaning Blacks, or African Americans, and Hispanics?

HARROP: Yes, that would always be an element in inspections. In fact, we had several special inspections or investigative inspections of allegations of sexual harassment or of racism at overseas missions. These are always very difficult matters to address.

There was one case in Warsaw, as I recall, a very difficult problem — an allegation of sexual discrimination. However, I guess I worked more on that when I was Chairman of AFSA than I did when I was Inspector General, because of the efforts to organize the women, particularly in the Foreign Service, in an effort to improve their role. The challenge of improving equality in a system has to be shared by everybody.

Q: What happened after you went through this interim stage? Did your appointment as Ambassador to Zaire come up at that point, was there an intervening period, or how did that work?

HARROP: It was during that intervening time. I don't think that the appointment to Zaire was particularly surprising. It was logical for me, since I'd served in Zaire before and had worked in that area of the world a good deal. My confirmation for that position was difficult.

Q: This was because of Senator Helms?

HARROP: Not entirely. It was partly Helms and partly the “Left” side of Congress, which was concerned about our support for Jonas Savimbi in Angola. It was, I think, well known that that support was implemented through the mission in Kinshasa [Zaire]. So it was one of those situations in which members of Congress attempted to use the confirmation process to make some policy points or to try to affect policy. This was a lever available to Senators, as so often happens.

Q: How did this work? Let's take this case. Here you are. You're not responsible for this policy...

HARROP: Well, it's an interesting matter, and I can tell you quite specifically how, in this case, it played out. There are two select intelligence committees, in the Senate and in the House. There are the Foreign Affairs Relations and Armed Services Forces committees in the two houses. Some of the Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee, and more particularly their staffs on the Democratic side, the side opposed to our covert operations in Angola, resented the fact that they were not fully informed by the Intelligence Committee as to what was going on there. So during my hearing for confirmation as Ambassador to Zaire they would ask me questions about the covert operations in Angola and try to insist that I reply.

Q: Could you explain more fully, since historians might not fully understand what the issue was?

HARROP: Well, the MPLA [Movement for the Liberation of Angola] government, the communist government of Angola, was opposed by an insurgent group, UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], under a man named Jonas Savimbi. A war between these two organizations had been going on many years. In fact, as we talk today, in 1993, this confrontation still continues. Savimbi has disappointed many of his acquaintances and people who respected him by not accepting the results of the elections held in Angola. Anyway, just as the Soviet Union and Cuba strongly backed the MPLA government — in fact, the Cubans put substantial forces into Angola — the United States had been covertly supporting Savimbi in his efforts to oppose that communist government. This had been going on for some time, and it was a matter of deep controversy within the American political system as well. A classic Cold War confrontation in Africa. As I was suggesting, my confirmation hearing on appointment as Ambassador to Zaire began to turn somewhat less on my experience, credentials, and competence to do the job, than on issues of substance. Our policy itself became directly injected into the confirmation process.

Q: Then how did you answer and deal with this question?

HARROP: Well, what I tried to do in this case was to turn it back to the policy partisans themselves. I tried to get the Intelligence Committee people to deal directly with the Foreign Relations Committee people, rather than expecting me to form a bridge between them. It worked to a fairly good extent.

Q: Did Helms take any stand on this particular issue or was it...

HARROP: On that issue Helms did not, although he did oppose me because he took strong issue with some of the things I had done as Inspector General, which he resented,

particularly on the Latin American matters which I mentioned before. He was after me on those grounds and put me “on hold” for many months. However, he was not concerned about covert operations. In fact, Senator Helms was quite comfortable with the support given to Jonas Savimbi in Angola.

Q: When you say you were put “on hold,” what does a senior Foreign Service Officer do when he or she is put “on hold” — with particular reference to your case?

HARROP: Well, you can spend a long season just trying to defend your case, preparing your testimony, trying to answer questions from the Senate, and meanwhile preparing for what you hope will be your new job. It can go on for many months, and meanwhile our posts are not properly staffed and our foreign policy is not properly led or conducted because of the delays in getting a chief of mission to the field. When an Ambassador appears before the Foreign Relations Committee, he or she is able to find out pretty quickly if there is going to be a problem, because three times out of four Senator Helms will say, “We have a few more questions in writing which we would like to ask subsequently.” Then, the next day, the Department will receive perhaps five, it may be 35, it may be 75 questions. These must all be replied to. So then you spend a long time, working with the bureau and working by yourself to prepare answers to all of these detailed questions. On some occasions these questions may be frivolous. Usually, they're meticulous, substantive questions. When you get those answers in, which could take several weeks, depending on the substance involved, often after a suitable period of time they are replaced by another series of, say, 22 or 43 questions which must be answered. This is the technique which is used, and the Senator's staff does it masterfully. And then Senator Helms will say, “Well, there is no way in which we can report out this candidate, when we still have a number of questions which have not been answered, to our satisfaction. So this process must be worked out.” And then, when he has no more questions, he may simply, as a matter of Senatorial privilege, say, “I prefer not to have this come up.” And he can hold it up. One colleague, Richard Viets, had his career ended in this way by Senator Helms refusing ever to allow a vote to come about. It

reached the point where either Viets himself or the White House would have to withdraw his nomination, his own candidacy, or our foreign policy would just not be conducted, American interests would suffer because there was no ambassador at the post.

I was held up at the same time, interestingly enough, as the officer who was later to be my successor in Zaire, Melissa Wells, who is now Under Secretary General of the United Nations. She was scheduled to go to Mozambique as I was going to Zaire in 1987. Senator Helms had a particular animosity toward Mrs. Wells. She had earlier worked in the United Nations Development Program and in other places and had taken positions which he regarded as being “liberal” or “incorrect.” So he held her up for several months longer than he held me up. She had a very hard time being confirmed, although only one Senator out of the 100 opposed her. Finally, she was able, by her own determination and belated support from the Executive Branch, to wait Senator Helms out and blast through to a vote which was, of course, favorable.

Q: After all, the head of the Foreign Relations Committee is a former Foreign Service Officer, Senator Claiborne Pell. At least in the Senate the Republicans were in the minority during all of this time. Was it a matter of...

HARROP: I guess that there are four reasons, really, why Senator Helms is able to do this. He is very competent, very tough, very intelligent, and very knowledgeable about the process of the Senate. He is a capable and determined man. Secondly, he plays artfully upon the individual rights and privileges of the individual Senator as a member of the “Club.” The other members of the Senate do not like to put down one of their own in an ad hominem way. You know, there have been rare historical events such as the political demise of Senator Joseph McCarthy, rejected finally by his peers. This happens very unusually in the Senate. Thirdly, it depends on the strength and leadership of the chairman of the committee. I'm sorry to say that Senator Pell has not shown great leadership, toughness, or determination in running the committee. Senator Helms could not necessarily have succeeded, and might not have, with a strong chairman. Senator

Helms had a relatively “inert” Committee leadership to work with. Then, lastly, there is the reluctance of the Executive Branch to put its weight behind issues of this kind, to do what might be seen by many in the Senate, otherwise out of patience with Senator Helms, as interfering in Senate business. The Executive Branch is reluctant to take risks with the Senate. Senator Helms is able to manipulate all of these factors in a quite brilliant fashion and to persevere, because he cares deeply about issues which are not on the top of anybody else's agenda. He can prevail in that fashion.

Q: When did you go to Zaire?

HARROP: I went to Zaire in January, 1988.

Q: What was the situation in Zaire at that time?

HARROP: The economy was declining. It had not been doing well for a long time, under the failing leadership of President Mobutu. The copper market was weak at the time, copper being the major foreign exchange resource of Zaire. This was not helpful. Human rights problems were very serious in Zaire, as they had been for a generation. The Angolan insurgency was continuing. It was very active, and there was a major level of American support for one of the protagonists — Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA. We had a substantial development assistance program in Zaire. We had a large mission, 150 people, of whom the largest single component was AID people. We had a major Peace Corps presence. It had come down from 300 to just under 200 volunteers because of a typical confrontation with President Mobutu, who had chosen to use the Peace Corps as a bargaining chip. It was a country with a deteriorating infrastructure. Zaire potentially could be extremely rich, since it has the most extensive natural resources. About 15-16 percent of the world's hydroelectric power potential is in the Zaire (Congo) River. There is excellent rainfall; excellent arable land; major mineral resources, including 65 percent of the world's industrial diamonds, as well as gem diamonds; 8 percent of the world's copper; 65 percent of the world's cobalt. There is enough oil for the country to be self-sufficient. It

has wonderful, natural communications through the waterways. You could say that it is at the same time a country of breathtaking potential and one that is on its back, economically. It was then (and is even more now) in pitiful condition.

Q: I notice that you didn't talk about the political situation. Was there a political situation to refer to?

HARROP: General Mobutu dominated the politics of Zaire. There were always efforts — part ethnically and part ideologically based — to oppose him, to organize a more democratic system, or to assemble an opposition. However, by his genius for ethnic manipulation and utilization of the military he was able to contain the situation pretty well. But conditions — both absolutely and from his point of view — were troublesome and getting worse.

Q: What was our feeling, then, about Zaire? Here is a country with great economic resources, under an inept ruler who was nonetheless able to stay in power. But what about the people? Was there an educated group that, given the right leadership, could actually do something or were we really talking about a country that would need almost an "earthquake" to...

HARROP: The people of Zaire, as a group, are remarkably docile. This is an odd thing to say about the political situation, I suppose. However, the Zairians seem willing to absorb all kinds of abuse and hardship. They are essentially peaceful people. Mobutu has exploited these qualities to a fare thee well. They have tolerated such privation, maladministration, and selfish exploitation from him without rising up that it's become a habit. Zaire may be one of the worse examples of this phenomenon in Africa, although I would not say much the worst. In Nigeria, Kenya, or other major countries, corruption has become a cultural reality — political power corruption as well as money corruption. It seems difficult to develop a decent regime, a true opposition, or a sense of public spirit or national consciousness that would stand up to cynical, greedy leadership. This is because

the opponents to the regime, unhappily, seem to become, over time, more motivated to get their hands on the levers of power, money, and spoils than to better the welfare of their fellow countrymen. This is a sad African reality, to what extent created by the failures of colonialism I am not sure.

Q: Were there groups within Zaire that one would look to — perhaps the entrepreneurial class? I'm not an African expert but I've heard about the Ibo's of Nigeria and people in the Ivory Coast. There are certain groups...

HARROP: It is true that there are ethnic groups in much of Africa which are thought of as being more entrepreneurial and more naturally adept at business or trade and commerce than others. One particular group or tribe from the central southern area of Zaire, the Kasai Baluba, in fact, have been the heart of the opposition to Mobutu. A man named Tshisekedi, a leader of the Baluba people and a very courageous man, openly opposed Mobutu and was in and out of jail, over and over again. He tried to run against Mobutu and tried to arrange for elections. He actually acted as a prime minister for a time, during the past two years and is thus, again now. But he also is seen by Zairians generally, sadly enough, more as a Baluba than as a national leader.

Q: What about the Zairian Army?

HARROP: The Army is an implement which is used very much by Mobutu, himself a former Army officer and still commander-in-chief of the Army. He is an Army general as well as president of the country. He has shown as much skill in managing the Army as he has in managing ethnic politics. The two are combined, really. The principal officers of the Army tend to be from his own ethnic group, as do the heads of the intelligence system, the judiciary, the gendarmerie, and other major leaders. Despite difficulty in assembling enough pay for the military, they are the first in line when resources are available. He is able to keep their loyalty, more or less. He has problems with military units from time to time in different regions, but I think that his success, despite all odds, and his staying

power over the last few years have certainly been due, as much as anything else, to his use of the military and their undoubted loyalty to him.

Q: So you were going out there in January, 1988? Particularly with Senator Helms to delay your departure, you had plenty of time to hone our policy toward Zaire. What did you go out with? What were American interests and what were you trying to do?

HARROP: We had a number of interests. The Cold War was still a major determinant, spoken or unspoken, of our policy there. I think that, looking back, historians are going to say, “How could the United States have been wedded to such a dictator for so long because there was a confrontation with the Soviet Union, a consideration which, in the end, proved specious?” But that was the situation. We did feel that he [Mobutu] was very useful. I say that he was a genius at manipulating the ethnic, military, and regional politics of his country. He was also a genius at manipulating the United States of America. Operating between and among the United States, France, and Belgium, and between and among the [U.S.] National Security Council, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense, he showed extraordinary political astuteness.

If we needed African support or help on issues before the UN, General Mobutu was always there. Our relationship was by no means just a one-way street. For instance, if there were a vote in the Security Council about the exclusion of Israel from some body, or if we needed support in the Security Council to do with Korea, Puerto Rico, or whatever the classic issues of the day were, we could always count on President Mobutu to come, front and center, to cast Zaire's vote in favor of the American position. This comportment tends to develop a certain loyalty on the part of American administrations.

I was instructed to and did work hard on human rights issues, forever going in and complaining about people being in jail. We actually went to visit Zairian political detainees in jail on several occasions, a gross violation, I suppose, of diplomatic norms.

Q: Would these be Zairians?

HARROP: Zairian citizens, yes — the opposition people who were incarcerated, beaten, mistreated, and all the rest. It was all true. It was a bad situation. We spent a good deal of time on that.

Then we were also interested in economic development and in the welfare of the Zairian people, and a large part of my day as Ambassador was spent supporting World Bank and IMF recommendations, pressing to free the economy.

However, as far as Mobutu was concerned, one of the main sources of leverage which he so cleverly used with the United States was cooperation on the Angola situation, which had become important to us in Cold War and political terms. It was essential for us to have access to Angola. And Zaire has a border with Angola over 1,000 miles long. Mobutu fully cooperated with the United States on that issue, at some little risk to his own country. That was another matter on which he was able to nurture his relationship with us. So there were a lot of reasons why the United States embraced this extraordinary, authoritarian, selfish, dictator. But these were the facts and that was the way we operated.

My own relationship with him was difficult. I was forever engaged in applying pressure on him to improve his record on human rights and the management of the Zairian economy. I regularly pressed him to accede to recommendations on the reform of the Zairian economy made by the International Monetary Fund, the OECD [Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development], and ourselves, in order to justify a continuation of economic support. These issues were not easy to handle, and the need to raise them regularly made the Ambassador's role in Zaire a very hard one. I was in repeated confrontation with President Mobutu at the same time that the United States Ambassador was probably the most important foreigner with whom he dealt.

Q: What was your evaluation of him? Was there somebody behind him, such as an advisor or advisors, or was he pretty much a one-man show?

HARROP: There were certainly advisors with him — usually closely related ethnic brothers or colleagues. However, he was by far the predominant person. He had been in charge of the country since I had been there before, in 1965, when he acceded to power. He's been in power ever since. The period we have been discussing began in 1988 when he had been top dog already for about 23 years. He had learned a great deal about the role of a leader. He operated as a traditional, tribal chief of the whole country, as well as a political president. He abused the country's treasury mercilessly to obtain money. He was personally dominant. Certainly, he wasn't anyone's “tool”. Zairians regarded him with great fear and great respect. He was the decision maker but at once corrupt and self-serving beyond description.

Q: Was it with sort of a “sigh” that you would go to see him? It sounds as if you were asked by the Department of State and the U. S. Government, as well as what your job required, to go in and keep telling him to “clean up his act” or go in with a request to support this or that.

HARROP: That's right. Often the two would be almost simultaneous. [Laughter] He knew that. We were always asking him for things — asking him for his vote, asking him to show leadership, to extend his neck politically for our benefit. In fact, when problems occurred in Chad, he would send his troops up there to support the American point of view. And then come to us to meet the cost of sending the troops. It was an awkward and difficult relationship. Strangely, I came to enjoy meeting with the man. I was fascinated by his skills and his absolutely amoral cunning. But it was a difficult assignment, distasteful to seek cooperation from a leader who treated his own people with such disdain.

The domestic political situation [in Zaire] was unraveling rapidly. There were demands for democracy. He was under a great deal of pressure as the economy came apart,

particularly after 1990, with the breakdown in Eastern Europe, when there was a call for democracy everywhere. It was clear that the “Cold War” elements in our relationship were going to become much less important. The winds of democracy were sweeping across the whole world. He had to respond to them — had to feel them. Things became very, very tense in Zaire after 1990.

I was one of those who underestimated Mobutu's staying power. During the last year and a half of my time there I had become quite frustrated because I could not get much of an ear in Washington for repeated recommendations that we disassociate ourselves from this man. I was convinced that it was not in our interest any longer to be so closely identified with him. I thought that we should not give him the kind of American support he had been getting. He used his American connection with great skill in domestic politics. The view he cultivated was, “You can't dispense with Mobutu. He's the American man.” I wanted to get that view set aside but could not get cooperation at home for all of the reasons that I mentioned. Plus, I guess, another argument that was most commonly voiced in Washington. For instance, I put into our “Goals and Objectives Plan” for the following year, 1991: Primary Objective - Gradual disassociation from Mobutu. This came back crossed out, with the comment, “We can't do that, be serious. It's out of the question.”

The feeling in Washington — and this was finally articulated fairly clearly by the National Security Council and people near the top levels of the Department of State — was that you don't lightly work to get rid of a leader without knowing who's going to replace him, particularly in a volatile situation. Mobutu was the devil that we knew, and so forth. Washington would challenge me to specify what would come after Mobutu. My answer would be that there were several possible formulations and several competent leaders who could step in. I could not predict which would prevail. I didn't know. But any juxtaposition of possibilities and people would be preferable, both for us and for Zaire, to the present situation. So therefore we should stop behaving in a way which helped to keep him in power. This analysis was not marketable in Washington.

Q: This involves both the Department and the Embassy and may be classified. What was the role of the CIA? Was this a CIA country?

HARROP: No, I believe that the role of the CIA can be exaggerated. The CIA historically had a long record of cooperation with the government of Zaire. CIA personnel had played a role in the early days of Patrice Lumumba, when the Congo was truly the cockpit of the Cold War. It was the first place where UN troops were deployed, in the early 1960's, during the Kennedy administration. This was where [then UN Secretary General] Dag Hammarskjold died in a plane accident in Zambia, traveling to a meeting in Zaire, or, rather, the Congo at the time. The CIA then — in defense of American interests — had played a major role in Zaire. CIA officers had formed bonds with the government and the power structure of the time. CIA officers continued to be significant “players” throughout the next 25 years, including the time when I was there. In fact, Mobutu liked it that way. It served his interest to underline our strategic and security cooperation, so he worked to maintain links with the American intelligence and defense communities as well as the State Department.

During my time as Ambassador the Central Intelligence Agency performed in a competent and responsible way, always in consultation with me, always ready to take policy guidance from the political side of the U.S. Government. The CIA has been badly maligned in Zaire and in some other places for doing its job to the best of its ability. I found the CIA to be a capable arm available to support me when I needed it, and a precious resource for advice and contacts.

Q: It seems clear that, as far as Washington was concerned, Mobutu was getting to be a heavier and heavier burden — as seen in media and other reporting. The linchpin that was keeping him useful to us was the Cold War. Was it simply pragmatists in the NSC and the Department of State who wanted to keep up our relationship with him, or what was it? Why couldn't we figure out a way to begin to disassociate ourselves from him?

HARROP: There were several things. There's always an inertia in policy, a reluctance to take risky initiatives or sometimes any initiatives at all. “If it ain't broke...” One hears the plea of don't disturb a political system when what you may be creating is chaos — more chaos than you have already, and you don't know who's going to replace him. It could become worse, the argument runs. You at least have influence in the present system, and you may not have some influence over what replaces it. Some people, I'm sorry to say, said, “Look, we do have certain obligations to this man who has cooperated with us over and over again, whatever you may think of him morally.”

Furthermore, there was another significant element which some in Washington may have understood better than I did. I did not sufficiently appreciate the fact that our influence in Zaire, despite all appearances was rather limited. Just before I left Zaire, which was in May, 1991 — I can't recall exactly — I did a kind of valedictory, confidential report summing up my time there, my predictions of what was going to happen, and my recommendations for future policy. I had been on the scene three and one-half years. I reiterated very strongly that we must disassociate ourselves from Mobutu. I made it clear that, in my view, Mobutu was not going to last much longer. I think that I predicted he could last, given present internal and international pressures, between seven and 10 months longer. I wrote that the situation was falling apart around him, he had destroyed his country, people were becoming hungry, and the opposition was growing. I expected there was going to be even greater chaos in Zaire and that Mobutu was going to be forced from power; if the United States was perceived as supporting the dictator against the will of the people, our influence with his successors would be attenuated, to put it mildly.

My prediction was largely mistaken, at least my time table was premature. It turned out that I both underestimated Mobutu and overestimated our own influence. Two years later we did finally disassociate ourselves from him, four years too late in my view. It happened a year or so ago, but Mobutu has held on. Part of his genius was utilizing the United States, explaining that one reason that he was in power was that he was America's man,

America backed him, and so forth. Consciously or unconsciously, he himself exaggerated the influence of the United States. Mobutu's own skills and Mobutu's dominance of his own political system kept him in power — far more than the support of the United States. During the last 18 months or so since we have disassociated ourselves from Mobutu the Belgians and French have gone along with us. They are the other two major powers concerned with Zaire. One of our problems in the past always has been a certain rivalry with them, a rivalry Mobutu manipulated quite brilliantly. At last all three governments have disassociated ourselves from him, but Mobutu has held on. The situation gets worse and worse. There is now a serious degree of starvation in this wealthy, food-producing nation. It's a tragic situation. But Mobutu has still not fallen. Copper production and exports are finished, but the President has cornered diamond sales to field his needs.

Q: On the policy side in Washington one of the complaints which has been made was that, under Secretary of State James Baker policy making was pretty well concentrated within a very tight group, and the members of this group were very much involved in the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In this view, incidents like the Gulf War occurred because there was inertia in the system, and the system perpetuated inertia. Do you think that it is fair to say that this is part of the explanation or not?

HARROP: I don't know. Baker made a visit to Zaire in January or February, 1991. He came out for the independence celebrations in Namibia. We had played the lead part in ensuring independence for Namibia. Baker stopped in Zaire and saw Mobutu. I found him quite open to policy analysis and ideas. I thought that he handled Mobutu with great skill. I suppose that Baker's interest in Central Africa at that time, to the extent Africa was on his agenda, from a geopolitical or geostrategic point of view, was Angola, a Cold War theater, more than the domestic situation in Zaire. However, I do not feel that we suffered from lack of Baker's personal involvement. I think that the places where he was focusing his attention were, in fact, more important to us than Zaire. I don't criticize him for that.

Q: What was it like to work in Zaire at that time — you and your staff in the Embassy?

HARROP: Do you mean was there a hostile or dangerous atmosphere?

Q: A hostile atmosphere. Was it difficult to operate there?

HARROP: No, it was not hostile. I think that the Americans have always appreciated the fact that the Zairian people have a certain tolerance, and perhaps a docility — which may be too strong a word. I wouldn't use that word myself. There was a deep resentment of the United States on the part of Mobutu and his intimates who were running the country — a resentment of our pressures and of our apparent support for the opposition, for the so-called democratic elements that were trying to get at him, or lack of gratitude for their political support of American interests. That was deeply resented. At the same time there was some little bitterness against the United States on the part of the Zairian people for our tolerance of Mobutu, who was less and less popular. In fact, he was becoming hated as well as feared. So there were plenty of pressures on the Embassy, but none of these pressures was translated into violence or big demonstrations against Americans. This just didn't happen. When violence came, it was generalized, against the “haves” more than against a nationality.

Q: What about wandering troops, over-armed troops running around, terrorizing...

HARROP: Well, the worst days of that came after my departure. There was some of that in Shaba, formerly Katanga Province, during the last year or year and a half that I was there. There were some very difficult attacks on the university and some official murders — a very bad business. But instances of marauding soldiers going around and attacking people were rare, although always a danger. We were chronically concerned about our widely dispersed Peace Corps volunteers and about the thousand or so American missionaries who were all over the country. This was always a worry to us, but there were many fewer actual instances of violence than we expected. Violence, depredations in the army, became very severe in September, 1991, after my departure. There were open riots. The economy was deteriorating to the point that it was inevitable that this sort of thing

would happen at some point. In September, 1991, there was wide scale plundering and gunfire in the streets of Kinshasa.. The French Ambassador was killed, apparently by a stray bullet. Since that time it has gone from bad to worse, but it had not reached that point of crisis by the time of my departure. And even now, with the infrastructure, the economy, the currency hardly still existing, Mobutu remains.

Q: Let's stop at this point, and I will return...

HARROP: For the Middle East thing.

Q: Thank you very much. -0- Q: Today is November 23, 1993. We ended with your departure from Zaire. When was that?

HARROP: I left Zaire at the end of May, 1991. I was there for three and one-half years. Then I returned to the United States for an unusually long preparation prior to going to Israel. There were two reasons. The principal reason, actually, was that Ambassador Brown, my predecessor, was very interested in completing his full three years there. He had come in...

Q: This was which Brown?

HARROP: Ambassador William A. Brown. He had gone to Israel in December, 1988. He wanted to stay in Tel Aviv until December, 1991. That was all right with me. He asked me to agree to let him stay that long. Secondly, the area was new to me, and this gave me a chance to do a lot of work and get ready for it. The third reason, as it turned out, was that I had the usual delays in getting through the Senate. If I had tried to go sooner, I couldn't have gone anyway. I wasn't confirmed until December, 1991. Q: How did this appointment come about?

HARROP: I was surprised by it because I had just been reminded that I would complete 10 years in the rank of Career Minister in October, 1991. Under the new regulations,

therefore, I would have to retire due to time in class as I no longer would hold a presidential appointment. I didn't really see much else that might be coming up. The possibility of an appointment as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs was in my mind, but I didn't think that that was a realistic possibility, given the fact that Hank Cohen was doing a splendid job. There was no particular reason to change him from that position. I assumed that I would retire.

I had had a message from the Director General, who called me up to say that I was one of the candidates for Ambassador to Pakistan or Israel. I said that I was surprised to hear that because I didn't have any deep background on those areas but that I would certainly be delighted to take either assignment on. I did not think that such an appointment was likely to be made, because I could think of two or three colleagues who had deeper knowledge of those areas than I did and who might be available for them. In the autumn of 1990 I talked about this with the Director General again, and he said, “No, you are a serious candidate, and I'll let you know if anything comes up.” Then I had a visit in Zaire from Congressman Steve Solarz, an old friend of mine who still follows Africa, though at that time he was pretty much focused on Asia...

Q: This is Congressman Steve Solarz...

HARROP: A Congressman from New York.

Q: Very much involved in foreign affairs.

HARROP: Very much so and very much involved in Zaire, as the former chairman of the House of Representatives Subcommittee for Africa. He came for a visit to Zaire. I must say that we had some very interesting discussions with Mobutu during his visit there. When he arrived at the airport [in Zaire], he said, “Well, congratulations! I hear that you're going to be our next Ambassador to Israel.” I said, “Well, I'm very glad to learn that.” Then on the next day I received a formal note that the President had approved me for that job.

So I set about trying to prepare for it. I had not had experience in the Middle East before that, so it was a great challenge.

Q: Two questions on this early period. First, did you have any feeling that you were being "vetted" by the "American Jewish Lobby" before you went there?

HARROP: No, I don't think so. I must say that, during this whole experience leading up to my appointment and during my service as Ambassador to Israel, I never had a sense of hostility or of "vetting" from the very articulate American Jewish community. There was only one occasion when I went up to address the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations in New York during the autumn of 1991, as I was getting ready to go to Israel. They have a sort of formal program there. This organization is one of the many efforts, and the most successful so far, to try to coordinate and rationalize the "world" of Jewish organizations in this country. American Jews are very competitive, very organization minded, and very political. They have dozens and dozens of overlapping organizations. In an effort to rationalize that situation and to be more effective they set up a Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations. This organization has been in existence for some years.

The occasion was one of their lunchtime meetings, which is their custom. There may have been 45 people there in the room in New York. I gave a talk. There was, I would say, some quite critical questions [asked of me]. There were questions about American relations with Israel, about the loan guarantee, some of the usual political hobby horses about the sentencing of Jonathan Pollard...

Q: He was convicted of spying [for Israel]...

HARROP: That question came up over and again during my tenure [as Ambassador to Israel]. In fact, it came up just a few weeks ago once again, when Prime Minister Rabin raised it with President Clinton. A number of rather critical questions were asked, but

I sensed then — and afterwards reached the firm conclusion — that this was a matter of style. I was not being subjected to any particular inquisition, nor were they being particularly hostile toward me. These were questions on which a lot of these organizations had a particular slant, and they were pushing their own slant. [The people attending the luncheon] had to go back to their own boards and report what they said to the new [United States] Ambassador.

I concluded that this process was not a particular case of “vetting.” In fact, I really felt that, starting from the beginning and throughout my time in Israel, I had a very satisfactory and successful relationship with the American Jewish leadership. Of course, they come to Israel frequently. I must have spoken an average of once a week to a visiting American delegation of one sort or another. Many of these organizations have their annual, directors' meetings in Jerusalem. I saw a great deal of these Jewish leaders, and some of the individual leaders — people like Abe Foxman, of the Anti-Defamation League; Robert Lifton, of the American Jewish Congress; or Al Moses, of the American Jewish Committee — are people whom I regard as good, personal friends. I saw them very often. In fact, I'm going up next week to an award ceremony for Robert Lifton in New York.

Although the American Jewish community, AIPAC [America-Israel Public Affairs Committee] and Jewish organizations maintain a considerable pressure on policy toward Israel, it is a pressure which is not entirely seamless. That is, there are differences within the Jewish community. As a matter of fact, you go from a fairly “liberal” point of view in the American Jewish Congress with Robert Lifton, across the spectrum to really “hard Right,” hard “conservative” positions. You can even go to the left of Lifton to the “Americans for Peace Now” group. Some of the senior members of the Clinton administration were active in Peace Now. Peter Adelman, who, I think, holds a sub-cabinet position in the [Clinton] administration and was Assistant Dean at Georgetown University School of Law, was the president of Americans for Peace Now. Then you had the ultra-Orthodox group and you had some hard line Right-wing people, many of whom I dealt with frequently in New York. They are really, I think, to the Right of the Likud Party [in Israel]. They support the

concepts of a Greater Israel, “Don't Yield an Inch of Territory,” “It is the Biblical right of the Jewish people to this entire land [of Palestine],” and “You cannot trust any agreement made with the Arabs.” “The Syrians will attack the Golan Heights if they're allowed to do so again.” Really, they hold “harder” positions than you hear, except in unusual quarters, in Israel.

The relationship is an extremely interesting one. You have the situation in which a huge outflow of private money — around $1.0 billion a year — goes to Israel in many different forms. I guess you could not call all of that money “grants,” because a good deal of it — several hundred million dollars — is in the form of State of Israel bonds. These are rather a good economic investment, among other things, because legislation was put through to make this a tax-free investment [in the U. S.]. A lot of money is spent on that. Many people give money to their synagogues by purchasing these bonds in the name of the synagogue.

Anyway, I developed a theory, since I was interested in the Israeli economy and the reform of the Israeli economy — to try to liberalize it a bit and to get rid of the overhang of socialism from the early days [of Israel]. There is still a very large parastatal sector — about 40 percent of the economy is either in the hands of the government or in the hands of the great labor union, Histadrut, which, like labor unions throughout the world, is now losing influence and political authority but still has these huge holdings. It owns banks, corporations, conglomerates, and all sorts of things. I was really working, as a matter of fact, with the new Governor of the Bank of Israel, Yaacov Frankel, who'd been...

Q: Was this before you went there?

HARROP: No, after I got there. I was just going into one section of my activities there. [Frankel] had been a senior executive of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] for some years and was very interested in reform. As a matter of fact, the Faculties of Economics of Hebrew University in Jerusalem and particularly of Tel Aviv University were very active

in these matters. The Labor Party was very active in these matters, so that it was a worthwhile issue to follow.

While on this subject, because we were speaking about the American Jewish community, I found that it was a matter of disappointment to many Israelis and to anyone who cares anything about Israel that American backers of Israel are prepared to give extraordinarily generous aid to Israel, but not to invest there. What's needed is investment, particularly in view of the large inflow of new immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Jobs are very important, and the expansion of the economy is crucial. That is what the debate over the [U. S.] loan guarantee was about — to provide funds for [economic] expansion.

I frequently spoke to the American Jewish community about the fact that if they really wanted to help Israel, they should invest there and not just grant money to the government. Invest in some productive enterprise. They were very reluctant to do it. Only a very few have done that.

Q: Why would they be so reluctant?

HARROP: Well, there are several theories on that. One theory is that successful Americans, whether Jewish or not, are reluctant to put their money in an economy which, in fact, has a lot of difficulties for the investor. There are rather numerous controls — over regulation, in fact — on labor, capital, foreign exchange, factory location. American supporters of Israel, as much as anyone else, are concerned about security questions and about the security of their capital. However, you might suppose that some of those questions would not make much sense if you were prepared to give a million dollars to Israel. You might be prepared to invest it there.

In fact, it doesn't work out that way. One theory which people cite is that American Jews who support Israel tend to look on Israel as in some sense a charity. The way they look at their synagogue. You don't do business in the synagogue. You give money to the synagogue to support it. There is an odd, psychological feeling there that you as an

American Jew may be in some particular business, where you are a very effective and a very tough businessman, perhaps. But you don't think of Israel as a place where you do that sort of thing. I don't know whether that theory holds water or not, but it's hard to find a theory to explain such a peculiar phenomenon. It was and is too bad.

I was struck by the intensity of interest on issues among the American Jewish community. I had dinner with a group of ultra-orthodox rabbis and others in New York and met with many people of many political viewpoints there. Some American Jews from Washington were extremely helpful to me in arranging meetings with all of the different [Jewish] organizations, setting up schedules for me to meet people. I felt that I was able to get a pretty good footing in this whole community here before I went to Israel.

Q: In getting ready, obviously you had to touch base or become immersed, because of its importance, with the American Jewish political community in all of its factions. What about the other side of the equation, the Arab world? This was not your area, but you were in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Did you get involved in that?

HARROP: Not very much, as a matter of fact. I tried to call on Prince Bandar, the Ambassador from Saudi Arabia. I wanted to meet him and talk to him. I had met the Egyptian Ambassador and chatted with him very briefly. However, I was not able to see Ambassador Bandar.

Q: Did this sound like a policy decision [not to meet with you]?

HARROP: I don't know. He tries to keep himself on a lofty plane of political and social activity which makes it hard to get at him. So I would hesitate to say that he made a conscious decision not to see me. He may just not have been available.

Q: What about the "Near Eastern hands" [in the Department]? It was basically a new bureau for you. One of the things that you hear at times is that whoever is our Ambassador

to Israel becomes a captive of the Israelis and their supporters and is sort of at odds with the people working in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Did you get any of this feeling?

HARROP: No, I didn't. It's a fairly sophisticated bureau. I think that there are some pretty heavy, pro-Israel pressures, but the bureau itself is fairly balanced. The heavy, pro-Israel pressures, which are very subtle indeed, came out of the...Well, I think of Dennis Ross, who is now the coordinator of...

Q: He was on [Secretary of State] Baker's staff.

HARROP: He was Baker's right hand man for both Soviet activities and the Near East and was, in many ways, the creative mind behind Baker's remarkable feat in bringing about the peace talks, [beginning with] the Madrid Conference. [Ross] is a man of extraordinarily high intellect, with a very agile, supple, and creative mind — a forceful fellow. However, I think that he is essentially a Zionist and is wedded to that point of view. I suppose you can go a step beyond that and say that it's all very well to criticize him for being Zionist, but if, in fact, he's doing something for Israel which is also in the American interest and in the interest of peace, he should be congratulated for that.

But the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs did not give me that impression. I spoke with the former NEA experts, and there I think you find a little more of an anti-Israel slant. I mean all of those people who have worked for so many years on the Middle East, like Talcott Seelye, Dick Parker, Bill Kontos, an old friend of mine, and many other such people. I think that they often have a little difficulty being even-handed, because they have been steeped in the business for so long. They've come to resent the role of Israel very much.

Q: What about Congress? Did you spend a lot of time with...

HARROP: Yes, I did. I called on, probably, 15 members of Congress and met with segments of the [House of Representatives] Foreign Affairs Committee and others there. I

found that there's a great deal of interest there, of course. I spent a good deal of time with Senator Lautenberg..

Q: Senator Lautenberg is from...

HARROP: From New Jersey, a Democrat. He is a former President of the United Jewish Appeal in the United States — a very fine man. I spent some time with Congressman Lee Hamilton [Democrat, Indiana] and quite a few others. It was an interesting experience to hear their point of view. Most of them said, “Well, I'll be seeing you over there,” because they visit Israel in large numbers. In fact, it's true. I guess that later on, in Israel, I saw almost all of the members of Congress whom I had called on.

Q: When did you go to Israel?

HARROP: January, 1992. I was delayed a long time in Congress. I did not experience the systematic kind of opposition there that I'd had in the past from various quarters — Senator Helms and others. It was more a question of bureaucracy and slow-going. I think that when it became known that I was not really intending to go to Israel until early in 1992, the Department did not press as hard to push me forward, because my approval was not as urgent as some of the other nominees.

Q: When you went out to Israel, did you anticipate facing any major problems there? There, more than anywhere else. Some places you go to and you just take things as they come. There are always some issues. What were they [regarding Israel]?

HARROP: The primary issues included the peace process, which had begun. Secretary of State Baker, by a remarkable effort, had made nine trips to the area in eight months. It was just a superhuman effort on his part, and I respect him immensely for it. He had finally broken through to get direct peace talks started between Israel and her four main adversaries, if you will, the Lebanese, Syrians, Jordanians, and the Palestinians themselves. That process had just begun at the end of October, 1991, and more talks

were being scheduled. They were still at the point, then, of haggling over the “great” problems of where they should meet, the shape of the table, and that kind of thing. However, the breakthrough had occurred, and advancing the talks was a central preoccupation.

Secondly, we were in the middle of the very tough discussion on loan guarantees for Israel, due to extremely heavy immigration [into Israel]. About half a million Jews from Central Europe and Central Asia had come in...

Q: What was the issue of the loan guarantees?

HARROP: Well, let me go through it. Because there had been this huge immigration into Israel, the Israelis were in need of funds for [their] absorption. Under the laws of Israel any Jew is welcome to come [to Israel] at any time, and, of course, they encourage [this inflow] immensely. They want [Israel] to be the homeland of the Jewish people. They feel that it's a matter of survival for them, since the population growth rate of the Palestinians and Arabs generally is much, much higher than that of the Israelis. So they were looking for financial help to absorb these people. It's very expensive to arrange for housing, care, language instruction, jobs, education, health, and all the rest for these immigrants. More than one-tenth of the previous population of the country came to Israel in this new wave from the Soviet Union. In fact, it was really more like one-fifth. There had been talk of the United States providing guarantees for Israel to raise, in international capital markets, something like $10 billion over an unspecified period of time to use for the absorption of these recent immigrants. They could obtain that money at a vastly more preferable rate of interest and preferable terms if the loans were guaranteed by the United States Government.

We were then dealing with the conservative and hard Right, Likud Party government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Secretary of State Baker and President Bush had said that the American taxpayer is just not going to finance settlements in the Occupied Territories

indirectly. That's all there was to it. They said that the settlement policy of the then Israeli Government was making it very hard to have a peace process of any validity. The Arabs won't talk when the Israeli Government is trying gradually to shift the situation on the ground to the point where there isn't need...

Q: Would you explain for the historical record what "settlement policy" means?

HARROP: The "settlement policy" in this sense was the practice of the Likud government of implanting as many Israeli villages, towns, and settlements in the Occupied Territories — in the West Bank primarily but also, to some extent, in the Gaza Strip and on the Golan Heights. This was to make the Occupied Territories more "Jewish" and to make it more difficult ever to turn that land back to the Arabs. It was a very systematic operation. The Minister of Housing in the Shamir Government was Ariel Sharon, one of the toughest and hardest of the Right wing Israeli leaders for many years. They were spending a very large part of the Israeli budget on this program, providing all kinds of incentives. The Israeli Government was actually building housing and settlements at a great rate and subsidizing interest rates and, indeed, every aspect of life to encourage Jews to live in the Occupied Territories. In fact, over a period of a few years they more than doubled the Jewish population in the Occupied Territories. The figure varies — it depends on whether you include the suburbs of East Jerusalem, but the number commonly used is 130,000 or so. That's quite a lot of people. This practice was such an anathema to the whole Arab world, and not only to the Palestinians, that any [Israeli] Government that pursued this kind of policy was fairly clearly not interested in a negotiation based on the exchange of land for peace.

So Secretary of State Baker and President Bush were really tough on this. But it was not just those two leaders who took this view. It was many influential people in Congress as well, particularly Senator Patrick Leahy [Democrat, Vermont], the Chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee and also the Chairman of the [Senate] Appropriations

Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. The loan guarantees would have to be considered by that Subcommittee.

This was a very difficult issue. AIPAC [America-Israel Public Affairs Committee] was extremely active on this issue, pressing for the loan guarantees to be approved, without any condition on settlement policy.

Q: Just to clear up this point. The [Israeli Government] policy was, basically, very Right wing oriented. Was AIPAC at that time a supporter of the Right wing [in Israel]?

HARROP: Absolutely. AIPAC gave the hard Right, [Israeli Government] its support, because that government, in one form or another, had been in power for 17 years, starting with Prime Minister Begin and the Right wing Likud Party. The American Jewish community has tended to reflect the political outlook of the government in office in Israel — though this later changed a bit, during the time I was in Israel. The American Jewish community, by and large — not the Left, not those most interested in negotiations [with the Palestinians] and peace — from the broad center all the way over to the Right was very much in favor of these loan guarantees to help Israel and to help [the absorption] of the immigrants. It was regarded as a very important thing for everyone concerned that all of these, perhaps two million Jews from the Soviet Union, who were thought of as being under great risk, [be resettled in Israel]. This dates back to the days of the late Senator [Henry] Jackson [Democrat, Washington] who was trying to arrange linkages of all sorts...

Q: The Jackson-Vanik Bill...

HARROP: All sorts of arms control agreements with the Soviets linked to the release of the Jews [from the Soviet Union]. One of the liberal things that Gorbachev did was to allow [these Jews] to leave [the Soviet Union]. They began to pour out. The American Jewish community had a real sense of identification with and support for those people and pushed for [the approval of the loan guarantees]. The watchword was, “Why should you mix up humanitarian questions with political questions?” They felt that it was a matter

of humanitarian aid to help in the absorption of these hundreds of thousands of Jews. The political issues of the settlements should be dealt with on other grounds, in this view. Anyway, it was a major debate. That was one of the things that I was going to have to look at.

American defense support of Israel has always been a tricky and difficult question. There were allegations of diversion of American technology by the Israeli arms industry before I went there. I was concerned about that subject.

The intimacy and the breadth of the United States-Israel relationship is such that it's almost impossible for an American Ambassador to complete his homework before going there — even with the six months that I had.

I called on a good number of the members of the cabinet of the United States Government. You know, you seldom would meet a senior official in any government department in the United States who did not have some type of bilateral program going with a counterpart agency in Israel, who was not that very week receiving a delegation from Israel in his area of concern, or who did not have a delegation or mission over in Israel at the time — whether it involved questions of environmental science or other matters. I recall that the head of the Federal Aviation Agency, with whom I had a long talk, said that he really had a deep span of cooperative activities with Israel. His was one of the areas where no one could say that it was a one way street, with just the United States helping out Israel. We were, he said, of considerable help to them because of our experience and expertise in air traffic control matters — a difficult question in Israel because of the minute size of the country. He said that we benefited immensely from our two-way cooperation and consultation on aviation and airport security, in which the Israelis were probably world leaders in the technology of airport security as well as the practices of...

Q: Perhaps historians in the future won't be concerned about these matters, but we're talking about bombs or weapons being smuggled on board...

HARROP: Sure. They're very expert and very experienced in this. FAA, in fact, was helping to fund some research, and we were purchasing, as I recall, some of this equipment which was particularly effective in the detection of weaponry or explosive devices at airports. But that is just one example. In education, in almost any field that you'd care to look at, such as transportation or communications, there is a rich, two-way exchange of information and cooperation. Israel benefits, really, from research and technical support money from a lot of different government agencies here, which is not covered by foreign assistance appropriations. For example, in the field of agricultural research some of the advances made in Israel in dry land agriculture have been funded in part by American private and public sources. It was really a challenge to try to keep abreast of all of these things. In a way, although it's not quite the same, you could make an analogy between being Ambassador to Israel and being Ambassador to Canada.

Q: I was just going to say that it sounds like that.

HARROP: The parallel, transnational lines of activities are so great, and the telephone is used so commonly. Although the telephone is probably not used quite as commonly between Israel and the United States as between Canada and the United States, this is a major challenge for the American Ambassador to Israel. The Ambassador's mettle is constantly tested in keeping abreast of these things.

Q: What were you getting from the [U. S.] Department of Defense? We had just finished the very successful operation called “Desert Storm,” in which our main diplomatic effort seemed to be to keep the Israelis out of the action and from “queering the deal,” in a way, because we had Arab allies. I've always felt that the Department of Defense has not been too happy with the Israeli connection because, first, it absorbs an awful lot of its power.

Also, as seen from the defense side, [Israel] really isn't all that much of a bastion for the [U.S.] military as it's been touted.

HARROP: There's a certain schizophrenia, I think, in the Pentagon toward Israel. There is some resentment of the fact that a lot of aid and resource transfers to Israel are “imposed” upon the Department of Defense by the Congress. In recent years particularly — for example during the last three years or so, as the United States budget generally and the defense budget like all the rest have come under increasing pressure — the strong supporters of Israel in the Congress, seeing that it was going to be difficult to increase the appropriations for foreign assistance under that category, have begun to make inroads within the defense budget to earmark appropriated defense funds for Israel. Whether it's the transfer of excess or supposedly excess equipment or weapons systems or whether it's in the form of the financing of R&D in Israel, this is very large.

Q: “R&D” means Research and Development.

HARROP: Very large funds have been involved there. So the Department of Defense feels some resentment. On the other hand I say the defense attitude is schizophrenic because there is tremendous respect, on the part of the American defense system, for Israel, for Israelis, for the military job that they've done, and for their competence — both as scientists, engineers, and as military leaders and fighters. There is a very close and warm camaraderie between the Israeli and American military establishments at all levels. I mean, I saw a great deal of it. We have approximately 3,000 Department of Defense visitors to Israel per year, from generals who come to visit — you almost always have the commanders from NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] forces in Europe — to people who come down from all the different branches of the [U.S.] military service, as well as the Supreme Allied Commander [of NATO]. This is entirely aside from the large number of joint exercises that we have and entirely aside from the 50,000 or so American sailors who come on shore leave during Sixth Fleet visits to Haifa and Ashdod. Most of the service secretaries come over at one time or another, as well as the Chief of Naval

Operations. The Sixth Fleet commander visits Israel several times a year. Other visitors include the heads of the different commands in the United States which do cooperative work with Israel regarding one system or another.

We must have to have a very large Defense Attach# office in Israel. I guess that about 60 percent of my mission was composed of defense personnel, because of the volume of business, commerce, and traffic, back and forth. So I spent a lot of time at the Department of Defense before I went to Israel. We have a structured series of collaborative conferences and consultations every year with Israel. There is a Joint Political Military Group, which meets twice a year, as well as a subgroup which is concerned with military activities, as opposed to political and military activities. The Joint Political Military Group is chaired by either the Under Secretary of State for Security Affairs or by the Assistant Secretary [of State] for Political-Military Affairs. Then there is a separate, annual, structured conference on the setting of the assistance levels for the following year. These are planning groups which have real meaning, and the Israelis attach great importance to them.

Q: You arrived in Israel, when?

HARROP: In January, 1992.

Q: What was your impression of the staffing, size, and composition of the Embassy when you got there?

HARROP: It's a large mission — about the same size as two other missions which I have headed: Nairobi [Kenya] and Kinshasa [Zaire], although in both Nairobi and Kinshasa a very large component of the mission consisted of personnel from AID [Agency for International Development] and the Peace Corps. In Israel there is no Peace Corps assigned. There was no AID component there when I arrived. Finally, one AID man was assigned in early 1993. I was afraid that it was the opening wedge of a classical large AID personnel presence. The military element in the mission in Tel Aviv was the big

component. I would say that it was a well-staffed mission in terms of composition and the structure. We had a good-sized public affairs office with, I guess, five officers. But you need those people, with so much going on. There is a huge Fulbright program, a large selection of Fulbright professors back and forth. We have continual cultural visits. American symphonies and ballet companies come. Arthur Miller came for a visit. I just can't name them all. And the Israeli press is so hyperactive, so omnipresent, and such a large element of society that relations with the media are a very important part of the responsibilities of the Ambassador as well as the USIS [United States Information Service].

We had a single commercial officer to try to expand American exports to Israel. There are a lot of American businesses in Israel — although not as many as I think there could and should be. But there is a good deal of two-way trade, particularly in the advanced electronic fields. The Israelis are really on the leading edge of many of those areas, in medical and military applications among other things.

We had a five or six man Political Section and a four or five officer Economic Section. We had a very large Consular Section because virtually all of the American citizens who have made “aliyah” — the term for emigrating to Israel — have retained American, as well as Israeli citizenship. There are about 100,000 American citizens in Israel. This leads to a tremendous volume of consular work.

Q: How did you deal with the Consulate General in Jerusalem? I've interviewed a number of people over the past decade. The relationship has waxed and waned. The Consulate General is both independent and involved with our Embassy. How did you find it?

HARROP: It's historically been a difficult relationship, because the Consul General [in Jerusalem] is not subordinate to the Ambassador in Tel Aviv, for reasons that are fairly easy to see. We don't recognize Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem. The Consul General in Jerusalem, aside from being concerned with the city of Jerusalem, is really our liaison

link to the Palestinians. That's pretty much what that job is. You have the dangers of bureaucratic frictions or jealousies resulting from the autonomy of the post. There is jealousy on the part of the Ambassador that any Consul General in “his” territory is really independent of him. Then there are the technical problems which you can have over budget matters, such as who's responsible for visits and the division of certain functional support responsibilities. Then there was also the almost inescapable, political unease like that which has at times developed between the Embassies in Athens and Ankara, the Embassies in Algiers and Rabat, Delhi and Rawalpindi, or in many other places in the world where there are conflicts between countries. It seems that American Ambassadors and Embassies, despite their best efforts, can't help but reflect local sentiments to some extent.

I was determined not to have this problem. I spent some time with the new Consul General in Washington before she went to post (a few months ahead of me).

Q: Who was that?

HARROP: Molly Williamson, a person of vast experience in that part of the world. She speaks very fluent Hebrew and Arabic. She is a quite exceptional and very intelligent officer. We just wanted to avoid these problems and we actually did. We inherited certain jealousies because there had not been a good relationship previously. One of the big areas of jealousy was over security — who was responsible for it and did the Regional Security Officer in Tel Aviv supervise the security operation [in Jerusalem]? You can see how such issues could develop in Jerusalem when a Secretary of State, a cabinet member, or a senior Congressional delegation came to Jerusalem for a visit, which frequently happened. Who was responsible and so forth? You can see that these things could become delicate. Who was responsible for determining the nature of advisory cautions to American citizens when the “Intifada” [Arab Palestinian uprising] became particularly heated and there were shootings...

Q: The Intifada involved attacks on private citizens.

HARROP: We managed to work that out. I had a very capable DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] when I arrived, Mark Parris, a superior Foreign Service Officer. He and I worked very hard with Molly Williamson to arrange the relationship [between the Embassy and the Consulate General in Jerusalem] on the security side — which I think was quite satisfactory in the end and has worked out well since then.

Then there was also a certain, inescapable jealousy over the fact that, just as a matter of economy, the Budget and Fiscal system, which is, of course, located in Tel Aviv, handles the budget of [the Consulate General in] Jerusalem. The budget [of the Consulate General is handled as a part of] the budget of [the Embassy] in Israel. You have to be very careful of jealousies on that subject.

Obviously, you get to the question of resources and money, and money is such a terrible problem everywhere now, as I'll go into in a moment with regard to Israel. But we worked these problems through.

On the political side, we simply refused to have problems. We kept in very close consultation, and we had only occasional differences. I really rode very hard on my substantive staff to be certain that there was no lack of communication [with the Consulate General in Jerusalem]. Any cables that went out were to be fully discussed between us. The only problems we ever got into were situations in which, from our [the Embassy's] point of view, more junior officers in Jerusalem had sent out messages which were of joint [Embassy-Consulate General] concern but which they had not cleared with us. I'm sure that they felt that we did the same thing. But we really kept this to a minimum. It worked very well.

Q: You're talking about a phenomenon within the Foreign Service where, essentially, the junior officers go out and look at the periphery of things, the dissidents, and the problems.

They are younger. They get very much engaged in these things. When you have two organizations doing this, it turns into...

HARROP: Into an area of emotional and ideological involvement. I think that most of our professionals are able to resist the emotional involvement, but it's simply inescapable when you live in a society in which you only hear one point of view, over and over again, day after day. Anyway, as it turned out, that was not a major problem for us. We were able to coordinate very well the visits of Secretary of State Baker and Secretary of State Christopher and of the numerous Congressional groups. That was a matter in which I take satisfaction. I think that Ms. Williamson can, too. We were able to handle our relationship with maturity.

Q: When you arrived there [in Tel Aviv], you mentioned the press. I've been in places where the Ambassador arrives, the press immediately picks up and says, "Ah, Mr. X has come as Ambassador. This means that he's either out to ride roughshod over us, or he's our friend, or something like that." Did you find yourself being characterized before you knew you had any particular character as far as this was concerned?

HARROP: There was a lot of that. Israel is a very special place in many, many ways. One aspect is the press, which is just extraordinarily outspoken. I think that there are more daily newspapers per capita in that country than in any other country in the world. Any Israeli newspaper, almost by definition, is a national paper because the country is the size of New Jersey. Speculation is simply uncontrolled. The line between editorial comment and news doesn't exist, so there was a lot of speculation about the outlook of the new Ambassador — is he going to be this way or that way? The speculation ran across the whole gamut. A number of theories built up.

One of the things that I had to decide very early was how I was going to relate to the press. This is a big problem, because you get misquoted. If you make a slip when you say something, it's going to be "blown up" to the skies as a major policy declaration. People

are going to be after you. You're going to be quoted, efforts will be made to manipulate you, and so forth. Some of my predecessors had taken the position that they simply would not deal with the press. This was true of my immediate predecessor. As the media never tired of telling me, they could never get at him. He would never make any comment. In a country which is so obsessed with and so thirsty for news — people walk around the streets listening to transistor radios — this seemed to me to be foregoing voluntarily a major opportunity for communication. Newspapers have a huge circulation. It seemed to be a lost opportunity for the Ambassador not to have some relationship with the media.

So I decided that, with the greatest prudence and with the advice of a very excellent Public Affairs Officer, I would be available and essentially would try to meet with the press fairly often. In fact, after I'd been there for about five or six weeks, I went onto what they called the “Moked” program. This is Israel's “Meet the Press,” “Face the Nation,” and all the rest, all rolled into one. There's one weekly program featuring an hour's interview of a news making individual. It has astounding ratings. A very large proportion of the country listens to this program. A country that has been through the security experiences that Israel has and a country where hardly a single family has not lost a relative in war is very, very interested in news, in what's going on, in the security situation. That's the explanation for it. I went on that program, and my appearance turned out to be successful. I worked very hard to prepare for it. The interview was in English, and then they “dubbed it over” into Hebrew for the broadcast. I was quite pleased. I was able to make the major points that I wanted to make. I was able to present myself as an individual sympathetic to Israel and aware of the main concerns of the Israeli people, while having a rational, analytical, American view of matters. Also, I was able to avoid appearing to be an intuitive, 100% pro-Israeli American. I was quite pleased with the outcome. I think that, by and large, it went pretty well.

I had other such experiences, interviews, and discussions with the press, both one-on-one's and in group forums. I got into trouble in Washington on several occasions, usually through a slip of the tongue, a choice of words which was picked up and then expanded

by the Israeli media, which is always a great danger. That is immediately picked up by the wire services. Several of the American newspapers have full-time correspondents in Jerusalem — the “Washington Post,” the “New York Times,” and other large publications. That would happen, and people would get upset back in Washington until they learned the context of the quote. We went through this several times. But I think that, by and large, the gain far outweighed the cost. None of these little slips ever caused a real problem, in policy terms. Everyone is always so nervous about relations with Israel that anything on the news is very much noted. I think that my decision to be occasionally available to the press was the right decision, and it worked out fairly well. It was difficult to deal with the public through the media in Israel, but also enjoyable, in many ways.

Q: You went to Israel. The Shamir Government — the Likud Party government, you said — had been in power for about 17 years. It was a “hard Right” wing government. We had our difficulties with it for a long, long time. How did you find dealing with the Shamir Government at that stage of its existence?

HARROP: This was the last six months of the Likud government in Israel, which, as I mentioned, had been in office for about 17 years. It wasn't clear by any means that Likud would lose the election. It looked like a very close election, and it was. The United States is very important to Israel. I could always meet with the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister, if I wished to. They make themselves available to the American Ambassador. In fact, the government makes itself available to any member of the American Congress. Even a freshman Congressman, in his first months in office, if he comes to Israel, can see the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, or the Foreign Minister if he wishes. They will make themselves available because they recognize the importance of the United States to them.

The situation now, under the Rabin Government, is a little bit different than it was under the Shamir Government, because the perception in Israel [during the Shamir Government] was that the Bush-Baker administration was rather tough on Israel. They felt that they

would have to obtain what they sought in the United States, through the Congress — not the Executive Branch. A great deal of effort was made to work through AIPAC and through the several, intimate friends of Israel in the American Congress — such as Larry Smith and Tom Lantos in the House of Representatives and Senators Inouye, Moynihan, and Lautenberg in the Senate. Anyway, the relationship with Congress was rather special for that reason.At the present time that's no longer quite the case because one of the changes which Prime Minister Rabin wished to make was to deal directly with the Executive Branch of the American government and not go around it. Prime Minister Rabin made that clear during my first meeting with him. That point came up immediately.

However, it was not difficult to deal with the Likud government because of their perception of the United States. But there were differences. I had a long and difficult interview with Arik Sharon. He was trying to justify his “settlement policy” but was doing it in a very confrontational way, knowing that I would not agree with him. I had difficult meetings with Ehud Olmert, who is now Mayor of Jerusalem. He was then Minister of Health and was, I thought, irresponsibly critical of the Bush administration. One or two other members of the Shamir Government were difficult, but you could always be received and could always work with the government. Israelis are, by and large, personable, attractive, vivacious, intelligent people. For a diplomat it's an exciting and fun place to be assigned, both professionally and personally.

Q: I've heard this from a number of people who have come [to Israel] from other places where either you're a peripheral person, as an American diplomat, or else, say, involved with the Arabs. You really don't get into [the society]. [In Israel] you were right in the middle of everything.

HARROP: The Israelis are engaged in issues, personally and ideologically, and you talk about issues. I remember that I was taken aback, when I presented my credentials to President Herzog, a most engaging and charming man — an intellectual and a man of parts. He set an example, which I encountered over and over again. I had presented the

diplomatic letter. I said a few words in Hebrew to him, and he said, in English, “Not bad!” Then, as we sat down to have coffee, he turned to me and said, “I don't know what I'm going to do about the Likud [Party].” I said, “What do you mean, Mr. President?” I thought that he was going to open our conversation about the day, what nice weather we were having, or how many children I had and that sort of thing. He said, “I'm trying to change the electoral system. I'm trying to raise the threshold of votes needed to obtain a seat in the Knesset to cut down on the mess we have with this large number of small parties, which makes it hard to form coalitions. I think I've got Labor on board, but Likud is getting difficult again.” We immediately entered into a highly substantive and highly political discussion of that, among other issues.

I found subsequently that Israelis simply don't have time for small talk. They don't bother with small talk. You meet someone for the first time and you begin discussing tough economic and political issues, right away, which I rather enjoy. I think that most people do. It's just a national characteristic. I enjoyed my introduction to this, but it was surprising.

There was a little sense of distance with the Likud because, in part, they were disingenuous about the peace process. I think that the global, political circumstances had backed them into agreeing to become engaged in this whole peace discussion. They couldn't resist, when it was offered to them — direct, face to face negotiations with their Arab counterparts. But they were not serious about it, which I think in retrospect was reprehensible. Prime Minister Shamir actually made a statement which made clear, after he'd left office, that he was not really committed to this process. He was not wholeheartedly or frankly engaging in negotiations.The Likud criticism of the Bush-Baker administration I found offensive. In fact, I spoke publicly about it a number of times because I feel, to this day, that, if you strip away all the rhetoric, and all the pro-Israeli “sweet talk,” which is so common in our political system, no American administration has done more for Israel than the Bush-Baker administration. The Gulf War neutralized their primary adversary in the Middle East — Iraq. [The Bush administration] then went forward with this tremendous commitment to the peace process and was able to reach

[agreement] on real negotiations with Israel's adversaries, on Israeli terms. Lastly, the resource transfers to Israel grew during this administration, in part because of the Gulf War. Grant aid to Israel from the United States, you know, is about half of our aid to the entire world. It's more than half in terms of grant military aid — 53 percent. It's about 45 percent of our grant economic aid to the entire world. I'm not talking about Israel plus Egypt. I'm talking about Israel alone. Transfers like that were actually expanded in various, temporary ways under the Bush administration. I was offended when I encountered a common perception among both Israelis and the American Jewish leadership that the Bush administration was somehow hostile toward Israel. Nothing could have been farther from the truth. Q: To what do you attribute this?

HARROP: I attribute it to the lack of a kind of “touchy-feeley” style. There was a kind of pragmatic toughness, a rhetorical toughness within the [Bush] administration. Also, there was no great personal warmth. Actually, President Bush and Prime Minister Shamir really didn't like each other much, and did not easily communicate. It was a big problem. Then there were such things as the celebrated quotation of Secretary of State Baker, using four-letter words about “the Jews” in an American political context. This quotation may or may not have been accurate, but it's the kind of thing that politicians say privately. I think that the context was that someone had asked what the American Jewish reaction would be to this or that. Baker was quoted as having said, “F___ the Jews. They have never been for us anyway.” Whether he said it or not, this reported remark had nothing whatsoever to do with the policies of the [U.S.] Government toward Israel, which were, from any objective point of view, extremely favorable.

At any rate the negotiations were very difficult. I dealt a great deal with the members of the negotiating teams. The Israelis had to have several negotiating teams to handle this complex of negotiations [on preparations for the Middle East peace talks]. They were dealing separately with each of these negotiating sessions. All of the teams would come together, gradually focusing in Washington. It was all done in Washington after a time. They would have an Israeli group dealing with Lebanese and an Israeli group dealing

with Syrians. There was an Israeli group, a bifurcated, double group, dealing with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, which, in fact, was two delegations, and these were separate talks. So there were four separate negotiations going on at once, plus five different, multilateral, regional negotiations including most of the Arab countries. A total of 12 different Arab countries were involved. It was really a success to get them together. There were also the major world powers, the Europeans, Japanese, Chinese, and even some of the smaller powers. The Australians were involved. The Canadians took an active role, as did the Austrians and the Scandinavians. The negotiations concerned water, refugees, arms control, and economic development.

So there were the four, bilateral negotiations that I mentioned with the Syrians, Lebanese, Jordanians, and Palestinians, and then five of these large, multilateral, regional talks on the future of water and water availability for development, on the environment, on refugees — a very sensitive subject in the Middle East because of all of the Palestinians who left the territory — on the economic development of the region, and on security and arms control. These [negotiations] were all held separately — amazingly, in different cities around the world. Our tactic was to involve the world as much as possible in the whole thing. [As a result], we would have arms control and disarmament talks in Moscow; we would have refugee discussions in Canada; we would have the environment discussed in Tokyo; we would have economic development discussed in Paris; and so forth.

That kept everybody very busy and it kept the Israelis extraordinarily busy, because they had to mount delegations for this whole range of talks. They were a participant in every single one. They've done quite a phenomenal job of it. However, it also kept me and my staff very busy, trying to keep in contact, not only with the [Israeli] Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the senior policy makers, but also with all of these delegation heads who were men and women of parts themselves and took a major role in the policy questions. It was a very busy, political job to do all of that.

Q: There was an [Israeli] election about six months after you arrived in Israel.

HARROP: The election was held on June 23...

Q: 1992.

HARROP: 1992. It was a very hard-fought election. In retrospect, I think that historians will say that that election was decided back in March or April [1992], when the first political primary ever held by a party in Israel took place — in the Labor Party. Yitzhak Rabin won over his longtime rival, Shimon Peres, for leadership of the Labor Party. It was with Rabin that the Labor Party could win, because Israelis tend to be quite conservative on security matters. Although they may be interested, if you can generalize, in a peace process or negotiated peace, but they will resist anything which would appear even remotely to put their security at risk. In Rabin there was the combination of a man who had been a lifelong, professional military officer, who had been chief of staff [of the Israeli Defense Forces] during the Six-Day War in 1967, had been present at the liberation of [East] Jerusalem, was thought of as being a hard headed, tough, military man, but also was interested in land for peace and in negotiations. With someone in whom they could have confidence for the security of the nation at the helm, the [Israeli] people were able to vote for the peace process, which is what they did. They put Likud out of office, and made clear that the Israeli people wanted to have real negotiations.

At that time, the process had been going on for eight or nine months, since October, 1991, but it had not gone very far because of Likud's actual beliefs and policies. But now [after the elections] the process could begin to move more rapidly. That was a sea change in Israeli politics.

Q: Were they trying to drag you in — you, the American Embassy, and so forth?

HARROP: Into the campaign? Sure, it came up all the time, but we were able to avoid that pretty well. I think that any career Foreign Service Officer, any diplomat who's been around for a number of years during a political campaign is very sensitive to the importance of

trying to keep out. Israel is particularly difficult because [the Israelis] were determined to bring us into it. However, we were able to keep out. In fact, the situation was that each side was sort of campaigning against the United States. It was peculiar, but that happens from time to time, as you know. I think that the Embassy was able to emerge unscathed on the issue of partisanship.

Q: There were some other things going on at the time. Were you involved in the General Motors engine scandal, and all of that?

HARROP: The so-called Dotan Affair. Yes. I don't want to spend much time on this, but for the past seven years there has been about $1.8 billion of defense equipment procurement per year by Israel using American grant aid. Israel has purchased squadrons of American aircraft, patrol boats, and all kinds of military equipment in the United States. They have had — unique among the beneficiaries of American defense support — their own, very large purchasing office, with scores of people employed, in New York, which undertakes this procurement, rather than having the [U.S.] Department of Defense do it on their behalf. They do this rather skillfully. They are rather good at getting competitive bids from American manufacturers — the best price, the best goods, and so forth. From a military engineering point of view they are plain competing. They know what they want and what they need for their theater of war. The “Dotan Affair” refers to General Dotan, who was among those responsible for procurement. He was found to have diverted funds in a deal which included General Electric and other American companies. He was tried, convicted, and sent to jail in Israel. The whole story continued to unfold — particularly on the American side — after that, but there have been no indictments as yet in the United States. However, the Department of Justice [in the U.S.] was and is very much interested in pressing forward with prosecution in America. It wants some good, exemplary convictions in the United States to “nip off” this kind of thing.

There was a tremendous need to interview General Dotan and get from him the facts in a deposition which could be used in the American courts. The Israelis were very resistant

to allowing Dotan to be interviewed. It became a real “cause celebre.” We spent a lot of time on it, between Department of State and Department of Justice lawyers and the legal advisers of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministries in Israel, trying to work this thing out. It may have been concluded by now. Just as I left, four or five months ago, we'd finally reached an agreement on the nature of an interview which could take place.

I think that the Israelis exposed themselves to suspicion by resisting having Dotan interviewed. People from the United States, critics of Israel, could say, “Now, wait a minute, what are they trying to hide? Is there more here than meets the eye?” Others said, “Well, the Israeli reluctance is [based on the consideration that] they don't want to set a precedent for other powers interviewing [Israelis].” Others said, “Well, they [the Israelis] don't want Dotan to have an opportunity to try to involve people as high as he can, including then Minister of Defense Rabin in this matter. Dotan is a very bitter man, understandably. He's going to try to sour Israeli politics.” Anyway, it was rather complicated. It's not over yet.

The other big effect of the Dotan affair was to have many people in the American Congress look with a skeptical eye upon the existence of this [Israeli] purchasing agency [in New York]. Perhaps purchasing should be done by the Pentagon, in the same way as most other programs are handled. I don't know. The Israelis feel that they can do better by purchasing for themselves, than having the Pentagon do it for them. There is a cost to the [U.S.] taxpayer with all of the paperwork. Actually, there's a cost to the Israeli taxpayer as well, in a sense, since the huge costs of the Pentagon bureaucracy doing the purchasing for Israel is deducted from the grant. I think of this off and on but I don't believe it is a major or enduring issue.

Before we get into the Rabin administration, the more important thing of this nature, during my first six months [in Israel] were the allegations of diversion of American military technology, particularly to China and to other powers. The Israeli defense industry is a large, complex, and very effective structure. It is largely government-owned, part of the

parastatal system. The Israelis have an active military export program. This enables them to lower unit costs of their own equipment, the same as every other nation which exports [military equipment]. This is a major foreign exchange earner for them, and it is also a way for them to fund research and development, which would be more difficult to fund, [if they did not have] the economies of scale and have customers overseas to do the research for them. They are the world leaders in certain areas, such as night vision, and night flying equipment. In some other areas of electronics and avionics they are at the front of technology. In fact, when they purchase American aircraft, such as the F-15 and the F-16, they actually install their own, classified equipment — improvements, if you will — to make these aircraft more adaptable to their own image of what they need to be doing.

Anyway, the major allegation, which became very public indeed, was that the technology having to do with the famous “Patriot” missile, which had defended Tel Aviv and Haifa during the Gulf War, had been, in fact, “leaked” to China. China is a customer of Israel for defense equipment. This became a very serious matter. American intelligence [information] was sufficiently sobering on the subject that we asked for and obtained Israeli permission to send a special team to Israel to do a thorough investigation. This was done along in March or April, 1992. The result was publicly announced that evidence of diversion [of this technology] could not be found. Now, that did not mean that the intelligence information was refuted or brushed aside. There are many people who still feel that there is evidence of some problems in this area, possibly involving the “Patriot” and possibly involving other technology. That is a continuing chancre, a continuing boil that must be lanced. Many Israeli leaders who attach great importance to their relationship with the United States, and are very proud of their own integrity, are extremely bitter that they are suspected [in this connection]. They say, “Why in the world would we divert technology to China or North Korea, which is the charge, which could then be sold back to our enemies here in the Middle East?” They argue that this doesn't make sense.

Other people in the United States say that we have intelligence information which is just so “hard” that we cannot ignore these things. We know that the Israeli Government may

not always completely control the Israeli defense industry, the same way as we know from experience that our government does not always control the American defense industry, and leaks could happen, etc. And so it goes, on and on. Efforts are made to set up systematic reviews, cooperative investigations, or other such things which will put these problems to rest. They will never be entirely put to rest at a time when the world arms industry is in great trouble. Obviously, it's part of our domestic political agenda to deal with the problems which major employers like Lockheed, Boeing, and General Dynamics are having. The same thing, of course, is true in Israel. So pressures become more acute. The search for markets for arms is a big issue. That was and is a troublesome bilateral issue between Israel and the United States.

When the Rabin Government came into office, they made it very clear that they were determined to move ahead with the peace process. In fact, the Prime Minister announced that within nine months of taking office there would be a deal with the Palestinians. That proved an unwise kind of a statement to make because such announcements inevitably harden your negotiating partner into feeling, that if he stands fast, you are going to give up some of his own positions in order to meet your own deadline of nine months. This statement may even ensure a lack of cooperation from the Palestinian side. There were plenty of other reasons why Rabin was not going to give in to the Palestinians. The legitimacy of the Palestinian negotiating delegation was not a very solid one. They had not been elected or appointed by any real, recognized political force. They were always playing “catch up” and trying to sell themselves to their own constituencies in the Occupied Territories at the same time that they were trying to negotiate against more experienced, more skilled, and better informed Israeli negotiators.

It was a tough impasse, despite herculean efforts by Prime Minister Rabin and his team. They did step back from the “settlement policy,” although there is still some limited financing of settlements going on — I think more than the Labor Party should be involved in based on its own platform. They could be more forthright on that subject, although they have, by and large, cut back on support of settlements. [Former Housing Minister]

Sharon and his friends had made so many commitments and signed so many contracts before they left office. They explicitly and expressly left the maximum amount of ongoing construction in settlement activity. This presented the Labor and Meretz (a Leftist, “Peace Now” party which is the major partner of the government in Israel at the present time) with a great overhang of settlement activity to contend with.

Anyway, negotiations [with the Arabs] were not going anywhere up until this recent breakthrough in August, 1993, following negotiations in Norway. In August, 1992, I accompanied Prime Minister Rabin to Kennebunkport [ME], to spend a weekend with President Bush and Secretary Baker. On that occasion we had some, I would say, tough but friendly discussions. There was a sense of reestablishment of positive relations between the Israeli Government and the personalities in that government and the United States Government. There was also some very blunt talk about settlements and about what the actual policies were going to be. The end result was what was politically necessary to both sides. The Israeli side agreed to sharply reduce settlement activity, and the American side agreed to go ahead with the large loan guarantee program. This was done, with the proviso, which was very much desired by Senator Leahy as well, that there should be a deduction to reflect settlement construction. Up to $2.0 billion would be guaranteed each year for five years for a total of $10.0 billion. Each year there would be a close accounting made of what money had been spent the previous year on settlement activities. That amount would be deducted from the amount to be guaranteed in the following year.

At present, in November, 1993, this is a big, political issue in the Clinton administration, since we have deducted almost one-fourth, almost $470 million, from the $2.0 billion to be guaranteed in 1994. Our estimate is that that amount was spent by the Israeli government [on building settlements in the Occupied Territories] during the first year of the guarantee [1993].

Q: Because of money committed by the Likud government?

HARROP: Well, it is mostly because of that, but not entirely. These are complicated, political issues. Many people in the Labor Party also do not want entirely to abandon the notion of settlement construction [in the Occupied Territories]. However, more importantly, Labor has to retain its credibility with the public in security terms if it is going to be reelected. Israel is a very real democracy — no question about it. The relationship of the voter to the government is an ever-important element.

President Clinton, to my dismay, is now speaking about “forgiving” the $470 million or so and allowing it to be guaranteed, despite the fact that that amount of money was spent on settlements. I think that it would be a bad political mistake to do that. I think that the pressure should be kept firmly on the Israeli Government not to engage in settlements. I think that if we are going to have a durable peace in the Middle East, we must really have Israel honestly prepared to trade land for peace. Anyway, that's an issue that's being discussed at the moment.

Q: How did the American election of 1992 impact on Israel and your mission?

HARROP: Well, it impacted on Israel because Israel was a part of the American election. Just as the United States is part of Israeli elections, so Israel is part of American elections. Jews represent about two percent of the American population, or slightly more than five million Jews in this country. It's a matter of great debate and discussion — who is a Jew, as it is a question everywhere. More than most communities in America, the Jewish community votes and is involved politically. American Jews have normally voted for Democratic Party candidates. In the elections of 1992, because, I believe, of the totally misplaced perception that the Bush-Baker administration had not been a good administration for Israel, a crazy perception, in fact, it was clear that the Republicans were not going to do very well among Jewish voters. For that reason [the Republicans] were trying to do all that they could to improve that situation. In October, 1992, first the loan guarantee went through. One could argue, in some respects, that this was related to the American elections, but I think it would have gone through eventually. Then there were

other announcements of defense support for Israel, resource transfers, and so forth along in October, 1992. So to that extent Israeli issues were part of the American elections.

I think that Israelis, by and large, would have preferred to have Clinton win, because they have this notion that Democrats are more friendly to them. However, I think that they're mistaken. You have a lot of rhetoric from the Democratic Party side and you may have a little more money change hands, but pursuit of the peace process was not really an issue in the American election campaign. This was a national concern. Sympathy for Israel is really not an issue in American politics. It may be that we give $3.0-4.0 billion in support to Israel. We definitely give $3.0 billion and how much of the rest is taxpayer money is a matter for debate. The polls in this country have repeatedly shown that it is not just the five-plus million American Jews who favor that. A majority of the American people strongly supports the independence of a democratic Israel, and a two-thirds majority of Americans over and over again have approved of these very large resource transfers to Israel. So it's a national attitude. It's not a question in American politics, whether or not we're going to support Israel. We're going to support both the existence and independence of Israel and the peace process.

I think that there is a perception that the bilateral relationship has a greater influence on elections than, in fact, is the case.

Q: In the 1992 elections Clinton was elected. However, before he assumed office, were you feeling noises from the transition team that we have to do things differently?

HARROP: No, I don't think so. There was a great effort being made by the transition team to make clear that, in fact, our policies were not going to change, and particularly our dedication to the peace process and our attention to it. It was difficult for me to imagine that any Secretary of State could spend the proportion of his time on this particular issue that Secretary of State Baker had spent on it. It just seemed impossible for him to do that. For example, they made clear that they were going to keep Djerejian in office as Assistant

Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. They appointed Sam Lewis, a well-known Israel supporter, to be Director of Policy Planning [in the Department of State]. They appointed Martin Indyk, a former executive of AIPAC and director of AIPAC's offshoot, a think tank public policy foundation called the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, as the National Security Council's man for the Middle East. So it was clear that they were going to continue in the same direction. In fact, the first overseas trip which Secretary of State Christopher made was to Israel. His first stop was Israel. He made the usual circuit to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, and, for the first time, he even went to Lebanon, which was regarded as rather daring, from the security point of view. That was in March, 1993. No, there was no sense of change. At that time the Norway talks were not really getting anywhere...

Q: You're talking about talks between the...

HARROP: Palestinians and [officials of the] Israeli Foreign Ministry. Interestingly enough, it was the Foreign Ministry, because the rivalry between Peres as Foreign Minister and Rabin as Prime Minister has never stopped. This rivalry has come as near to stopping as it has in the past — right now — because Peres was the architect of this relationship with the PLO. Rabin saw that he had to go along with that — indeed, wanted to go along with that. Rabin did a complete reversal of his policy toward the PLO. He recognized the PLO. He made that move. I think that he saw that the only way he was going to get the peace process going was to do that, since without an interlocuteur valable, he wasn't going to be able to make progress. It was clear that, whatever you might think of the PLO, they were the nearest thing to a valid negotiating partner, particularly when it became increasingly apparent that Israel and the PLO had a number of common concerns.

Most of the Arab governments were concerned by the threat of the Islamic fundamentalists in the Middle East. Peres told me shortly before I left [the Embassy in Tel Aviv] at the beginning of May, 1993, that there were talks going on in Norway. We knew that, I guess, but he didn't give me the impression that he thought that they were going to “break

through" any more than had a series of other, secret meetings that had been arranged in various locations between Palestinians and Israelis. All of a sudden, during the summer of 1993 that meeting [in Norway] began to acquire substance. Both teams decided that they really were going to make progress, and that's the way it came out. Rabin had been through a difficult spell before that. The American Ambassador was forever calling in to plea for moderation in response to terrorist actions.

There always are incursions from Lebanon down into Israel in the form of Katusha rockets fired at Israeli towns. There are frequent armed attacks against Israeli forces by units of Hezbollah, the extremist Shiite Muslim fundamentalist group in southern Lebanon, which is supported and financed by Iran and operates with the quiet concurrence of the Syrian Government. Israel has occupied that five or eight mile wide security zone in Southern Lebanon to protect itself from these incursions. Whenever these rockets blast into Israel and kill Israelis in Kiryat Sh'mona and other towns in Northern Israel or, and this is a bit more questionable from an ethical point of view, when Israeli forces in the security zone are attacked by the Hezbollah, Israel tends to retaliate with great vigor. Then the American Ambassador finds himself preaching forbearance, trying to limit the retaliation. My colleague in Damascus [at the time], Ambassador Chris Ross, would go to the Syrians and say, "Please use what influence you can with the Hezbollah." I would speak to the Israelis to try to prevent all of this conflict from interfering with the peace process, which was in everybody's interest.

Then the most dramatic event of all, of course, was the second visit of Prime Minister Rabin to Washington. I was in Washington in March, 1993 — I guess Christopher's visit [to Israel] must have been in February, 1993. Rabin came to Washington in March. There were some particularly bloody murders of Israeli military and civilians in Israel proper by "Hamas," the extremist counterpart of Hezbollah in the Occupied Territories. Rabin cut short his visit, in fact, and went back to Israel because there was such public concern at home. At that time he closed off the Occupied Territories — sealing off the "Green Line," the border between Israel and both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. He did not allow

Palestinians who worked in Israel — about 70,000-80,000 in number — to come over to their jobs. That gave the Israeli public a sense of greater security, with fewer Palestinians present. Also, I think, this contributed to the peace process because many Israelis began to see that they could really live pretty well with that line closed off. They derived a certain encouragement from that.

There had also been the very dramatic deportation of 415 supposedly Hamas leaders in December 1992. They were selected with such speed that not all the right ones were chosen. In fact, some of them were released shortly afterwards because they were not involved with Hamas. The deportation was in retaliation for more Hamas killing of Israelis.

That led to the most difficult negotiation I had when I was in Israel, which was on behalf of Secretary of State Christopher. I met with Prime Minister Rabin seven times in five days. I made a note of this. I must write it up some time, since it was so interesting. [I met with Rabin] to negotiate a confidential agreement between the United States and Israel on how the Israelis would behave in regard to these deported Palestinians. This agreement made it possible for us to maintain our support for Israel in the United Nations, where deportation was a major issue because...

Q: It was on television, showing the plight of these people on a daily basis. You knew what they were doing.

HARROP: It was a very difficult negotiation and one which I was pleased with. I think that Prime Minister Rabin was also pleased, because we were able to reach an understanding which bridged a very real difference between the United States and Israel. Deportation under international law, is a very harsh and politically repugnant move. We were able to get by that. In fact, the last of these deportees will be returned [to Israel or the Occupied Territories] in a matter of a very few days. In December, 1993, the last ones will be sent back.

Q: How did you feel about the dynamics of the relationship between Clinton, the Clinton administration, and Christopher with the Israeli Government? Did you see a change between that and the Bush-Baker administration?

HARROP: Not very great, because they had made such a point of keeping people on. I think that it took a while for Christopher to develop confidence. The [Israelis] knew Baker awfully well. Not just the people in the Likud Party but also the Labor Party people. They met with Baker and knew him very well, understood what his thinking was, how his mind worked, and what he was trying to achieve. After January 1993 there was a certain disarray, as there always is when a new administration comes into office. Christopher is a dramatically different sort of person, reserved, seemingly closed. He is not warm, does not tell jokes, does not have that kind of human rapport which Baker established very quickly with [the Israelis]. I think that they were a little tentative [in their contacts with him]. On the other hand, I felt that in the Clinton administration they had people who would do almost anything for them, as had been repeatedly made clear. The new Administration was determined to be perceived as pro-Israeli and to make that the tenet of its policies.

The relationship picked up fairly quickly. Mr. Christopher had a successful visit to Israel in February, 1993. I guess that we had four meetings with Prime Minister Rabin, two of which were one-on-one meetings between Christopher and Rabin, and two — one a luncheon and one a larger meeting — all went pretty well.

Toward the end [of my tour in Israel] I was engaged in economic issues, because I felt it was so important that something be done about the liberalization of the Israeli economy. Investment was not going to be attracted to that economy unless they took further steps to deregulate foreign exchange and capital markets, to simplify licensing and labor regulations, to privatize the 4% of the economy still in Government or Labor Union hands. I had discussed these matters with the Israelis and, in fact, was able to persuade both Mr. Baker in August, 1992, and Mr. Christopher in February, 1993, during their visits while I was there, to raise the subject of privatization and liberalization of the

[Israeli] economy. It's one issue on which the American Congress has been ahead of the Executive Branch. Many of the Congressional leaders and even many of those who are the best friends of Israel are quite concerned about this matter. I tried to work on that with them, along with other Israeli leaders. The Israeli Government itself is interested in doing this, but the political obstacles in the Israeli system, as in any other — political obstacles to privatization and taking these measures — are very difficult. There are always vested interests howling to be heard when you make these changes.

In fact, the supposed reason why I was replaced [in Israel], and rather abruptly, was a speech that I gave in March, 1993, to the combined Rotary Clubs of Tel Aviv on the economy and economic reform in Israel. In this speech I stated, among other things, that in the course of recent visits to Israel, Senator Inouye and Senator Leahy had each stated that it was going to be difficult, given the end of the Cold War, given the American budgetary deficit, and the shrinkage of the American presence overseas generally, to maintain for very much longer the very high level of resource transfers to Israel. I mentioned their comments in passing as a further reason why there should be more attention paid to liberalizing the economy, so that growth could be maintained and more jobs created without dependence on American largesse to do it. American grant aid represented about 7-8% of the Israeli budget. I pointed out that, in my view, it was not prudent for any government to rely — even on its staunchest friend — for that proportion of its national budget.

These remarks brought a great cacophony of criticism and, I think, a somewhat hypocritical outburst in Washington, in the Congress and on the part of the press spokesman of the Department of State. I was removed very quickly but I think it was not really for that reason.

Q: What do you think was the reason?

HARROP: I think there was a perception that I was maybe a little too much of a player myself in the affair and that I spoke too much to people, to the press, and to others in Israel. I had not, perhaps — I guess the term is — “gone native” to quite the extent that some of my predecessors had in Israel. I was perhaps not seen by the [Clinton] administration as someone whose every automatic instinct was going to be to support Israel.

Q: Do you think that it was the gut reaction of a new administration on a very politically sensitive subject? I mean, on the political side rather than, you might say, the professional side?

HARROP: I don't really know. I was rather hurt, I must say, by the attitude of Secretary Christopher, whom I'd regarded as a friend. I'd worked with him. I was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa when he was last in the Department of State, and I'd worked quite closely with him on a number of human rights issues. I was hurt that he never spoke with me at all and never discussed with me why I was being withdrawn. There was no communication of any kind. I was informed that I was to leave very quickly by Peter Tarnoff, who also did not discuss the rationale...

Q: He'd just been through a somewhat bruising...

HARROP: He had the same sort of reaction to a public statement that I did, a few weeks later, although he survived his...

Q: But barely.

HARROP: But it was all right. My wife and I were prepared to [leave]. You know, it's not unusual in a country of that sensitivity for a new Administration to want to have a change. So now they will send [Edward] Djerejian, the Assistant Secretary [for Near East Affairs] to Israel as Ambassador.

Q: I'm sure that one goes through a certain amount of introspection and thinking about this. Did any of this come from the Israeli side?

HARROP: I do not believe so. I do not believe that it came from the Israeli side, and I do not believe that it came from the American Jewish community. I'm fairly confident of the latter. I had confidence in these people, I think that they had confidence in me, and I don't believe that that was the case. On the Israeli side I know that my friend, the Governor of the Central Bank, a little bit before this, had mentioned when he was in Washington that he hoped that I would not press too urgently for privatization of the banks, though he and I had, in fact, been coordinating closely on economic reform. He wanted to delay privatization of certain banks for technical reasons related to changing their structure. Whether a comment of that sort had an effect, I don't know. I'm sure that he did not mean it to have the effect of hurrying my departure.

I don't believe that it was from the Israeli side. It was from the [Clinton] administration itself. I think that it was [Secretary of State] Christopher. It was people right around him — very likely, Dennis Ross, who had no particular affection for me. What others? I won't mention other names. I don't know who it was, or to what extent it was “ad hominem.” I'll probably never know exactly what happened.

Q: What was your reaction after getting this [order of recall]? One knows that things have changed, but to leave sort of under fire leaves the impression...

HARROP: It was a little difficult, and I've had a difficult summer. I haven't gone back and really engaged in things at the Department of State. It seemed to me that after 39 years of service in this system and rising to the top of it — I guess I was the fourth most senior Foreign Service Officer in the government when I retired in May, 1993. I was the most senior Career Minister. You know, I was hurt by it. I was hurt particularly by the fact, the rather pointed fact, that the administration recalled from retirement and sent back as a temporary “fill in” the officer who had been my immediate predecessor, Bill Brown. But

that also, I think, made a point regarding the nature of their concern, since Bill Brown was seen as just a 100 percent, pro-Israeli figure. He's almost, really — he left Israel to state publicly that he thought that we should not combine humanitarian and political issues over the loan guarantees, at the time that the government was still doing that strongly. He's a member of boards of directors of Israeli banks, he's the Chairman of the Truman Institute of the Hebrew University, and he is thoroughly pro-Israeli and very concerned about Israel. I think that, maybe, that was a point that they wanted to make. They wanted someone who just did not have any reserves at all about total, even uncritical American support for Israel.

I think that it was probably known that I had certain reserves, as I did, about the advisability of our continuing current high levels of grant economic aid — not the security assistance, which is essential to reassure the Israeli public that they can take some chances in the peace process. But I think that at a time when we cannot afford essential programs at home, and cannot give any aid to poor peoples we'd like to help around the world, it is difficult to justify allocating over one half of all our aid grants to a relatively prosperous country with a growth rate — at this time — three times our own. I don't think that it is any secret that I had doubts about our continuing the $1.2 billion of grant economic aid, among other reasons because I think that it is not in Israel's own interest. It is used as a cushion which saves them from taking the hard decisions to reform their own economy, improve their economic circumstances, and attract investment.

Q: One can understand the political side — making this type of decision. Fair enough, we're all creatures of this. But you have been very much concerned with the professionalism of the Foreign Service, in a whole series of capacities. It sounds as if you know that you should have stayed on in the Service — but the reaction of what you might call the professional part of the Department was, “Well, you're out and Sayonara.”

HARROP: You know, the Department of State and the Foreign Service have never known how to treat their senior people. I remember, 20 years ago, that a dear, respected friend of mine, H. Freeman Matthews, Sr. — “Doc” Matthews — was retiring after being the

first Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and on the first list ever promoted to Career Ambassador. I met him in the Department. I saw him in that second corridor on the “C” Street side, where the Personnel area, the Foreign Service Lounge, the Leave and Retirement Office, and Accounts are located. He was walking around all alone, a little dazed. I said, “Ambassador Matthews, how are you? What are you doing?” He answered, “Well, I'm trying to retire. I'm going around here. I've got to find a Mrs. So-and-so. What is 'PT4L2'? I've got all these papers to sign, and I don't know where to take them.” He was wandering about. No one was helping him, no one was advising him.

I had so much that same sense at the end of May, 1993, when I returned from Tel Aviv to Washington, a feeling of deja vu from the time I ran into Doc Matthews. You know, you're just another nameless bureaucrat as you leave the Foreign Service. You walk around, trying to calculate what your annuity is supposed to be and sign the right papers. I had to go out and buy my own passport photographs for something — I've forgotten what it was. Anyway, the whole thing was a sense of not really being much of a respected part of an institution which, you felt, had been your whole life for 40 years. It's an interesting phenomenon. I think that many people feel this. I don't think that I'm about to attend the semi-annual retirement party that Warren Christopher gives for retired Foreign Service Officers. He did not have the grace to tell me why he was retiring me. I feel — I would not say bitterness — but disappointment.

Q: I think that, unfortunately, in a way this is what this whole oral history project is about, among other things. I think that there are recollections of careers which are worth preserving, there are lessons to be learned, there is respect which is due...

HARROP: Well, who can talk about “I want respect”? That sounds like the comedian [Rodney Dangerfield] who says, “I don't get no respect.” It is a poignant moment in a man's life to end a 40-year career. You just feel completely isolated, alone, and rather forlorn, walking around and slipping away. You hand in your identity card and slip out the side

door for the last time you'll be in the Department. It's a rather difficult experience, which everyone must go through.

Q: Well, it's a difficult experience, and we don't do it well. I've watched the military. I've been to retirement ceremonies.

HARROP: It's a very different style altogether in the armed forces.

Q: Well, I want to thank you very much.

HARROP: Good. Thank you.

End of interview